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Introduction
The literature on this topic [resemblance] (and there is an in-
teresting and important literature) generally maintains, quite
correctly I believe, that there are two main sorts of resemblance.
First, there is the resemblance of particulars. This is not a par-
ticularly taxing topic [. . . ]. But, second, there is the resemblance
of universals. (Armstrong 1978b, 95)
The topic of this study is the resemblance of particulars, or as I prefer to call
them, individuals. The underlying contention of this dissertation is, contra
Armstrong, that the resemblance of individuals is a taxing and challenging
philosophical topic.
There are two main claims that are defended in this study which should
suffice to show that resemblance demands some efforts from philosophers.
The first of these claims is that resemblance is not a binary relation but
a monadic multigrade property. The second of these claims is that the
metaphysics of resemblance and the metaphysics of properties are distinct,
although not independent, philosophical issues.
That resemblance is not binary but a monadic multigrade property
makes resemblance taxing in at least two ways. First, resemblance is tradi-
tionally conceived of as a binary relation and on my account this traditional
view is wrong. Second, a metaphysical account of multigrade properties is
in itself a challenging issue.
That the metaphysics of resemblance and the metaphysics of properties
are distinct is motivated by the fact that an answer to the central ques-
tion of the metaphysics of resemblance, which I identify as the question of
whether the resemblance facts are context-relative, is not determined by
any positioning on the central debate in the metaphysics of properties: the
debate between the realist and the nominalist. Authors engaged in the real-
ist/nominalist debate often address the central question of the metaphysics
of resemblance in few words as their interest in resemblance is usually no
more than an epiphenomenom of their interest in properties. It is one goal
of this study to convince the reader that the central question of the meta-
physics of resemblance needs to be addressed with more depth, and that
addressing this question is challenging.
9
10 Introduction
The layout of the dissertation is as follows. Chapter 1 is an introductory
chapter which provides a surface analysis of resemblance. I discriminate dif-
ferent notions of resemblance and difference that I call minimal, overall, and
exact. I next distinguish two big pictures of resemblance that I call Egali-
tarianism and Inegalitarianism. According to Egalitarianism, the sharing of
any abundant property is sufficient for minimal resemblance, where abundant
properties of individuals are thought of as sets of n-tuples of individuals. Ac-
cording to Inegalitarianism, only a selected minority of properties, which I
call elected properties, is linked with resemblance, and while the sharing of
an elected property is sufficient for minimal resemblance, the sharing of a
merely abundant property is not sufficient for minimal resemblance. I ar-
gue that Egalitarianism is a non-starter. Once we assume Inegalitarianism,
two families of views about elected properties can be distinguished. Ac-
cording to the first family of views, that I call vegetarian, which properties
are elected is a mind-dependent matter. According to the second family of
views, that I call carnivorous, which properties are elected is an objective,
mind-independent matter. I do not commit myself in favour of either family
of views of elected properties at the end of this chapter.
The topic of chapter 2 is the arity of resemblance properties. I first
distinguish the arity from the adicity of properties. The arity of a property
is determined by the number of entities of or between which the property can
hold. The adicity of a property is determined by the groupings the property
imposes on the entities of or between which it can hold. The traditional
view of resemblance, that I call the binarist view, is that resemblance is
binary, and more precisely that resemblance can hold of either one or two
individuals, but no more than two. I shall argue that the view is ill-grounded
and defend the opposite view of resemblance, called the collectivist view,
according to which resemblance can hold between more than two individuals.
The argument runs as follows. I argue in section 2.3 that since resem-
blance can truly be ascribed to more than two individuals, binarists about
resemblance must provide an account of ascriptions of resemblance to more
than two individuals, which I call collective ascriptions of resemblance. In
section 2.4 I discuss a proposed analysis of collective ascriptions of resem-
blance in terms of a binary resemblance property and argue that imperfect
communities show that the proposed analysis fails. The discussion of the in-
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determinacy of plural predications of resemblance in section 2.5 establishes
why it fails.
I then discuss, in section 2.6, a satisfactory account of ascriptions of re-
semblance to more than two individuals in terms of resemblance between
at most two individuals and resemblance in some respect. I argue that in-
stead of legitimating the binarist view of resemblance the latter account of
collective ascriptions of resemblance legitimates the collectivist view. In the
process of the argument I examine how metaphysics of properties account
for resemblance and resemblance in some respect. Section 2.7 focuses on the
debate between the collectivist and the binarist within Resemblance Nomi-
nalism. Resemblance can hold between indeterminately many individuals. If
so, resemblance is multigrade. In the last section of the chapter I undermine
strategies to avoid the consequence that resemblance is multigrade.
Chapter 3 deals with the adicity of non-comparative and comparative
resemblance. In section 3.1 I argue that non-comparative resemblance is
monadic. Since my argument relies on the assumption that the transitive
form of the resemblance verb is symmetrical, I shall undermine objections
against this assumption in section 3.2. In section 3.3 I consider comparative
resemblance. The standard logic for comparative resemblance suggests that
comparative resemblance is a tetradic relation holding between at most four
entities. I argue that comparative resemblance is not a tetradic property but
a dyadic and multigrade property. In the final section of chapter 3 I account
for monadic and dyadic multigrade properties in a set-theoretic framework.
Chapter 4 comes back to the relationship between resemblance and re-
semblance in some respect introduced in chapter 2. I first argue that resem-
blance in some respect is a disjunctive notion: we can resemble with respect
to properties, parts, or possessions. From the consideration of the disjunc-
tiveness of resemblance in some respect I argue that respects of resemblance
are not determinable properties but similarity orderings of properties, parts,
or possessions. Leaving aside resemblances with respect to parts or posses-
sions I use the preceding results to refine the surface analyses of resemblance
proposed in chapter 1. I distinguish strong minimal resemblance from weak
minimal resemblance. Having a common elected property is necessary and
sufficient for individuals to strongly minimally resemble each other. Hav-
ing resembling elected properties is necessary and sufficient for individuals
to weakly minimally resemble each other. Likewise, I distinguish strong
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minimal difference from weak minimal difference. I then argue that exact
difference is the dual of weak minimal resemblance and exact resemblance
is the dual of weak minimal difference.
In chapter 5 I introduce a formal language for resemblance which allows
me to restate formally definitions and principles about resemblance and
difference that I introduced and defended in previous chapters. This formal
language is a plural language. Further principles about non-comparative
resemblance and difference are also introduced in this formal chapter.
The context-relativity of our resemblance judgements is the topic of
chapter 6. The characteristic of context-relative judgements is that subjects
can disagree in their judgements without committing any fault. The aim
of the chapter is to account for the conditions under which a disagreement
between resemblance judgements is faultless.
In section 6.1 I review the various ways in which our resemblance judge-
ments can vary with the context. In section 6.2 I appeal to entities that I
call representational perspectives and that are designed to comprise all the
contextual features that can make resemblance judgements vary with the
context. I then interpret the claim that our resemblance judgements are
context-relative as the claim that they are relative to the representational
perspective of agents when comparing objects relative to their resemblance.
In section 6.3 I state the conditions under which a disagreement between
resemblance judgements would be faultless. Roughly, subjects disagree in
their resemblance judgements without committing any fault when they are
warranted, relative to their representational perspective and true beliefs for
which there is no defeater, in judging as they do about the resemblance
of objects. If subjects can disagree in this way, their disagreement must
be explained by a difference in their representational perspectives, and so
resemblance judgements are relative to a representational perspective.
Whether the resemblance facts are also relative to a representational
perspective is the topic of chapter 7. There I call Anti-Resemblism the view
according to which the resemblance of individuals is relative to a represen-
tational perspective. Resemblism on the other hand is the view according to
which the resemblance of individuals is a mind-indepedent matter. I think of
the resemblist vs. anti-resemblist debate as the central debate of the meta-
physics of resemblance. I show in chapter 7 that a positioning in this debate
is not determined by any positioning in the realist vs. nominalist debate. If
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the latter debate is the central debate in the metaphysics of properties, the
main issue of the metaphysics of resemblance is not the main issue of the
metaphysics of properties.
Section 7.1 introduces the debate. Anti-Resemblism is presented in sec-
tion 7.2. Anti-Resemblism can take at least three forms that I call contextual-
ist, propositional, and factual : according to Contextualist Anti-Resemblism,
it is the content of resemblance judgements that is relative to a represen-
tational perspective; according to Propositional Anti-Resemblism, it is the
truth of the content of resemblance judgements that is relative to a represen-
tational perspective; according to Factual Anti-Resemblism, it is the world
at which we evaluate the truth of ascriptions of resemblance that can vary
with the representational perspective. I argue for the superiority of Factual
Anti-Resemblism. Then I introduce candidate anti-resemblist truthmaker
analyses for ascriptions of resemblance. The candidate truthmaker analyses
all entail a vegetarian conception of elected properties, and I argue that the
anti-resemblist truthmaker analyses can be nominalist as well as realist.
Section 7.3 is concerned with the presentation of Resemblism. Resem-
blism follows from the carnivorous interpretation of ‘elected properties’ as
being sparse properties. Understood in this way elected properties consti-
tute an elite class of properties objectively designed to be the properties that
are linked with resemblance. I offer resemblist truth conditions for ascrip-
tions of resemblance and then say what the candidate resemblist truthmaker
analyses for ascriptions of resemblance are.
In chapter 8, I argue in favour of Anti-Resemblism. There are three main
reasons why I defend Anti-Resemblism. First, I think that a metaphysics of
resemblance should provide an explanation of the context-sensitivity of our
resemblance judgements and I argue that Anti-Resemblism is the only meta-
physics of resemblance that succeeds in doing so. Second, Anti-Resemblism
allied with Nominalism is the most powerful project of metaphysics of re-
semblance in terms of explanatory power and avoidance of ad hoc ontology.
Finally, I argue against an objective realm of sparse properties and rebut
objections against Anti-Resemblism.
Do anti-resemblists have to solve the Problem of Universals? In the
first section of chapter 9 I argue that they do if the Problem of Universals
is the demand for a truthmaker analysis of ascriptions of elected proper-
ties to individuals. The difference between the resemblist and the anti-
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resemblist on this issue is that the resemblist truthmakers are all part of the
mind-independent world, while the anti-resemblist ones are partly mind-
dependent. The rest of the chapter is therefore devoted to the discussion
of an anti-resemblist solution to the Problem of Universals which is a form
of Resemblance Nominalism and that I call Vegetarian Resemblance Nomi-
nalism. As I explain at the beginning of the chapter, I neither endorse nor
reject the view. What I endorse is Anti-Resemblist Nominalism and the
reason why I focus on the vegetarian resemblance nominalist solution to the
Problem of Universals is only that resemblance is part of the solution.
The discussed anti-resemblist version of Resemblance Nominalism is in-
spired by a resemblist version of the view that has been proposed and dis-
missed by Lewis. I shall argue that Lewis’s worries fall down in the anti-
resemblist context. I next discuss the classical difficulties to Resemblance
Nominalism and show how the proposal allows us to solve these difficulties.
The final section of the chapter is devoted to the Coextension Difficulty. I
argue there that the nominalist need not commit herself to Lewis’s Modal
Realism – thus to the concrete existence of non-actual possibilia – to solve
the difficulty. The nominalist can, or so I argue, maintain that coexten-
sive properties are identical and explain why we falsely believe them to be
distinct. Resemblance, again, is part of the explanation.
Beyond the metaphysical issue, there is also the logic of resemblance.
The appendix of this dissertation introduces a plural logic for comparative
resemblance which represents comparative resemblance statements by means
of a primitive dyadic comparative resemblance predicate. This logic is more
expressive than the standard logic for comparative similarity for the reasons
exposed in chapter 3. The content of the last section of the appendix to-
gether with the content of chapter 5 provide, for the first time, a logic for
non-comparative resemblance.
On the next page a tree represents the main positions that are discussed
in this dissertation. Labels of defended views are in bold type.
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Figure 1: Metaphysics of resemblance.
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Chapter 1
Superficial Analyses
1.1 Notions of resemblance
Analyses of resemblance typically take the form of an analysis of a relation
holding between at most two things. However, this is a simplification. Re-
semblance can be truly ascribed to more than two things and this triviality,
when taken seriously, leads to the result that resemblance is not a binary
relation, as I will argue in chapter 2. Since I do not believe that resemblance
is a relation between at most two things, the left-hand sides of the proposed
conceptual analyses will all have a similar, perhaps unusual, form: “the As
resemble each other iff . . . ”; where ‘the As’ is an arbitrary plural name de-
noting one or more individuals (if it denotes anything). Thus, the way ‘the
As’ refers is the same as expressions like ‘the Beatles’, ‘the Montagues’, ‘the
Capulets’, etc. However, the proposed analyses do not incur commitment
to the view that resemblance is not binary. The reader who believes that
resemblance holds between at most two individuals can simply take ‘the As’
as denoting at most two individuals.
I will distinguish between three kinds of resemblance and difference in
this section. The proposed analyses are intended as the least substantive,
least informative, and least controversial analyses of resemblance. I shall
commit myself to each of the proposed analyses. Also, it should be noticed
that despite the fact that some authors distinguish between resemblance on
17
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the one hand, and similarity on the other hand, for some ad hoc reason,1 I
will use the two expressions as synonyms.
There exist various notions of resemblance in the literature. The most
central one, the notion of resemblance I will mainly focus on, is what I call,
following Taylor (2004, 246), minimal resemblance:
(MR) The As minimally resemble each other iff there is some resemblance
between the As.
(MR) of course is not intended as providing a reductive definition of mini-
mal resemblance but only as providing an understanding of what minimal
resemblance is. But which understanding? (MR) is not very informative as
it analyses a class of predications of resemblance in terms of resemblance.
Moreover, (MR) is actually ambiguous for there are distinct notions of min-
imal resemblance.2 Though it is uninteresting and ambiguous, (MR) gives
enough information regarding my present purposes since (MR) is not an
account of any notion of resemblance but of a specific kind of resemblance:
that kind of resemblance such that a minimal amount of resemblance be-
tween some objects is necessary and sufficient to satisfy it.
Parallel to the notion of minimal resemblance, there is the notion of
minimal difference:3
(MD) The As are minimally different from each other iff there is some
difference between them.
1See e.g. (Buras 2006). In Buras’s paper resemblance and similarity are more or less
the same thing. The only difference is that resemblance is primitive and similarity defined
in terms of natural properties which are themselves defined in terms of resemblance.
2Cf. chapter 4.
3‘Difference’ is an ambiguous term. Sometimes it is used to mean distinctness, some-
times it is used to mean dissimilarity. Philosophers are used to distinguish between these
two meanings by making use of the expressions ‘numerical difference’ and ‘qualitative dif-
ference’. Here are some examples from The Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary, where
‘difference’ clearly does not mean distinctness: “She noticed a marked difference in the
children on her second visit”; “I can never tell the difference between the twins”. In these
examples, the distinctness is marked by the use of the plural, not by the use of the word
‘difference’. The way I use ‘difference’ in this study is the way it is used in these exam-
ples. ‘Difference’ in this sense is to ‘resemblance’ what ‘dissimilarity’ is to ‘similarity’.
Therefore, I will mean by ‘difference’ what I mean by ‘dissimilarity’ and will only use
‘distinctness’ to mean distinctness.
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“The As minimally resemble each other” and “the As minimally differ from
each other” are subcontraries that are not contraries, and thus not contra-
dictories. For the proposition that there is a resemblance between some
things does not entail that there is no difference between these things, but
if there is no difference between some things, then there is a resemblance
between them. Likewise, that there is a difference between some things does
not imply that there is no resemblance between them, but if there is no
resemblance between some things, then there is a difference between them.
Some things can, and this is actually the usual case, be both minimally
similar and minimally dissimilar from each other.
As I understand it, it is not minimal resemblance which is expressed
by the resemblance predicate in Grandma’s judgement that “Your son re-
sembles you.” Grandma certainly does not intend to say that there is some
resemblance between my child and I because I take Grandma as intending
to transmit some information by performing her judgement. Yet it is triv-
ially the case that there is some resemblance between a child and his father.
Perhaps, the conversational implicature of Grandma’s judgement is that my
son resembles me more than he resembles his mother. But Grandma may
sincerely judge that the child resembles me even if she is not acquainted with
his mother. What, according to me, Grandma literally means in this case is
that the child and I resemble each other saliently more than is typical.
Typical for what? The expression ‘saliently more than is typical’ is
vague. What I mean when saying that some individuals resemble each other
saliently more than is typical is that they resemble each other saliently,
remarkably, more than the relevant standard for resemblance. What is the
relevant standard in Grandma’s judgement? Presumably, it is a standard in-
ductively derived from Grandma’s long experience of resemblances between
children and parents.
Let me reserve the label overall resemblance for the kind of resemblance
involved in Grandma’s judgement and call overall difference the parallel
notion of difference.
(OR) The As resemble overall iff there is saliently more resemblance be-
tween them than is typical.
(OD) The As differ overall iff there is saliently more difference between
them than is typical.
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Overall resemblance has the following features: (i) relative to a fixed standard
for typicality, if some things resemble overall, then these things do not differ
overall and vice versa;4 overall resemblance and difference are thus contrary
notions. (ii) The analysans of overall resemblance contains a notion of com-
parative resemblance we will have to account for. (iii) It is possible for some
things to be neither similar nor dissimilar overall; i.e. to be such that they
are neither saliently more similar than is typical nor saliently more dissimi-
lar than is typical. Overall resemblance and overall difference, therefore, are
not subcontrary notions and thus not contradictory notions. (iv) Intuitively,
for there to be saliently more resemblance between some things than is typ-
ical, it is required that there is a resemblance between these things; that is,
overall resemblance entails minimal resemblance. Likewise, for there to be
saliently more difference between some things than is typical, there must be
a difference between these things; that is, overall difference entails minimal
difference.
It shall be noted that ‘overall resemblance’ does not have a determinate
meaning in the literature. For instance, Rodriguez-Pereyra (2002) uses the
expression ‘overall resemblance’ to refer to his primitive resemblance relation
which, according to my terminology, is more akin to minimal resemblance
than to what I call ‘overall resemblance’. In Rodriguez-Pereyra’s work ‘over-
all resemblance’ is primarily used to emphasise that his primitive is not a
relation of resemblance in some respect ; i.e. ‘overall’ is opposed to ‘in some
respect’. Buras (2006, 36) uses the expression ‘overall perfectly natural sim-
ilarity’ to refer to the maximal degree of resemblance in perfectly natural
respects. In the psychological literature ‘overall similarity’ is often used to
mean similarity with respect to holistic properties, or superficial properties
(e.g. in Medin et al. 1993).
4In other words, the standard for typicality being fixed, if some things resemble each
other saliently more than is typical, they do not differ saliently more from each other than
is typical, and vice versa. If the standard for typicality is not kept fixed, then some things
can resemblance overall and differ overall on one occasion. Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra
gave me the following example. Imagine that two identical twins are such that one acts like
Mother Teresa and the other like Bernie Madoff. Somehow they resemble saliently more
than is typical and somehow they differ saliently more than is typical. But the standard
for typicality is not the same in both judgements. We agree that the twins resemble
overall relative to a standard for typicality of physical resemblance between human beings.
And we agree that the twins differ overall relative to a standard for typicality of moral
resemblance between moral agents.
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These various uses of ‘overall resemblance’ are valuable technical uses
but my intention when using the phrase ‘overall resemblance’ is precisely
not to mean anything technical but what we in general, and Grandma in
particular, mean when we make resemblance judgements such as “the baby
resembles you”, “the plot of The 6th Sense resembles that of The Carnival
of Souls”, “dogs and wolves resemble each other”. And I am inclined to
think that the application of the resemblance predicate in such judgements
parallels the application of predicates such as ‘tall’ and ‘rich’ in natural
language: ‘tall’ is correctly applied to something when this thing is saliently
taller than typical relative to the relevant standard; ‘rich’ is correctly applied
to someone when this person is saliently richer than typical relative to the
relevant standard (Fara 2000).
There is a third important notion of resemblance, called exact resem-
blance, which is to be distinguished from minimal and overall resemblance,
and that I superficially analyse as:
(ER) The As resemble exactly iff there is no difference between them.
Parallel to the notion of exact resemblance, there is the notion of exact
difference:
(ED) The As are exactly different iff there is no resemblance between them.
If (ER) is correct, exact resemblance and minimal difference are contra-
dictory notions; and if (ED) is right, then exact difference and minimal
resemblance are contradictory notions.
Therefore, minimal resemblance is some amount of resemblance, overall
resemblance is a saliently greater amount of resemblance than is typical
and exact resemblance is the maximal amount of resemblance in that it
is absence of difference. Likewise, minimal difference is some amount of
difference, overall difference is a saliently greater amount of difference than
is typical and exact difference is the maximal amount of difference.
Overall resemblance and exact resemblance both entail minimal resem-
blance and we can think of minimal resemblance as the primitive notion
of resemblance in this sense that every amount of resemblance requires a
minimal amount of it. This is the reason why I will pay most attention
to minimal resemblance. Likewise, overall difference and exact difference
both entail minimal difference and we may think of minimal difference as
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the primitive notion of difference in that every amount of different requires
a minimal amount of difference.
In this work I will often use the term ‘resemblance’ as a generic and um-
brella term subsuming the notions of minimal, overall, exact resemblance
and other notions of resemblance, and will use the term ‘difference’ as a
generic term for the many notions of difference. Likewise, I will mainly
use the term ‘resemblance property’ to refer indeterminately to properties
of minimal, overall, and exact resemblance. Strictly speaking, there is no
single resemblance property but many different ones standing in some log-
ical relations with each other5. The same remark applies for the phrases
‘difference property’, ‘resemblance predicate’, and ‘difference predicate’.
Importantly, there are more notions of resemblance and difference than
those analysed here in natural language. I could have provided an anal-
ysis of what it means for some things to be very similar, fairly similar,
somewhat similar, etc. My focus on the notions of minimal, overall and
exact resemblance, and also comparative resemblance which will be intro-
duced in chapter 3, is merely methodological. Introducing more notions of
resemblance would have made this study more confusing. Restricting my
attention to the above notions of resemblance is also motivated by the fact
that these are the notions which are central in the philosophical literature
and in particular in philosophical applications of resemblance.
If it is true that there is no controversy regarding the correctness of
the proposed surface analyses, with the possible exception of overall resem-
blance, this absence of controversy is due to the lack of information trans-
mitted by these accounts. Resemblance becomes of philosophical interest
when we begin to wonder about the following:
1. What are the conditions for there to be a resemblance between indi-
viduals?
2. What is it for some individuals to resemble each other more than is
typical?
3. What makes it true that some individuals resemble each other, if they
do?
This study provides answers to these questions. In the following section I
discuss a superficial and incomplete answer to the first of them.
5These logical relations are exhibited in chapter 5.
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1.2 Egalitarianism
Let us begin with what resemblance certainly is not. Any competent speaker
of English can notice that resemblance has to do with having something in
common; that if Sam says “There is a resemblance between Jack and Jim”
and Mary asks him “What do you mean?”, Sam is likely to reformulate his
claim as “I mean they have something in common”. Traditionally, prop-
erties are the entities which play the role of these things individuals can
have in common and such that commonality of them can justify a resem-
blance judgement between individuals. Assume then that for there to be
a resemblance between individuals it is necessary and sufficient that these
individuals share a property.
There is a venerable account of properties following which, (i) any set
of individuals is a property, and (ii) what it means for some individuals to
have a property in common is for them to be co-members of a set.6
If one agrees with (MR), agrees that commonality of property is neces-
sary and sufficient for there to be a resemblance between some individuals,
and that commonality of property is co-membership in some set, then we
get the following analysis of minimal resemblance:
Egalitarianism: The As minimally resemble each other iff there is a set of
which all the As are members.7
Since no matter which individuals we take, and no matter how many they
are, there is a set of which all these individuals are members, it follows from
the latter analysis that no matter what some individuals, the As, are, the
As minimally resemble each other.8
Egalitarianism makes minimal resemblance universal and trivial as it
results from the view that no individuals can fail to resemble minimally. We
do not need to look at the world, given Egalitarianism, to determine whether
6See e.g. (Goodman 1970).
7The terminology ‘Egalitarianism’ and ‘Inegalitarianism’ used in this and the following
section is the one used by Lewis in (Lewis 1986d, 53-4). Rodriguez-Pereyra (2002, 124-
41) uses the term ‘Egalitarianism’ in another way to refer to a view about the structure
of property classes, and Hirsch (1993) uses the distinction between ‘Egalitarianism’ and
‘Inegalitarianism’ to refer to two views about properties, Inegalitarianism being the view
that some properties are natural.
8The expression ‘no matter what some individuals are’ is the natural language trans-
lation of universal quantification over plurals proposed by Boolos (1998a).
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things resemble or not, we can do it from our armchair, since we know a
priori that they all do. Also, Egalitarianism makes exact resemblance and
exact difference between distinct individuals trivially impossible.
A further source of dissatisfaction with Egalitarianism concerns compar-
ative resemblance. Let us focus on resemblances holding between at most
two things, for the sake of simplicity. Given set theory and the premises
leading to Egalitarianism, it is clear that the number of properties shared
by any two individuals is exactly the same as the number of properties shared
by any two other individuals, and that the number of properties unshared
by two individual is exactly the same as the number of properties unshared
by any two other individuals.9 Any two things, be they two cats or a moun-
tain and a screwdriver, are alike and unlike in equally many respects. “If
so”, as Lewis contends, “then there’s little to be said about comparative
similarity” (Lewis 1986d, 53). And so there is little to be said about overall
resemblance, which involves a comparison to a standard for similarity. If a
minimal resemblance is an amount of resemblance, there seems to be no way
in which the amount of resemblance between some individuals can exceed
that of other individuals given Egalitarianism.
Egalitarianism contradicts the way we think and judge about the re-
semblance of individuals. We undeniably make judgements of comparative
resemblance and these judgements certainly play an important role in our
classificatory and inductive practices. When judging that some individuals
resemble each other more than some other individuals do, we aim to trans-
mit some information. Such a judgement may be false of course, but not
trivially false.
Moreover, if Egalitarianism were true, resemblance could not be used in
philosophy as it is actually used. Resemblance is the basis of the Stalnaker-
Lewis resemblance-based semantics for counterfactuals (Lewis 1973), it gives
to counterpart theory its flexibility (Lewis 1968), and is the most primitive
and fundamental tie between individuals according to Resemblance Nomi-
nalism (Rodriguez-Pereyra 2002). Resemblance has many virtues that make
it useful in philosophy, but it wouldn’t have these virtues, if Egalitarianism
were true.
9Cf. the seventh stricture of (Goodman 1970).
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As a matter of fact, some individuals resemble each other and other
individuals do not. If resemblance is to be taken seriously, we have to
acknowledge that Egalitarianism is false, that resemblance is inegalitarian.
1.3 Inegalitarianism
An approach to resemblance which is not egalitarian is inegalitarian. Ine-
galitarianism is a common-sense view of resemblance. It is the view that
there are individuals that do resemble each other and individuals that do
not resemble each other. The lesson of the previous section is that, on
the assumption that the proposed surface analyses are correct, one cannot
maintain this common-sense truth about resemblance if co-instantiation of
a property is both necessary and sufficient for there to be a minimal resem-
blance between individuals and if any set of individuals is a property.
In this study I shall admit that there is a legitimate sense of ‘property’
according to which properties are abundant, and I will always use the word
‘property’ without qualification in this sense. The motivation for my admis-
sion of abundant properties is to be found in the view of resemblance that
is defended in chapter 8.
I will follow Lewis’s lead (1986b) in identifying properties in the abundant
sense with sets of n-tuples of individuals.10 Any set of n-tuples of actual
and possible individuals is a property, if you think that possible individuals
exist and properties are not worldbound. Only sets of n-tuples of actual
individuals are properties, if you think that actual individuals are all the
individuals there are. Finally, only sets of n-tuples of individuals all of
10We can then use the methods proposed in (Lewis 1991) to deflate our set-theoretic talk
and reduce it to mereological talk. It shall be noticed that, following Lewis (Lewis 1991,
81-91), composition is some sort of identity relation. So ultimately, an abundant property
is identical to the many individuals that have it. A monadic property on this account
is thus understood as many individuals, a plurality of individuals. Difficulties arise with
polyadic properties. But we might follow the proposal of Burgess and Hazen in (Lewis
1991, Appendix) to account for such properties. If we follow this account, commitment to
abundant properties commits us to no more than concrete individuals. But the proposal of
Burgess and Hazen also has its ontological cost, as it commits us to the view that there are
infinitely many atomic individuals. As a nominalist, my sympathy goes for the reductive
account of abundant properties as being identical to many individuals; where identity does
not distribute (that is, if P is identical to a, b, c, and d, then P is not identical to a). But
in order to avoid complications, I will follow Lewis in talking of abundant properties as
set-theoretic entities.
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which inhabit the same world are properties, if you think that properties
are worldbound and that there are other worlds like ours.
We may, if we dislike set-theoretical entities, also conceive of abundant
properties as abundant universals, in the most inclusive possible sense of
that word. Many philosophers, among which we find Armstrong, Mellor,
and Lewis, have argued against such an abundant conception of univer-
sals and I think that there are good reasons for preferring a conception of
abundant properties as set-theoretic entities, that I will expose in chapter
8. Nevertheless, the view of universals as abundant has not proved incon-
sistent, and the defence of a particular account of abundant properties is
beyond the scope of the present study.
Given the assumption that there are abundant properties and the pro-
posed surface analyses, it appears that I must deny that commonality of
properties is sufficient for there to be a resemblance between individuals if I
want to maintain this common-sense truth: some individuals resemble each
other and other individuals don’t. For I agree that no matter what the As
are, the As share an abundant property, and thus share a property.
Inegalitarianism is the view that resemblance has to do with commonal-
ity of properties, but not with commonality of any abundant, more or less
gerrymandered property. Resemblance has to do with commonality of a very
small minority of properties and this is the reason why it is at least possible
that some individuals resemble and other individuals do not.
Let us call the properties belonging to this very small minority of prop-
erties having to do with resemblance, the elected properties. The basic claim
of Inegalitarianism is thus the following:
Inegalitarianism: The sharing of any non-elected property is not sufficient
for there to be a resemblance between individuals, whereas the sharing
of an elected property is sufficient for minimal resemblance.
In what follows, I will reserve the label ‘merely abundant ’ for those abundant
properties that are not elected. Various inegalitarian views of resemblance
differ with respect to their interpretation of the expression ‘elected property’
and with respect to whether the sharing of an elected property is also nec-
essary for minimal resemblance. Whether or not the sharing of an elected
property is necessary is an issue I will not deal with before chapter 4; the
interpretation of ‘elected property’ is the topic of the next section.
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1.4 Elected properties
The core intuition behind the distinction between an elected and a merely
abundant property is that an elected property is a property such that the
sharing of it makes individuals have something genuinely in common. In
some sense, of course, the sharing of a merely abundant property makes
individuals have something in common, namely the merely abundant prop-
erty. But, nevertheless, confronted with the fact that some individuals share
a merely abundant property, we are intuitively reluctant to accept the view
that their sharing such a merely abundant property is sufficient for their
having something genuinely in common.
Take the property gricular which is to be analysed as being green or
circular.11 A white plate in front of me and the grass in front of me are both
gricular. Yet I am intuitively reluctant to accept the view that their sharing
the property gricular makes the white plate and the grass have something
genuinely in common. Since gricular provokes such an intuitive reaction,
I call it a merely abundant property.12 If my reaction to the claim that
the plate and the grass are both gricular had been that, if true, the claim
justifies the judgement that the plate and the grass are somehow identical
in nature, then I would have judged, truly or wrongly, that gricular is an
elected property.
Some reader may think that this characterisation of elected properties
as the properties such that the sharing of them makes individuals have
something genuinely in common, be partly identical in nature, is somewhat
metaphorical and is actually just another way to say that elected prop-
erties are these properties that are linked with resemblance. I could not
agree more. There is some circularity in our pre-theoretical understanding
of the notions of elected property and minimal resemblance. Despite this
pre-theoretic circularity some more information can be given regarding the
nature of elected properties.
There are two available views regarding what it is for a property to be
an elected one.
11‘Gricular’ is an example from (Hirsch 1993).
12I call it merely abundant because it provokes such a reaction. Whether gricular is
merely abundant because it provokes such a reaction or whether it provokes such a reaction
because it is merely abundant is another issue.
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(i) Whether or not a property is elected depends on the way we, or any
other cognizer, represent individuals. If we focus on mind-independent, ob-
jective reality, properties are all on a par: given that properties are sets – or
abundant universals –, reality privileges no property over any other.13 But
as a result of evolution, entrenchment or simply contextual relevance, some
properties turn out to play a more central role in our classification prac-
tices than others do. These properties which play a role in our classification
and comparison practices are the elected properties. Have our classification
practices being different, other properties would have been linked with re-
semblance; that is, the election of a property may vary with classification
practices.14
(ii) An elected property genuinely differs in nature from other proper-
ties, it has some characteristic intrinsic features that makes it an elite prop-
erty; whether a property is elected or not has nothing to do with inductive
practices, entrenchment or contextual relevance but is grounded in its real,
objective nature. Whether some individuals are identical in nature is an
absolute truth because whether a property is an elected one is an objective
fact, a fact that is independent of the way we, or any other cognizer, rep-
resent individuals. Whenever ‘elected property’ is interpreted in this way, I
shall talk of sparse properties.
The first view is the view I will call vegetarian about elected properties,
and I will call the second, carnivorous about elected properties. I follow
Taylor (1993) in using these labels because the vegetarian seems to be happy
with a psychological tofu ersatz of the objective distinction embraced by the
carnivorous. These two interpretations of ‘an elected property’ give rise to
two views of resemblance and difference that will be the topic of chapter 7.
More pressing is the discussion of the arity of resemblance. For so long as
we do not know what the arity of resemblance is, we do not know what kind
of property the analysandum of the analysis of resemblance is.
13George McClure (1964) has endorsed this view of elected properties and conceives of
abundant properties as abundant universals.
14Medin and Ortony (1989, 182) call elected properties, understood as in (i), ‘repre-
sented properties’.
Chapter 2
The Arity of Resemblance
2.1 Introduction: arity and adicity
For technical purposes I shall distinguish between the arity and the adicity of
a property, though these two terms are used as synonyms in the literature.
The arity of a property is determined by the number of individuals the
property is instantiated by,1 whereas the adicity of a property is determined
by the groupings the property imposes on the individuals that instantiate
it.
If a property is necessarily such that on every occasion it is instantiated
by exactly one individual, the arity of the property is one; in other terms, it
is unary. If a property necessarily holds between exactly two individuals on
every occasion, the arity of the property is two and the property is called
binary. But a property can be binary and fail to hold between exactly two
individuals on every occasion, if it is reflexive. Therefore, a property is
binary if and only if it can hold between two individuals, and cannot hold
between more than two individuals. A property is then ternary if and only
if it can hold between three individuals and cannot hold between more than
three individuals; and so on and so forth.
1‘Property’ here is as usual to be understood as ‘abundant property’. Since properties
are conceived of as sets of individuals, the instantiation relation is understood in terms of
the membership relation: to instantiate a property is to be a member of the set that is
identical to this property.
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Following MacBride (2006), a property is multigrade if and only if it holds
between different numbers of individuals in different cricumstances.2 In that
sense, reflexive binary relations are all multigrade in that they hold of one
individual on some occasion and between two individuals on other occasions.
Nevertheless, the multigradicity of reflexive binary relations is restricted by
the definition of such a property: no binary property can hold between
more than two individuals. By contrast, genuine multigrade properties are
such that the number of individuals between which they can hold is not so
restricted; they can hold between an indeterminate number of individuals.
MacBride acknowledges that there is a clear sense in which apparent
multigrade properties may still have a fixed adicity (MacBride 2006, 487).
In this sense, the adicity of a property is determined by the groupings the
property imposes on the objects it is ascribed to. I reserve the word ‘adicity’
to the latter sense.
If a property imposes no groupings on the individuals instantiating it,
then the adicity of the property is one; in other words, the property is
monadic. Of course, every unary property is ipso facto monadic, but some
monadic properties are not unary. For instance, the property of forming a
circle is a monadic property in my sense but is clearly not unary in that we
usually need more than one individual to form a circle. A property which dis-
tinguishes the individuals between which it holds into two groups is dyadic.
Thus causation is clearly a dyadic property in that it groups the objects it
is ascribed to as causes and effects. Likewise, the part-whole property is
clearly a dyadic property. Yet these dyadic properties need not be binary.
There are causal relations standing between many causes and many effects,
or between one cause and many effects, or between many causes and one
effect. Also, the most interesting part-whole relations, those of composition,
hold between many parts and a whole. Whenever the adicity of a property
is greater than one, we say that it is a relation; whenever a property is
monadic, then we say that the property is a property in the narrow sense
which excludes relations. Whenever the adicity – in my sense – of a property
is unfixed, the property is properly labelled ‘variably polyadic’. Hence, the
2MacBride’s concern is universals rather than properties: “Let be granted that there
are universals that are ‘multigrade’ in the sense defined: they enter into instantiation on
different occasions with different numbers of individuals.” (MacBride 2006, 487).
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two phrases ‘multigrade property’ and ‘variably polyadic property’ are not
synonymous in the present study.3
Resemblance is traditionally conceived of as a relation which is both
binary and dyadic. This traditional view, I shall argue, doubly misconceives
resemblance: resemblance is neither binary nor dyadic. In this chapter I
focus on the arity of resemblance, the adicity of resemblance will be the
topic of the next chapter.
2.2 The Imperfect Community Difficulty I
The Imperfect Community Difficulty is familiar. There might be some indi-
viduals, the As, such that any two of the As resemble in some respect, or
share an elected property, but such that there is no single respect in which all
the As resemble. Such individuals are said to form an imperfect community.
Then if resemblance is assumed to hold between at most two individuals,
the further assumption that, for all x and y, x and y resemble each other if
and only if they resemble in some respect leads to the result that the resem-
blance of every x and y such that x and y are among the As is insufficient
for there to be a common respect in which the As resemble. Individuals
which resemble in a common respect form a so-called perfect community.
A necessary condition for some individuals to form a property class4 is for
them to form a perfect community. It follows that the resemblance of any
two of some individuals is insufficient for the latter individuals to form a
property class, and the nominalist who attempts to analyse property classes
in terms of a resemblance relation holding between at most two individuals
fails.
Obviously, the plausibility of the difficulty also requires that we acknowl-
edge an inegalitarian distinction between merely abundant and elected prop-
erties or resemblance respects. For if there is no such difference, no matter
what the As are, the resemblance of any two of the As is sufficient for there
3What I call variably polyadic properties are those properties that MacBride calls
‘varigrade’. Cf. (MacBride 2006, 487-495).
4Where a property class is a class whose members are all and only individuals sharing a
certain elected property. Resemblance nominalists traditionally identify elected properties
with property classes and aim to characterise property classes in terms of the resemblance
of their members; see e.g. (Price 1969, 21), (Hausman 1979), and (Rodriguez-Pereyra
2002, 56).
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to be an abundant respect in which the As resemble; since individuals, no
matter what they are, resemble in some abundant respect. The difficulty
makes sense only if there is an inegalitarian notion of resemblance respects
such that some individuals fail, or at least may fail, to resemble in some
elected respect. I will always use the phrases ‘resemblance respect’ and ‘re-
semble in some respect’ to mean respectively ‘elected resemblance respect’
and ‘resemble in some elected respect’.
Is resemblance interpreted as minimal, overall or exact in the difficulty
presented? The plausibility of the difficulty requires that resemblance is not
interpreted as exact if exact resemblance is assumed, as usual, as entailing
exact resemblance in every resemblance respect. For if any two of the As
are exactly similar and thus exactly resemble in every respect, then the As
cannot fail to resemble in every respect as well. The nominalist theories
that are threatened by the difficulty may however interpret resemblance as
minimal or overall.5 For it may be true that there is a minimal resemblance
between every two As and yet that there is no respect in which the As
resemble. Likewise, it may be true that every two As resemble each other
saliently more than is typical given a certain standard, while the As resemble
in no respect.
The lesson Hausman (1979) draws from the difficulty is that the resem-
blance nominalist should allow resemblance, her primitive, to hold between
more than two individuals. For as the following appears constitutive of re-
semblance, no matter whether we interpret resemblance as minimal, overall
or exact,
(Nec) if the As resemble each other, then the As resemble in some respect6
5As mentioned in the previous chapter, Rodriguez-Pereyra’s resemblance primitive is
akin to a minimal property of resemblance, for it is a minimal value of resemblance: in
his theory, resembling to a degree > 0 is sufficient for resemblance. However, Price’s
resemblance primitive is more akin to overall resemblance in that it involves some com-
parative feature: “What is required is only that every other member of the class should
resemble the class-exemplars as closely as they resemble each other” (Price 1969, 21).
Following Price, we may thus think of the resemblance of class-exemplars as our standard
for typicality in a property class, and what it means for the members of a property class
to resemble each other is for them to resemble each other as much as is typical; the latter
is some overall notion of resemblance though not the strict notion of resemblance that I
analysed in the previous chapter.
6On the constitutivity of (Nec) see e.g. (Searle 1959, 151), (Goodman 1970, 27-8),
(Lewis 1973, 91), (Armstrong 1989, 15), and (Heil 2003, 152).
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(where ‘the As’ is an arbitrary plural constant ranging over individuals) it
cannot happen that the As resemble and fail to resemble in some respect.
So if we analyse property classes in terms of the resemblance of all their
members rather than in terms of the resemblance of any two of them, the
Imperfect Community Difficulty no more threatens the nominalist. Despite
its ingenious simplicity, Hausman’s proposed solution to the Imperfect Com-
munity has met with little or no enthousiasm.
Lewis (1999a, 14-5) also suggested a nominalist account of elected prop-
erties – where ‘elected’ is interpreted as natural – which makes use of a
primitive multigrade and contrastive resemblance that can hold between
any number of individuals. But Lewis was unsatisfied with his own proposal
on the grounds that such a resemblance primitive is artificial. For Lewis’s
conviction was that the familiar resemblance property we ascribe to individ-
uals in the pub and elsewhere is a binary relation: a relation holding between
at most two individuals. Lewis’s conviction is shared by most contemporary
metaphysicians who always account for resemblance as a relation linking at
most two individuals.7 But what grounds the conviction that resemblance
is a binary relation?
Let us call Binarism the view according to which resemblance is a prop-
erty linking at most two individuals. And let us call Collectivism the view
of resemblance according to which resemblance can hold between more than
two individuals.8 In this chapter, I undermine the binarist view of resem-
blance and provide reasons to believe that the collectivist view is true.
2.3 The binarist vs. collectivist debate
Before I begin, let me make clear the terms of the debate between Binarism
and Collectivism about resemblance. Of course this is not a linguistic debate
about whether our resemblance predicates can be correctly predicated to
more than two individuals, since they obviously can. Consider the following
statements, for instance:
(2.1) John, Jack, and Jim, who are identical triplets, resemble each other.
(2.2) Red individuals resemble each other.
7Here is a non-exhaustive list of such accounts: (Armstrong 1978b, 96), (Buras 2006,
31), (Eddon 2007, 385), (Oliver 1996, 52-4), (Rodriguez-Pereyra 2002).
8This is the terminology used by Rodriguez-Pereyra (2002, 81).
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(2.3) a, which is red, resembles red individuals.
(2.4) Red individuals resemble a, which is red.
(2.5) Wildcats resemble cats.
All these statements are grammatically correct and meaningful. Statements
(2.1)-(2.5) suggest that (i) sometimes, resemblance statements – like (2.1)
and (2.2) – have a subject-predicate form where the subject is a plural
expression and where a monadic resemblance predicate applies to the many
objects denoted by the plural expression, yielding sentences of the following
scheme:
(2.6) X resemble each other
(where ‘X’ is a plural variable9 occurring freely). (ii) Sometimes resem-
blance statements – like (2.3)-(2.5) – have a subject-predicate form where
the subject is either a plural or a singular expression and where it is predi-
cated of (the many things denoted by) the subject that they/it resemble(s)
some other object(s), yielding sentences of the schema:
(2.7) X resemble y
(2.8) x resembles Y
(2.9) X resemble Y
(where ‘x’ and ‘y’ are singular variables occurring freely and where ‘X’,
and ‘Y ’ are plural variables occurring freely). Let us call statements that
assert the resemblance of more than two individuals collective resemblance
statements and let us call resemblances obtaining between more than two
individuals collective resemblances. By contrast, let us call pairwise those
resemblances that obtain between at most two individuals. In this chapter,
I focus on collective resemblances expressed by statements of the form of
(2.6), and will consider statements of the forms (2.7)-(2.9) when discussing
the adicity of resemblance in chapter 3.
Clearly, each of (2.1)-(2.5) is grammatically correct. So if Binarism were
a linguistic view according to which resemblance predicates cannot be pred-
icated to more than two individuals, while Collectivism were the view that
9See chapter 5 on the syntax of the plural language I make use of.
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resemblance predicates can be predicated to more than two individuals, Col-
lectivism would be the clear winner. But the debate is not a linguistic one.
Nor is the debate between Binarism and Collectivism about resemblance
a debate about whether there can be true statements of resemblance between
more than two individuals. For some such statements are clearly true given
some usual interpretation of the resemblance predicate. Identical twins,
triplets, etc, are paradigm cases of resembling individuals in everyday life.
Thus (2.1) is true, according to common-sense. Statements (2.2)-(2.4) are
akin to metaphysical platitudes. (2.5) is true according to common-sense.
It should be noted that these statements assert distinct resemblance
properties to individuals. The natural reading of (2.1) is either as a state-
ment of overall resemblance or as exact resemblance, while (2.2)-(2.4) are
correctly interpreted as statements of minimal resemblance: they can be
true even if red individuals may resemble less than our standard for typi-
cality for coloured individuals. Anyway, as exact resemblance and overall
resemblance entail minimal resemblance, there corresponds a plausibly true
statement of minimal resemblance to each of (2.1)-(2.5) that asserts the
minimal resemblance of more than two individuals.
A binarist who would deny that any such collective resemblance state-
ment can be true will impose a revision both of our common-sense beliefs
and of our philosophical practice. Such a binarist position is conceivable, but
I can think of no good reason to maintain such a revisionary view.10 Even if
10Here are three bad reasons to maintain the revision, however: (a) the notion of a
plural term is incoherent; (b) plural terms are not part of classical predicate logic; (c) the
traditional view that all relations are binary. None of these reasons seems good to me.
First, regarding (a) and (b), instead of using plural terms we may use series of singular
terms and say that the resemblance predicate is bound to such series. Singular terms are
part of classical predicate logic and the notion of a series of singular terms is coherent
if that of singular term is. My preference for using plural terms is that difficulties arise
with series of indefinitely many singular terms; on this linguistic issue, see (McKay 2006,
19-22).
Regarding (c), it must first be shown that resemblance is a relation in order to appeal
to this ‘traditional’ view. And if relationality requires polyadicity then, according to the
argument of chapter 3, resemblance is not a relation. Moreover, the view that every
relation is binary, though tradition, seems self-refuting. For if the latter view is the claim
that, for every R, if R is a relation, then R holds between at most two entities, then the
view appeals to a ternary predicate: ‘x holds between y and z’; the latter is ternary in
that x, y, and z can all be distinct. On my abundant view of properties, to every predicate
there corresponds a property, and thus to the ternary predicate ‘x holds between y and
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the view is conceivable, existing binarists, those that I aim to challenge, do
not deny that there can be true statements of collective resemblance, and
do not deny that at least some of (2.1)-(2.5) is true.
If so, what do binarists and collectivists disagree about? They disagree
about the resemblance facts that are represented by the propositional con-
tent of statements of collective resemblance. The collectivist typically main-
tains that the content of true collective resemblance statements represent
resemblance facts wherein resemblance holds between more than two in-
dividuals. Thus “John, Jack, and Jim resemble each other” asserts that
resemblance holds between John, Jack, and Jim, who are three. So that if
the resemblance statement is true, it is a fact that John, Jack, and Jim re-
semble each other, and this resemblance fact involves a resemblance property
holding between three individuals.
However, according to the binarists that I shall consider in the following
section, the content of statements of collective resemblance, despite the ap-
pearance, does not represent resemblance facts wherein resemblance holds
between more than two individuals. Resemblance facts involve only pair-
wise resemblances between individuals. So if it is a fact that John, Jack,
and Jim resemble each other, this fact, despite the appearance, involves no
more than a binary resemblance property.
I shall argue that the latter binarist view is false. If I am right, then we
must acknowledge that resemblance can hold between more than two indi-
viduals. Yet this does not suffice to establish that Collectivism is true. For
the binarist can still argue that analysis reveals that resemblances holding
between more than two individuals are supervenient, second-class, resem-
blances. By appealing to the further assumption that supervenient entities
are no ontological addition,11 the binarist can maintain that resemblances
between more than two individuals are no addition to the realm of resem-
blances. The latter is denied by the collectivist who maintains that col-
lective resemblances are ontologically as important, as genuine, as pairwise
z’ there corresponds a ternary property, or if you prefer, relation. The only way to make
the view that every relation is binary not self-refuting is by assuming a sparse view of
relations. But if so, advocates of the traditional view must argue that resemblance is a
sparse relation in order to threaten the claim that resemblance is not binary.
11Campbell (1990, 35-6), Simons (1994, 556), Mellor (1995, 207), and Armstrong (1989,
55-7) have endorsed the claim that supervenient entities are no addition to the ontology.
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resemblances. I shall argue that the claim that collective resemblances are
supervenient resemblances is unjustified.
2.4 Defining collective resemblance in terms of pair-
wise resemblance
Rodriguez-Pereyra (2002, 80-1) has argued that the resemblance nominal-
ist should maintain that resemblance is a binary relation on the grounds
that the resemblance nominalist can explain the following basic fact about
resemblance only if she maintains that resemblance holds between at most
two individuals (where ‘the As’ is an arbitrary plural constant ranging over
individuals):
(Rdistributivity) If the As resemble each other, then, for any x and y
such that x and y are among the As, x resembles y.
That (Rdistributivity) is true is, Rodriguez-Pereyra (2002, 81) says, “in the
nature of resemblance: if Socrate, Plato, and Aristotle resemble, then so do
Socrates and Plato, Socrates and Aristotle, and Plato and Aristotle.”
If ascriptions of elected properties to individuals (no matter what an
elected property is) is what explains ascriptions of resemblance, it is easy
to explain why (Rdistributivity) is a necessary truth: (Rdistributivity) is
necessary because, necessarily, if some individuals share some elected prop-
erty, then any two of them do. However, no such explanation is available to
the resemblance nominalist who attempts to explain ascriptions of elected
properties in terms of resemblance.
If the resemblance nominalist takes the collective resemblance of the As
as primitive, then, Rodriguez-Pereyra claims, (Rdistributivity) turns out to
be a brute necessity.12 However, Rodriguez-Pereyra argues, if we maintain
that resemblance is a binary relation, then we get an easy explanation of
the distributivity of resemblance: some individuals, no matter what they
are, resemble because, for any x and y that are among the latter, x and y
resemble each other (Rodriguez-Pereyra 2002, 81).
If the resemblance of any x and y among the As is what explains the
resemblance of the As, then the resemblance of any x and y among the As
12As I shall argue in section 2.7, I think Rodriguez-Pereyra is wrong on this point.
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is sufficient for the resemblance of the As, and the following is valid (where
‘the As’ is an arbitrary plural constant ranging over individuals):
(Rcumulativity) If any x and y such that x and y are among the As
resemble each other, the As resemble each other.
(Rdistributivity) and (Rcumulativity) together give rise to the following
analysis of collective resemblance:
(C1) The As (for more than two As) resemble each other if, and only if,
any x and y that are among the As resemble each other.
If (C1) is true, then a collective resemblance is a mere conjunction of
pairwise resemblances as Butchvarov maintains:
Of course there are singular resemblance statements which assert
the resemblance of more than two objects, such as statements of
the forms “x, y, and z resemble each other” and “x resembles y
and z.” The relation of resemblance in such statements, however,
still appears to be dyadic, each statement being readily analyz-
able as a conjunction of several statements of the primary form
“x resembles y”. For instance, “a resembles b and c” is equiv-
alent to “a resembles b, and a resembles c”, and “a, b, and c
resemble each other” is equivalent to “a resembles b, a resembles
c, and b resembles c”. (Butchvarov 1966, 111-112)
If (C1) is true, then it is true that statements of collective resemblance
do not assert the resemblance of more than two individuals, and it seems
true that the content of such statements represent no resemblance fact in-
volving a resemblance property holding between more than two individuals.
Statements of collective resemblance assert no more than a conjunction of
pairwise resemblances and apparent facts of resemblance between more than
two individuals, given (C1), turn out to be conjunctive facts of resemblance
with resemblance holding between at most two individuals. If this is so, the
binarist view is justified.
But this is not so because the Imperfect Community Difficulty does
not only raise a difficulty to the nominalist but also to advocates of (C1).
Any two members of an imperfect community resemble each other, so that
by (Rcumulativity) the members of an imperfect community resemble each
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other. However, the members of an imperfect community fail to resemble
in some respect. If so, (Nec) fails. But (Nec) is usually assumed as a
constitutive claim about resemblance. It seems deeply wrong to ascribe
resemblance to some individuals, if there is no common respect in which
they resemble.
Since (Rcumulativity) conflicts with (Nec), the upholder of (C1) must
contend that (Nec) is not a basic claim about resemblance and may fail.
Ordinary speech about resemblance actually displays plausible failures of
(Nec). If these failures are genuine, we are justified in rejecting (Nec).
Consider the following situation, where a, b, c, and d are four individuals.
Let us assume that r1, r2, r3, and r4 are the only (elected) respects in which
they resemble. Let us also assume that resemblance with respect to one of
r1, r2, r3, and r4 is sufficient for resemblance tout court. In other words, if
some of the considered individuals resemble in one of the respects assumed,
then they resemble each other.
r1 r2 r3 r4
a& b 0 0 0 0
a& c 1 0 0 0
a& d 0 0 1 0
b& c 0 1 0 0
b& d 0 0 0 1
c& d 0 0 0 0
(where ‘1’ means that the two individuals at hand resemble in the relevant
respect, and 0 means that they do not). Now let a and b be called ‘the F s’,
and let c and d be called ‘the Gs’. It is correct to assert that the F s resemble
the Gs since a resembles c and d, and b resembles c and d. It is also true
that the Gs resemble the F s, since c resembles a and b, and so does d. Now
if the F s resemble the Gs and the Gs resemble the F s, then the following
follows by symmetry of the transitive form of the resemblance verb:13
(2.10) the F s and the Gs resemble each other.
Yet the F s and the Gs are a, b, c, and d, and a, b, c, and d fail to resemble
in some common respect. So, apparently, (Nec) fails in this situation.
13The symmetry of the transitive form of the resemblance verb is discussed in the
following chapter.
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Yes, but so does (Rdistributivity). For it seems true that the F s and the
Gs resemble each other but false that, for any x and y such that x and y
are among the F s and the Gs, x resembles y. For a and b are among the F s
and the Gs and a and b, by assumption, fail to resemble each other. This
apparently contradicts (Rdistributivity).
Our analysis of collective resemblance is going from bad to worse. Be-
cause it conflicts with (Nec), we tried to ground the view that (Nec) is not
constitutive about resemblance by giving a plausible failure of (Nec). But
in doing so, we exhibited an apparent failure of (Rdistributivity). So that
if the situation displayed is a genuine counterexample to (Nec), it falsifies
(C1) as well.
It should not be surprising that if we deny the constitutivity of (Nec),
then the resemblance of individuals may fail to distribute over every pair
of the latter individuals. For our belief in (Rdistributivity) seems to be
grounded in the fact that if some individuals resemble, then they resemble
in some respect, and if they resemble in some respect, then any two of them
do; so that any two of them resemble, provided resemblance in some respect
is assumed as sufficient for resemblance tout court. Deny (Nec), and our
belief in (Rdistributivity) seems to lose its warrant.
Because (C1) requires the validity of (Rdistributivity) and because (Rdis-
tributivity) can fail if (Nec), with which (Rcumulativity) conflicts, does, we
must conclude that accounting for collective resemblances in terms of (Rdis-
tributivity) and (Rcumulativity) alone is hopelessly wrong. Statements of
collective resemblance are not conjunctions of statements of pairwise resem-
blance, and resemblance facts between more than two individuals are not
mere conjunctive facts of pairwise resemblances. (C1) fails and the binarist
view of resemblance is still ill-grounded. Moreover, Rodriguez-Pereyra’s ex-
planation of why (Rdistributivity) is a necessary truth, which is intended
to ground the superiority of his resemblance nominalist’s proposal over re-
semblance nominalist’s proposals that make use of collective resemblances,
cannot be true.
In order to ground the view that resemblance is a binary relation, we
thus need an alternative account of collective ascriptions of resemblance.
However, we should not attempt to propose such an account if we do not
understand what is wrong with (C1). And we still do not understand what
is wrong with (C1) because we still do not know whether it is (Nec) and
2. The Arity of Resemblance 41
(Rdistributivity) which fail or whether it is (Rcumulativity) which fails. I
think the latter, and thus I need to explain why apparent failures of (Nec)
and (Rdistributivity) are not genuine.
2.5 The indeterminacy of plural predications of re-
semblance
The lesson of the previous section is the following. A collective resem-
blance, a resemblance holding between more than two individuals, is not a
mere conjunction of pairwise resemblances because either (Rdistributivity)
or (Rcumulativity) can fail. How do we express ascriptions of collective
resemblances in English? We do so by predicating the predicate ‘resemble
each other’ to a plural subject; that is, we do so by means of statements of
the form (2.6). How do we express conjunctions of pairwise resemblances in
English? We do so either by predicating ‘resemble each other’ to a plural
subject, and thus by means of statements of the form (2.6), or by means of
statements of either of the forms (2.7)-(2.9). So that sentences like “the As
resemble each other” (where there are more than two As) are ambiguous. In
some contexts, “the As resemble each other” expresses the proposition that
there is a resemblance holding between the As; i.e., expresses an ascription
of collective resemblance to the As. Yet in other contexts, “the As resemble
each other” can express the proposition that some, or all, x and y such that
x and y are among the As resemble. My suggestion in this section is that
apparent failures of (Nec) and (Rdistributivity) are due to the ambiguity of
plural predications of resemblance.
In order to develop this suggestion I shall make use of some metalinguistic
device. Plural terms sometimes denote collectively, sometimes denote dis-
tributively. Distributive and collective denotation are defined thus (Oliver
& Smiley 2008, 24):
(a) ‘a’ denotesd b iff b are among a.
and
(b) ‘a’ denotesc b iff b are a.
(Where ‘are among’ is constructed so as to include ‘are’ as a limit case).
Consider an example. Suppose that John and Mary danced with each other
only once at t1; that John and Jack danced with each other only once at t2;
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and that Jack and Mary danced with each other only once at t3. In some
sense, it is true that John, Jack, and Mary danced with each other; but in
some other sense, it is false that they did. There is some ambiguity here.
English, sometimes, has some linguistic device to account for this ambiguity.
“John, Jack, and Mary danced with each other” is true if interpreted as
the proposition that John, Jack, and Mary danced with one another. And
“John, Jack, and Mary danced with each other” is false, if interpreted as
the proposition that John, Jack, and Mary danced together.
Using Oliver and Smiley’s apparatus, we can say that the true inter-
pretation of “John, Jack, and Mary danced with each other” is such that
‘John, Jack, and Mary’ denotesd every two individuals among John, Jack,
and Mary. The false interpretation of the sentence however is such that
‘John, Jack, and Mary’ denotesc John, Jack, and Mary.
Now let us agree with Wittgenstein (1958, 32) that what games exhibit is
just “a complicated network of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing”.
And consider the sentence “games resemble in some respect”. This sentence
is ambiguous too and we can clearly understand the way it is ambiguous.
According to one reading of the sentence, it expresses the plausibly true
proposition that every x and y that are among the games resemble in some
respect. According to the second reading of the sentence, it expresses the
false proposition, according to our assumption at least, that all games re-
semble in some common respect.
A well-known trick allows us to represent these two readings by quanti-
fying only over every pair of games and a resemblance respect. The reading
according to which “games resemble in some respect” is true can be repre-
sented as
∀x, y(Gx&Gy → ∃rR(x, y, r))
The reading according to which “games resemble in some respect” is false
can be represented as
∃r∀x, y(Gx&Gy → R(x, y, r))
This traditional formal representation however misrepresents the way the
two readings were introduced. For the way I introduced the first reading
was such that resemblance in some respect is ascribed to every x and y that
are among the games, and the way I introduced the second reading was such
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that resemblance in some respect is ascribed to all games. Yet the formal
representation of the false reading, even if extensionally correct, is not about
all games but still about every x and y such that x and y are among the
games and makes the trick by a change of scope of the existential quantifier.
Using the metalinguistic apparatus of Oliver and Smiley, we can disam-
biguate “games resemble in some respect” in a way that better matches the
two intended readings: (i) according to the true reading of “games resemble
in some respect”, ‘games’ denotesd every x and y such that x and y are
among the games; (ii) according to the false reading of “games resemble in
some respect”, ‘games’ denotesc the games.
Obviously, when ‘games’ is intended as denoting every x and y that are
among the games, “games resemble in some respect” does not express the
proposition that there is a resemblance in some respect holding between the
many games; i.e., does not express a collective ascription of resemblance in
some respect. What the sentence expresses in this case is a mere conjunc-
tion of ascriptions of pairwise resemblances in some respect to every pair of
games. It is only when the intended denotation of ‘games’ is collective that
“games resemble in some respect” genuinely expresses a collective ascription
of resemblance in some respect to the many games.
What is true of games is true of the F s and the Gs, which display the
apparent failure of (Nec). In some sense, it is true that the F s and the Gs
resemble in some respect, and in another sense it is false that they do. We
can again use the trick that consists in a variation of scope of the existential
quantifier to represent these two readings as with games.14 But the trick
does not reflect the fact that the difference between the two readings is one
of denotation of the plural subject and it would be better to use Oliver and
Smiley’s metalinguistic tool. According to the true interpretation of “the F s
and the Gs resemble in some respect”, ‘the Fs and the Gs’ denotesd every
x and y such that x is one of the F s and y is one of the Gs. According to
the false reading of “the F s and the Gs resemble in some respect”, ‘the F s
and the Gs’ denotesc the F s and the Gs; i.e., a, b, c and d.
Again it is only when ‘the F s and the Gs’ denotes collectively that “the
F s and the Gs resemble in some respect” counts as a genuine collective
ascription of resemblance in some respect to the F s and the Gs. When ‘the
14Let ‘A’ be the among predicate. Then the true reading of “the F s and the Gs resemble
each other” can be represented thus: ∀x, y(xAF s & yAGs → ∃r R(x, y, r)). The false
reading can be represented thus: ∃r∀x, y(xAF s & yAGs) → R(x, y, r)).
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F s and the Gs’ denotesd every x and y such that x is one of the F s and y
is one of the Gs, the sentence only expresses a mere conjunction of pairwise
ascriptions of resemblance in some respect.
Now what is true about resemblance in some respect is true about re-
semblance. If “games resemble in some respect” is ambiguous, then so is
“games resemble each other”. According to one reading of the latter sen-
tence, it expresses a true proposition; according to a second reading of the
sentence, and if Wittgenstein is right, it expresses a false proposition.
But plural predications of resemblance are not only ambiguous, but also
capricious. For we cannot use the trick that consists in a change of scope
of the existential quantifier to disambiguate “games resemble each other”,
since there is nothing, no respect or property, to existentially quantify over.
This does not mean that the sentence is not ambiguous, it only means that
we have no means to account for its ambiguity if we do not acknowledge the
indeterminacy of plural denotation. If we do, however, we can disambiguate
“games resemble each other” as follows: according to the true reading of the
latter sentence, ‘games’ denotesd every x and y among the games; according
to its false reading, ‘games’ denotesc the games.
Likewise, there is a true and a false reading of (2.10) – “the F s and the
Gs resemble each other” – corresponding to the true and the false readings
of “the F s and the Gs resemble in some respect”. According to the true
reading of (2.10), ‘the F s and the Gs’ denotesd every x and y such that x is
one of the F s and y is one of the Gs; according to the false reading of (2.10),
‘the F s and the Gs’ denotesc the F s and the Gs, that is a, b, c, and d.
And again it is only when the plural expression denotes collectively that
(2.10) asserts a collective resemblance holding between the F s and the Gs;
that is, between a, b, c, and d. When ‘the F s and the Gs’ denotesd every
x and y such that x is one of the F s and y is one of the Gs, then “the F s
and the Gs resemble each other” expresses a mere conjunction of pairwise
resemblances between every x and y such that x is one of the F s and y is
one of the Gs.
Now we inferred (2.10) from the claim that each of the F s resembles
each of the Gs and each of the Gs resembles each of the F s. So that “the
F s and the Gs resemble each other” is true in this context because it asserts
the resemblance of every x and y such that x is one of the F s and y is one
of the Gs; in other words, it is true because ‘the F s and the Gs’ in this
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context denotesd every x and y such that x is one of the F s and y is one of
the Gs. (Rdistributivity) apparently fails here because we are not asserting
that there is a resemblance between the F s and the Gs. And no reason
has been given to deny that from a statement that asserts that there is a
resemblance between some individuals (e.g. between the F s and the Gs) we
can infer that any x and y among the latter individuals resemble. We can
thus follow Rodriguez-Pereyra in assuming that (Rdistributivity) is a basic
truth about resemblance provided “the As resemble each other” asserts the
resemblance of the As; that is, is such that ‘the As’ denotes collectively. If
(Rdistributivity) is such a basic claim about the resemblance of individuals,
then so is (Nec).
Consider again the situation represented in the table. From our assump-
tions about the F s and the Gs, what follows is that (2.10) is true for ‘the
F s and the Gs’ denotingd every x and y such that x is one of the F s and
y one of the Gs. If so, the only thing (Nec) allows us to conclude is that
“the F s and the Gs resemble in some respect” is true for ‘the F s and the
Gs’ denotingd every x and y such that x is one of the F s and y one of the
Gs. And this is the case since a and c resemble in some respect, a and d
resemble in some respect, b and c resemble in some respect, and so do b and
d. So there is no failure of (Nec) here.
(Nec) seemed to fail because we intended the interpretation of “the F s
and the Gs resemble in some respect” according to which ‘the F s and the
Gs’ denotesc a, b, c, and d. Clearly “the F s and the Gs resemble in some re-
spect” is false for the collective denotation of the plural subject. But, since
(Rdistributivity) is valid for resemblance statements asserting the (collec-
tive) resemblance of individuals, “the F s and the Gs resemble each other”
is false for the very same denotation of ‘the F s and the Gs’. For, given the
intended denotation of ‘the F s and the Gs’, it is not the case that every x
and y such that x and y are among the F s and the Gs resemble each other.
There is no failure of (Nec) here.
However, if (Nec) does not fail, (Rcumulativity) does. Let the As be the
members of an arbitrary imperfect community. Then if ‘the As’ denotesc
the As, the As fail to resemble in some respect. And so by (Nec), it is false
that the As resemble each other for the collective denotation of ‘the As’.
What contradicts (Rcumulativity).
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Therefore, (Rdistributivity) and (Nec) do not fail. Apparent failures of
(Rdistributivity) and (Nec) are only due to the indeterminacy of plural de-
notation. If so, (C1) fails to correctly account for collective resemblances
because (Rcumulativity) is invalid. Alternative accounts of collective resem-
blances can however exploit the validity of (Rdistributivity) and (Nec).
2.6 Do collective resemblances supervene on pair-
wise resemblances?
To my mind, that (C1) is false suffices to show that resemblance can hold
between more than two individuals. For it is sufficient to show that “John,
Jack, and Jim resemble each other” asserts that resemblance holds between
these three individuals. But some may argue that collective resemblance
may still be supervenient on pairwise resemblances and some extra ingredi-
ent. If the latter is true, it does not amount to the rejection of the claim
that resemblance can hold between more than two individuals. However,
if one assumes that supervenient entities are no addition to the ontology,
that collective resemblances supervene on pairwise resemblances and some
extra ingredient seems to justify the view that collective resemblances are
no ontological addition to pairwise resemblances and this extra ingredient.
By this course of reasoning, the binarist can maintain that collective re-
semblances are somewhat superfluous, are second-class resemblances. The
fundamental resemblances, the only resemblances we need to be committed
to, are pairwise resemblances. So that, regarding the fundamental realm of
resemblances, we can affirm that resemblance is binary.
In order to evaluate this binarist strategy, I shall make use of a plau-
sibly true account of collective resemblances. (Rdistributivity) and (Nec)
give rise to the following account of collective ascriptions of resemblance in
the presence of a further ancillary assumption (where ‘the As’ is as usual
arbitrary):
(C2) The As (for more than two As) resemble each other iff for any x and
y such that x and y are some of the As, x resembles y, and the As
resemble in some respect.
The left-to-right direction of (C2) follows from (Rdistributivity) and (Nec).
The right-to-left direction requires a further assumption: that resemblance
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in some respect is sufficient for resemblance. (C2) is certainly false if the
resemblance predicate it involves is interpreted as an overall or an exact
resemblance predicate. For resemblance in some respect is clearly not suffi-
cient for exact resemblance and is, for every standard of resemblance such
that resemblance in one respect is not saliently more resemblance than typ-
ical, insufficient for overall resemblance. But (C2) is a true account of those
ascriptions of resemblance such that resemblance in some (elected) respect
suffices for there to be a resemblance between some individuals. The latter
resemblances are minimal resemblances. I shall thus admit the truth of (C2)
understood as an analysis of collective ascriptions of minimal resemblance.15
Prima facie, (C2) justifies the view that resemblance can hold between
more than two individuals instead of the contrary. For it is legitimate to
agree with (C2) and maintain that if “the As resemble each other” is true,
then resemblance holds between the As. Now suppose that the As are more
than two and that the right hand side of (C2) is satisfied by them. Then (C2)
gives us the result that resemblance holds between the As, which are more
than two, and thus that resembance can hold between more than two indi-
viduals. (C2) provides necessary and sufficient conditions for resemblance
to hold between more than two individuals. Then, since these conditions
can be satisfied, resemblance can hold between more than two individuals.
But on the assumption that supervenient entities are no addition to the
ontology, (C2) can be used by the binarist, provided (C2) can be used to
justify the view that collective resemblances, resemblances between more
than two individuals, somehow supervene on pairwise resemblances and re-
semblance in some respect. If the latter is the case, resemblances between
15It shall be emphasized that (C2) being true we need no predicate of resemblance
ranging over n-tuples of individuals, for n > 2, once we dispose of a binary predicate
of resemblance and a predicate of resemblance in some respect. For (C2) provides a
paraphrase of our talk of collective resemblances which allows us to avoid the use of such
a predicate.
But the issue here is not the arity of the resemblance predicate, it is the arity of the
resemblance property; or better, of resemblance properties, one of which is the property of
minimal resemblance analysed by (C2). And the fact that we dispose of such a paraphrase
to avoid the use of a resemblance predicate ranging over n-tuples of individuals, for n >
2, is not by itself a sufficient reason to believe that resemblance properties do not hold
between more than two individuals. The absence of such a paraphrase would be a clear
argument in favour of the collectivist view of resemblance. But the presence of such a
paraphrase is not by itself an argument to the opposite binarist view.
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more than two individuals are no addition to the ontology, they are just
second-class resemblances.
Before I enter the argument, let me emphasize that the latter course of
reasoning helps the binarist only if it is assumed that if a supervenes on
b and c, then each of b and c is more fundamental than, is ontologically
prior to, a. For if the latter is not assumed, it may be the case that collec-
tive resemblances supervene on pairwise resemblances and resemblance in
some respect and that pairwise resemblances are not ontologically prior to
collective resemblances. Yet in such a case collective resemblances are no
second-class resemblances, and Binarism is unjustified. Therefore, in what
follows I will assume that if a supervenes on b and c, then each of b and
c is more fundamental than, is ontologically prior to, a. I shall argue on
the assumption that (C2) is true that there are good reasons to maintain
that collective resemblances are not less fundamental than pairwise resem-
blances. If so, collective resemblances cannot be supervenient on pairwise
resemblances and resemblance in some respect in a sense that suits the bi-
narist, and the assumption that supervenient entities are no addition to the
ontology cannot come into play to justify Binarism.
What is remarkable about (C2) is that the first conjunct of its analysans,
which states the pairwise resemblance of every pair among the As, is super-
fluous. The reason why this is so is that (C2) is a correct account of collec-
tive resemblance only if resemblance in some respect is not only necessary
but also sufficient for the collective resemblance of individuals. Thus (C2)
reduces to the following:
(C3) The As (for more than two As) resemble each other iff the As resemble
in some respect.
If resemblance in some respect is assumed to be both necessary and suffi-
cient for resemblance, then we also obtain the following account of pairwise
resemblance:
(Pairwise) The As (for at most two As) resemble each other iff the As
resemble in some respect.
Yet either (C3) and (Pairwise) are both true or neither is provided the re-
semblance predicate has the same interpretation in both. They are both true
if resemblance in some respect is both necessary and sufficient for (minimal)
resemblance. Otherwise, they are both false.
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That (C3) and (Pairwise) are either both true or both false suggests
that collective resemblances are not second-class resemblances. Pairwise re-
semblances have no peculiar ontological status that allows us to claim that
pairwise resemblances are more fundamental than collective resemblances
are, and thus that collective resemblances supervene on pairwise resem-
blances. Just as pairwise resemblances either supervene on resemblances in
some respect or not, collective resemblances supervene on resemblances in
some respect or not. If they supervene on resemblances in some respect, then
neither of pairwise and collective resemblances are an ontological addition
to reality on the assumption that supervenient entities are no addition to re-
ality. If they do not supervene on resemblances in some respect, then either
they supervene on something else or they are both ontological additions to
reality. In every case, that (C3) and (Pairwise) are both true suggests that
pairwise and collective resemblances are on a par regarding their degree of
ontological priority and regarding whether they are or not addition to the
ontology.
But the latter suggestion is misleading if we can motivate the view that
pairwise resemblances in some respect are more fundamental than collective
resemblances in some respect. For if resemblances in some respect between
at most two individuals are more fundamental than resemblances in some
respect between more than two individuals, then by (C3) and (Pairwise)
it seems to follow that pairwise resemblances are more fundamental than
collectively resemblances.
Can we motivate the view that collective resemblances in some respect
are less fundamental than pairwise resemblances in some respect? In order
to address this question I need to consider opposite solutions to the Prob-
lem of Universals. In doing so, I will assume for ease of presentation that,
according to each of the considered solutions to the Problem of Universals,
individuals resemble in some respect if and only if they share an elected
property.16 I shall argue that no opponent of Resemblance Nominalism can
16This assumption is a simplification, as I will argue in chapter 4. Resemblance in
some respect is a somewhat disjunctive notion and the sharing of an elected property is
sufficient but not necessary for resemblance in some respect; the resemblance of elected
properties, the resemblance of (significant) parts, and of possessions can each be sufficient
for resemblance in some respect too. As the reader should see by considering them, taking
into account the others disjuncts of the analysans of resemblance in some respect would
not help the binarist but only make my demonstration longer and redundant. This is the
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motivate the view that pairwise resemblances in some respect are ontolog-
ically prior to collective resemblances in some respect. Then I shall argue
that the resemblance nominalist can motivate the latter view but only on
the assumption that resemblance is a binary relation.
Consider first Realism about Universals. Realists about universals typ-
ically explain the resemblance of individuals in terms of instantiation of a
common universal.17 Thus a and b resemble each other because there is a
universal had by a which is identical to some universal had by b. There-
fore by (Pairwise), Realism about Universals is such that a and b resemble
in some respect because there is a universal had by a which is identical to
some universal had by b.
Likewise, what, according to the realist about universals, explains that
a, b, and c, which are three individuals, resemble in some respect is that
some universal had by a is identical to some universal had by b and had
by c. But the fact that there is a universal had by a which is identical to
some universal had by b is no more fundamental than the fact that there is
a universal had by a which is identical to some universal had by b and by c.
Therefore, by (Pairwise) and (C3), if Realism about Universals is true,
the resemblance of more than two individuals is no less fundamental than the
resemblance of at most two individuals. For what grounds the resemblance
of at most two individuals – their sharing some identical universal – is not
more fundamental than what grounds the resemblance of more than two
individuals – their sharing some identical universal. And the conclusion
follows that if Realism about Universals is true then resemblance is not
a binary relation, because pairwise resemblances are no more fundamental
than collective resemblances are and collective resemblances are no second-
class resemblances.
reason why I allow myself to work here with a simplified notion of resemblance in some
respect for the ease of presentation.
17Armstrong accounts for the resemblance of individuals by means of a disjunction:
individuals resemble either if they share some identical universal or instantiate resembling
universals (Armstrong 1978b, 96). I avoid this complication for the reason offered in the
last footnote.
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Likewise, realists about tropes18 and elected class nominalists19 are not
justified in affirming the binarist view of resemblance. According to the
realist about tropes, a and b resemble in some respect because there is a
trope had by a which is exactly similar to some trope had by b. And a, b,
and c resemble each other because there is a trope had by a which is exactly
similar to some trope had by b and some trope had by c. The fact that
there is a trope had by a which is exactly similar to some trope had by b is
no more fundamental than the fact that there is a trope had by a which is
exactly similar to some trope had by b and some trope had by c. Therefore,
by (C3) and (Pairwise), the realist about tropes has no right to affirm that
pairwise resemblances are more fundamental than collective resemblances
are, and thus no right to affirm the binarist view of resemblance.
According to the elected class nominalist, a and b resemble in some
respect in virtue of being co-members of a set which is an elected set, an
elected property; and a, b, and c resemble in some respect in virtue of
being all co-members of a same set which is an elected property. Obviously,
the fact that two individuals are co-members of a set, which is an elected
property, is no more fundamental than the fact that three individuals are
co-members of a set, which is an elected property. And so by (C3) and
(Pairwise), if Elected Class Nominalism is true, pairwise resemblances are
no more fundamental than collective resemblances are, and resemblance is
not a binary relation.
Therefore, assuming that opponents of Resemblance Nominalism agree
with (C2) and thus with (C3) and (Pairwise), none of them is justified in
affirming that collective resemblances supervene on pairwise resemblances
and resemblance in some respect. They can be justified in affirming that
collective resemblances supervene on resemblance in some respect just as
they can be justified in affirming that pairwise resemblances supervene on
resemblance in some respect. But as their analysis of resemblance in some
respect is such that resemblance in some respect between more than two
18On Realism about Tropes, see e.g. (Williams 1997), (Campbell 1990), and (Nef 2004,
748-71; 2006).
19Elected class nominalists are better known under the label ‘natural class nominalists’.
Elected class nominalists are natural class nominalists when they interpret ‘elected prop-
erty’ according to Lewis’s notion of a natural class (Lewis 1999a), which is a carnivorous
interpretation of ‘elected property’. But elected class nominalists can also be vegetarian
about elected properties.
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individuals is no less fundamental than resemblance in some respect between
at most two individuals (both being equally grounded in the instantiation
of a universal, or of similar tropes, etc.), their analysis of resemblance in
some respect is such that collective resemblances are no less fundamental
than pairwise resemblances are. So, if (C3) and (Pairwise) are both true,
and provided they agree that there can be true statements of collective
resemblance as I asumed, Binarism is false according to each opponent of
Resemblance Nominalism.
Things are different for the binarist resemblance nominalist because the
binarist resemblance nominalist has a peculiar stance regarding the rela-
tionship between resemblance and resemblance in some respect. Rodriguez-
Pereyra’s version of Resemblance Nominalism is the most accomplished bi-
narist resemblance nominalist proposal and I will thus concentrate my at-
tention on his view. The binarist resemblance nominalist maintains that a
and b’s resemblance in some respect, or their sharing an elected property,20
is grounded in their resemblance. Roughly, a and b resemble in some respect
because a and b resemble each other.
The binarist and the collectivist resemblance nominalists agree that re-
semblance explains ascriptions of resemblance in some respect to at most
two individuals. But they disagree regarding the explanation of ascriptions
of resemblance in some respect to more than two individuals. Suppose that
a, b, and c resemble in some respect. Then, according to the collectivist re-
semblance nominalist, it is the resemblance of a, b, and c which explains that
they resemble in some respect, just as it is the resemblance of a and b which
explains that a and b resemble in some respect. However, according to the
binarist resemblance nominalist, it cannot be the resemblance of a, b, and c
which explains their resemblance in some respect, since resemblance holds
between at most two individuals. The binarist resemblance nominalist’s ex-
planation of collective ascriptions of resemblance in some respect must be
distinct from his explanation of pairwise ascriptions of resemblance in some
respect.
Rodriguez-Pereyra (2002, 156-74) explains resemblance in some respect
between more than two individuals in terms of an ad hoc binary relation
of resemblance, called R*, which can hold not only between individuals but
20Where ‘elected’ is specifically understood as ‘sparse’ in Rodriguez-Pereyra’s theory.
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also between ordered pairs called hereditary pairs.21 Thus roughly, R* is
such that the As (for more than two As) resemble in some respect iff R*
holds between every two As and between every two hereditary pairs of the
same order which are made out of the individuals As. There is a hierarchy of
ordered pairs that are pairs of individuals, pairs of pairs of individuals, pairs
of pairs of pairs of individuals, etc., and the resemblance in some respect of
more than two individuals is explained by the pairwise resemblances between
these individuals and all the hereditary ordered pairs of the same order that
we can construct out of these individuals.
Now, following Rodriguez-Pereyra’s account of collective ascriptions of
resemblance in some respect, it is true that pairwise ascriptions of resem-
blance in some respect to individuals are more fundamental than collective
ascriptions of resemblance in some respect to individuals. For facts of pair-
wise resemblance between two individuals are brute primitive facts which
alone suffice to explain ascriptions of resemblance in some respect to at most
two individuals: a and b resemble in some respect because they resemble.
On the other hand, the primitive facts of pairwise resemblance ground, and
are more fundamental than, the pairwise resemblance facts between hered-
itary pairs of individuals. Pairwise resemblance facts between individuals
and their hereditary pairs together ground, and are more fundamental than,
collective ascriptions of resemblance in some respect to individuals. Finally,
we can explain ascriptions of resemblance to more than two individuals in
terms of the resemblance in some respect of the latter individuals using (C3).
The result is that pairwise resemblance facts are brute primitive facts, while
collective resemblance facts are derived facts: the latter ultimately super-
vene on pairwise resemblances between individuals and hereditary pairs of
individuals. Then, if supervenient entities are no ontological addition, col-
lective resemblances are no addition to the realm of resemblances.
In contrast to its rivals, Rodriguez-Pereyra can account for collective
ascriptions of resemblance in a way that justifies the view that collective
ascriptions of resemblance are less fundamental than pairwise ascriptions of
resemblance and supervene on pairwise ascriptions of resemblance. However,
21I call R* ad hoc because R* is introduced by Rodriguez-Pereyra only for the purpose
of solving the Imperfect Community Difficulty. So ‘ad hoc’ in this sense only means that
what is qualified as such is a purely theoretical device, and I shall insist that there is
nothing deeply wrong in a theory which makes use of such ad hoc devices. The theory is
just more convincing if we can do without such devices.
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the described account of collective ascriptions of resemblance22 assumes that
the primitive of the resemblance nominalist, namely resemblance, cannot
hold between more than two individuals. This is so because we get the result
that collective resemblances are supervenient from the assumption that the
brute facts of resemblance are facts of resemblance between no more than two
individuals. However, our demand for an account of collective resemblances
that justifies the claim that collective resemblances are less fundamental
than pairwise resemblances was a demand for a justification of the binarist
view. Yet Rodriguez-Pereyra satisfies our demand of such an account of
collective resemblance by assuming the binarist view. Unless the binarist
resemblance nominalist provides an independent argument for the view that
resemblance is a binary relation, the latter account is question-begging and
does not justify the view that the resemblance nominalist’s primitive should
be a binary relation.
2.7 Collective resemblance and Resemblance Nom-
inalism
In the last section, I have shown that opponents of Resemblance Nominalism
are not justified in maintaining the binarist view of resemblance. On the
other hand, the resemblance nominalist should provide an independent ar-
gument to the conclusion that the resemblance nominalist’s primitive should
link no more than two individuals, if he aims to justify the described account
of collective resemblances.
As I emphasized at the beginning of section 4 of the present chapter,
Rodriguez-Pereyra provides such an argument, which is that the collec-
tivist resemblance nominalist cannot explain why (Rdistributivity) neces-
sarily holds, whereas the binarist can. If so, one can maintain that the
resemblance nominalist’s primitive should link no more than two individ-
uals for matters of explanatory power. However, Rodriguez-Pereyra’s ex-
planation of the validity of (Rdistributivity), which requires the validity of
(Rcumulativity), fails.
But that Rodriguez-Pereyra’s explanation of the validity of (Rdistribu-
tivity) fails does not mean that he cannot explain it, he can. He can explain
the validity of (Rdistributivity) in terms of his account of collective ascrip-
22Which, I insist, is not Rodriguez-Pereyra’s one, but one we can draw from his theory.
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tions of resemblance in some respect if he maintains (Nec). For if (Nec) is
valid, then if the As (for more than two As) resemble each other, they resem-
ble in some respect. And given his account of resemblances in some respect
between more than two individuals, if the As resemble in some respect, any
x and y such that x and y are among the As resemble each other. So that he
can maintain that (Rdistributivity) is valid because (Nec) is valid and the
proposed account of collective ascriptions of resemblance in some respect is
correct.
The binarist resemblance nominalist can explain the validity of (Rdis-
tributivity) in terms of (Nec). But the collectivist resemblance nominalist
can also explain (Rdistributivity) in terms of (Nec) in the presence of the
assumption that resemblance in some respect is also sufficient for (minimal)
resemblance as follows. (Rdistributivity) is valid because (a) if the As re-
semble each other, they resemble in some respect, (b) if the As resemble in
some respect, any x and y that are among the As resemble in some respect,
and (c) if any x and y that are among the As resemble in some respect, then
any x and y that are among the As resemble each other.
Since (Rdistributivity) is explained in terms of (a), (b), and (c), (Rdis-
tributivity) is not a brute necessity in Collectivist Resemblance Nominalism.
Some may reply that given this explanation it is (a), (b), and (c) which turn
out to be brute necessities.23 But (a), (b), and (c) are not brute necessi-
ties, if the collectivist can explain what he purports to explain, namely why
individuals resemble in some respect and instantiate elected properties.
(a), that is (Nec), and (c) are both explained by the fact that within
Resemblance Nominalism it is the resemblance of individuals that explains,
and uniquely explains their resemblance in some respect. In Collectivist
Resemblance Nominalism, the resemblance of the As explains their resem-
blance in some respect, their sharing an elected property. If x explains y,
then x is sufficient for y.24 Therefore, if the resemblance of the As explains
their resemblance in some respect, the resemblance of the As is sufficient for
their resemblance in some respect, i.e. (Nec). Then, in both versions of Re-
semblance Nominalism, resemblance is what uniquely explains resemblance
in some respect. If so, it may not happen that some individuals resemble
23Where brute necessities are necessary truths having no explanation. In modern meta-
physics, and in particular in Spinoza and Leibniz, it is the Principle of Sufficient Reason
that prevents us from admitting such necessities.
24Cf. (Correia 2005) on explanation relations.
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in some respect while they fail to resemble because if it were the case, their
resemblance in some respect would not be grounded in their resemblance.
But the latter cannot be according to Resemblance Nominalism. Therefore,
that resemblance in some respect is sufficient for resemblance, i.e (c), is
explained in Resemblance Nominalism.
Now (b) is explained, if the collectivist resemblance nominalist can ex-
plain what he purports to explain, i.e why an individual instantiates an
elected property.25 Once the instantiation of an elected property is ex-
plained in terms of resemblance, that some individuals, a, b, and c resemble
in some respect can be explained in terms of a conjunction of the following
form: a instantiates the elected property P, b instantiates the elected prop-
erty P, and c instantiates the elected property P.26 And (b) can finally be
explained by the truth-functionality of conjunction.
Therefore, the binarist and the collectivist resemblance nominalists are
on a par regarding the explanation of (Rdistributivity). Rodriguez-Pereyra
cannot explain more than the collectivist resemblance nominalist does and
the collectivist’s explanation of (Rdistributivity) does not assume more than
the binarist’s explanation of it. If I am right, Rodriguez-Pereyra is not
justified in maintaining that resemblance, the primitive of the resemblance
nominalist, cannot link more than two individuals.
On the other hand, there is a good reason to maintain that the primitive
of the resemblance nominalist should be a resemblance property that can
link more than two individuals. Let us come back to our starting point:
the Imperfect Community Difficulty. If we follow Hausman’s suggestion
and allow resemblance to hold between more than two individuals, then we
have available an easy and elegant solution to the Difficulty. Members of
an imperfect community do not resemble each other, since they resemble
in no common respect. Members of a perfect community resemble each
other, on the assumption that resemblance in some respect is sufficient for
the relevant ascriptions of minimal resemblance. The resemblance property
the collectivist appeals to in order to solve the difficulty here is the famil-
iar property that is instantiated by individuals when and only when they
resemble in some respect, and this is the resemblance property opponents
of Resemblance Nominalism purport to analyse in terms of their favourite
25Cf. chapter 9.
26Provided we assume as I did in the previous section that the sharing of an elected
property is sufficient and necessary for resemblance in some respect.
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primitive. Moreover, this solution commits us to no entities besides concrete
individuals.
By contrast, consider Rodriguez-Pereyra’s solution to the difficulty. First
R* is taken as a primitive. Then an imperfect community of individuals is
such that every two of its members stand in the relation R*, but such that
some hereditary n-ordered pairs constructed out of the latter individuals do
not stand in the relation R*; a perfect community of individuals is such that
every two of its members stand in the relation R* and such that every two
hereditary n-ordered pairs constructed out of the latter individuals stand in
the relation R*. By making use of R*, Rodriguez-Pereyra solves the Imper-
fect Community Difficulty27 but at a daunting price of technical complexity,
lack of familiarity, and ontological commitment.
R* is a less familiar resemblance property than the resemblance property
used by the collectivist to solve the difficulty. All the rest being equal, it
is of course better to assume as primitive a resemblance property we are
familiar with instead of a resemblance property we are not familiar with;
for it makes the proposal more convincing. Second, it seems also preferable
to solve the difficulty without too much technical tools because, again, it
makes the proposal more convincing. Finally, a solution that incurs no
commitment to extra entities is clearly better than a solution that incurs
commitment to an extra kind of entities. And Rodriguez-Pereyra’s solution
incurs commitment to hereditary ordered pairs that are set-like entities.28
The latter provide a good, and I think sufficient, reason to maintain
that the resemblance nominalist should, like his opponents, agree that re-
semblance can link more than two individuals.
I have argued that resemblances between more than two individuals are
not mere conjunctions of resemblances between at most two individuals. I
have argued, on the basis of a plausibly true account of ascriptions of min-
27However, his solution has been found objectionable; see e.g. (Dorr 2005) and
(MacBride 2004).
28It is true that I also commit myself to set-like entities by following Lewis in assuming
that abundant properties are set. But I do so only because I need some account of
abundant properties and that the set-theoretic account of them is presently the best
available account (but we may hope for better days when we look at developments in
plural logics and semantics for these logics that make use of no set-like entities (McKay
2006, 55-77)). I do not commit myself to sets in order to solve the Imperfect Community
Difficulty. So someone who rejects sets can endorse the collectivist solution to this difficulty
but cannot endorse Rodriguez-Pereyra’s solution.
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imal resemblance to more than two individuals, (C2), that no metaphysics
of properties can justify the claim that collective resemblances are less fun-
damental than pairwise resemblances. If there can be true ascriptions of
collective resemblance and if collective resemblances are no less fundamen-
tal than pairwise resemblances, then Collectivism is true.
Resemblance can hold between two individuals and between more than
two individuals. If so, resemblance seems to be a multigrade property: a
property that can hold on different occasions between different numbers of
individuals. Yet some may endorse the collectivist view of resemblance and
deny that resemblance is a multigrade property as I shall discuss in the last
section of the present chapter.
2.8 Fixing the arity of resemblance
Nothing in the nature of resemblance seems to constrain the number of in-
dividuals between which it can hold. Therefore, resemblance is, at least
prima facie, a multigrade property. Yet one may agree that resemblance
can be truly asserted of more than two individuals and deny that resem-
blance is a multigrade property on the grounds that there are no multigrade
properties.29
In order to avoid the conclusion that resemblance is a multigrade prop-
erty of individuals, two strategies are available. We might think of resem-
blance as a property of sets of individuals, or we can think of it as a prop-
erty of mereological fusions of individuals. According to the former strategy,
what we do in fact by ascribing resemblance to John, Jack, and Jim is as-
cribing it to the set {John, Jack, Jim}; according to the latter view, when
we ascribe resemblance to John, Jack, and Jim, what we do is ascribing re-
semblance to the mereological fusion John+Jack+Jim. Both strategies have
the welcome consequence that they fix both the arity and the adicity of re-
semblance, but in a surprising way: these two strategies make resemblance
unary and monadic. According to the former, resemblance is a unary and
monadic property of sets. According to the latter, resemblance is a unary
and monadic property of mereological fusions. I shall say that these two
views have been defended by no philosopher, plausibly because, with Haus-
29This tradition goes back at least to (Russell & Whitehead 1925, xix) and has been
promoted over three decades by Armstrong. For a detailed discussion of this tradition see
(MacBride 2006, 568-95).
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man’s exception, they all endorse the binarist view. But the mereological
strategy is inspired by the so-called compound object strategy discussed in
(MacBride 2006, 580-4). My aim in this section is to argue against these
two possible strategies.
2.8.1 The set-theoretic strategy
According to the set-theoretic approach, resemblance is a property of sets of
individuals, such that the number of members of the sets to which resem-
blance applies varies on different occasions. If resemblance is understood as
such, then given Inegalitarianism there are sets instantiating resemblance
and sets that do not instantiate it.
The strategy makes resemblance something wholly different from what
we think it is. It is not only that, according to this view, resemblance
is a property of abstract entities, and only of abstract entities, it is also
that what it is for something to instantiate the resemblance property is
very different from what we think it is. If we say of something that it
resembles itself, it seems that what we mean is that this thing instantiates
the resemblance property. But, according to the set-theoretic approach, that
something resembles itself and that something instantiates the resemblance
property are two different things. For, according to the strategy, that an
individual a resembles itself means that the singleton {a} instantiates the
resemblance property, and that {a} resembles itself means that the singleton
{{a}} instantiates the resemblance property, and so on. Thus according
to this strategy, to say that something resembles itself is not to ascribe a
property to this thing, but to its singleton.
A deeper worry with the view is that it seems to get the order of expla-
nation wrong. Sets supervene on their members. So it seems that the fact
that a set instantiates the property of resemblance should be explained by
what its members are. But according to the set-theoretic strategy, it seems
that individuals resemble each other because their set has the resemblance
property and not the other way round.
The friend of the set-theoretic strategy cannot maintain that the set
instantiates the resemblance property because its members resemble each
other. For if she does so she reintroduces a property of resemblance instan-
tiated by the members of the set which would not be unary. The advocate
of the set-theoretic strategy might reply that the set has the property of
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resemblance in virtue of the fact that its members resemble in some respect.
If so, resemblance tout court and resemblance in some respect come totally
apart. Resemblance in some respect is a property of the members of the set.
If the members of a set resemble in colour, their resemblance in colour is
certainly not a property of the set since sets have no colour. So resemblance
in some respect is a property of individuals but resemblance tout court is a
property of sets. This makes resemblance and resemblance in some respect
come totally apart, and we should be reluctant to such a result.
Also I cannot make sense of the strategy unless it implies a conception
of properties which is not as abundant as mine. I conceive of resemblance
as an abundant property. On the other hand, the set-theoretic strategy
incurs commitment to sets. Yet if sets exist and if there are individuals
that resemble each other, there certainly is a set of resembling individuals.
I say that this set is the resemblance property holding between individuals.
But according to the set-theoretic strategy, the resemblance property cannot
be the set of resembling individuals, since resemblance is not a property of
individuals.
Yet there is the set of resembling individuals. So suppose that the friend
of the set-theoretic strategy agrees with my conception of abundant prop-
erties according to which any set of individuals is a property of individuals.
On this assumption there is a property that is the set of resembling individ-
uals, however, this property is not the resemblance property. Nevertheless,
the property that is the set of resembling individuals is a multigrade prop-
erty if I am right that resemblance can hold between indeterminately many
individuals. It follows from the latter that if the friend of the set-theoretic
strategy agrees with my conception of abundant properties, she fails to avoid
multigrade properties. In this case, the strategy is pointless.
If the friend of the strategy aims to avoid multigrade properties, then
she must have a conception of properties which is different from mine, and
less abundant than mine. If so the friend of the set-theoretic strategy and I
are just talking past each other: we have the same ontology of individuals
and sets, but the friend of the set-theoretic strategy simply refuses to call a
property what I call a property.
Or perhaps the ontology of the friend of the set-theoretic strategy is
qualitatively richer than mine. Perhaps her ontology is made of individuals,
sets, and universals (or tropes), and she thinks of the resemblance property
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as a universal instantiated by sets of resembling individuals. If so, then
her universals are neither abundant, in the most inclusive sense, nor sparse.
They are not abundant in the most inclusive sense because if they were, there
would be a universal common to all resembling individuals: a universal of
resemblance instantiated by individuals and which is multigrade. But her
universals are not sparse either because sparse universals are properties of
individuals, not properties of their sets.
If the rejection of the view that resemblance is a multigrade property of
individuals is at this cost – an important revision of our conception of re-
semblance, the conclusion that resemblance and resemblance in some respect
are properties instantiated by different kinds of entities, and the admission
of an unorthodox conception of universals (or tropes) –, then the game is
not worth the candle.
2.8.2 The mereological approach
The mereological strategy also conceives of resemblance as a unary and
monadic property but of mereological fusions of individuals. The mereolog-
ical strategy is also a revisionary view of resemblance. For, according to it,
mereological atoms cannot instantiate the resemblance property, and what
it means to say that some mereological fusion instantiates the resemblance
property is not that the fusion resembles itself but that some of its proper
parts resemble each other.
But the mereological approach faces a more decisive difficulty that nei-
ther the multigrade nor the set-theoretic approach faces. Suppose that John,
Jack, and Jim resemble each other. The latter, according to the mereolog-
ical approach, is to be analysed as the fact that the mereological fusion of
John, Jack, and Jim, for short (John+Jack+Jim), has the property of re-
semblance. Suppose then that the mereological fusion of John and Jack,
(John+Jack), and Jim resemble each other. That (John+Jack) and Jim re-
semble each other is according to the mereological approach to be analysed
as the fact that the mereological fusion of (John+Jack) and Jim, that is
((John+Jack)+Jim), has the resemblance property.
But the mereological fusion (John+Jack+Jim) is identical to the mere-
ological fusion ((John+Jack)+Jim) by associativity of mereological summa-
tion. If so, by Leibniz’s Law, it is not possible that resemblance is a prop-
erty of (John+Jack+Jim) without being a property of ((John+Jack)+Jim).
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However, it is intuitively possible that John, Jack, and Jim resemble each
other without it being the case that the mereological fusion of John and Jack
resembles Jim. I conclude that the mereological approach fails to distinguish
distinct resemblance facts.
Once we admit that resemblance can hold between more than two in-
dividuals, the set-theoretic and the mereological approaches appear to be
the only available strategies to fix the arity of resemblance. The mereologi-
cal view encounters a decisive objection and, because of its high theoretical
cost, the set-theoretic strategy does not constitute an appealing alternative
to the view that resemblance is multigrade. Therefore, I endorse the view
that the resemblance of individuals is a multigrade property of individuals.
Chapter 3
The Adicity of Resemblance
Resemblance properties are multigrade properties; they can hold between
an indeterminate number of individuals. But what is their adicity? In
this chapter I first argue that non-comparative resemblance properties are
monadic. Since my argument relies on the symmetry of the transitive form
of the resemblance verb I discuss objections to the assumption that the tran-
sitive form of the verb is symmetrical in section 3.2. In section 3.3 I consider
whether comparative resemblance is a four-termed relation, and argue that
it is not. Comparative resemblance is a dyadic multigrade property. Finally,
I shall briefly account for such monadic and dyadic multigrade properties in
the set-theoretic framework.
3.1 From dyadic to monadic
Non-comparative resemblance has traditionally been thought of as a dyadic
relation. Why is it so? I think the only reasons for this traditional view
are linguistic. The main reason is that statements of resemblance can be,
and often are, expressed using a transitive resemblance verb that can be
saturated by plural or singular expressions. These statements are of the
following forms:
(3.1) x resembles y
(2.7) X resemble y
(2.8) x resembles Y
(2.9) X resemble Y
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(where ‘X’ and ‘Y ’ are as usual free occurrences of plural variables). In such
statements resemblance apparently groups the individuals between which it
holds between subjects of resemblance and objects to which the subject(s)
resemble(s). We usually think that to transitive verbs there correspond
dyadic properties because these verbs contain two places that are to be
saturated each by a term. Thus since there is a transitive form of the
resemblance verb that is to be saturated by two terms, we think that to this
verb there corresponds a dyadic relation.
A second linguistic use which may have helped forming the belief that
resemblance is dyadic is that we say that resemblance holds between individ-
uals; and betweenness is often taken as the mark of relationality and thus
polyadicity. But the reason why we use the word ‘between’ in “resemblance
holds between X” need be no more than the fact that we use transitive
resemblance verbs to express resemblance statements. For there does not
seem to be any order, for instance, in “resemblance holds between John,
Jack, and Jim” given that a collective ascription of resemblance is not a
mere conjunction of pairwise resemblances.1
Last but not least, a further reason why we believe resemblance to be
dyadic is that classical first-order singular logic, the logic we learn as a first
year student in philosophy, conflates the adicity and the arity of predicates:
if a predicate is binary, i.e. is predicated to one or two entities, first-order
singular logic represents it as a dyadic predicate; and, in general, if a predi-
cate is n-ary, first-order singular logic represents it as n-adic. So first-order
singular logic leads to the result that resemblance is dyadic only if resem-
blance is binary. But resemblance is not binary and there is no necessity
that if a predicate is n-ary, it is then n-adic.2 Besides these linguistic reasons
I can think of no other reason to believe that resemblance is dyadic.
Regarding our linguistic use, there also are statements of resemblance
that are expressed using the predicate ‘X resemble each other’ which is to
be saturated by one, and no more than one, term. These are the statements
of the form (2.6) I focused on in the previous chapter. The form of “the
students resemble each other” is not different from that of “the students
1Consider: “Hesperus is identical to Phosphorus; therefore, identity holds between
Hesperus and Phosphorus”. We can use ‘between’ here, but there is no order as there is
not even distinctness.
2This is one of the consequences of plural logics: in plural logics a monadic predicate
can be saturated by a single term denoting many, sometimes infinitely many, entities.
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form a circle”, and forming a circle is a clear monadic, given my usage of
the term, though multigrade property.3 Regarding statements of the form
of (2.6), resemblance is a property that individuals together have or fail to
have, just as forming a circle is a property that individuals, students, points
or whatever, together have or fail to have.
So if the central motivation for the belief that resemblance is dyadic is
that the transitive form of the resemblance verb requires to be saturated by
two terms, it seems that statements involving ‘X resemble each other’, which
is to be saturated by only one term, equally suggest that resemblance is, at
least sometimes, monadic. Is it then that resemblance is variably polyadic,
sometimes monadic and sometimes dyadic? I do not think so. I shall argue
that resemblance is monadic. Since I think that the reason for believing
that resemblance is dyadic is purely linguistic my argument will be purely
linguistic.
I will argue that every transitive predicate of resemblance which is to be
saturated by two terms can be defined in terms of ‘X resemble each other’
which is to be saturated by only one term and whose semantic value seems
to be a monadic multigrade resemblance property. This provides a necessary
but no sufficient condition for resemblance to be monadic. My motivation
for thinking that resemblance is monadic is that, given the discussion of
(C1) in chapter 2, the converse definition is not possible. We cannot define
the predicate ‘X resemble each other’ in terms of a transitive predicate of
resemblance that is to be saturated by two terms. So every resemblance fact
can be reported using a resemblance verb which is to be saturated by only
one term, while not every resemblance fact can be reported using (only) a
resemblance verb that is to be saturated by two terms.
Therefore, if the adicity of a property has anything to do with the number
of terms that are needed to saturate the predicate we use to represent this
property in a language with sufficient expressive power, then the latter are
sufficient reasons to think that resemblance is monadic. If the adicity of
a property has nothing to do with the number of terms that saturate the
predicate which represents this property, then there is no good reason to
think that resemblance is dyadic.
3Some may thought that forming a circle is a relational property of constitution. But
it can be relational and monadic. The view that forming a circle is a monadic property,
in my sense of the term, is defended by MacBride; cf. (MacBride 2006, 587).
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First consider statements of the form (3.1). Assuming that the transitive
form of the resemblance verb ‘x resembles y’ is symmetrical, it is obvious
that from “Dee resembles Dum”, it follows that Dee and Dum resemble
each other and vice versa. Hence the following is a valid translation scheme
assuming that resemblance is symmetrical:
(Def1) x resembles y iff x and y resemble each other.
Therefore, assuming the symmetry of the transitive form of the resemblance
verb I can define the predicate ‘x resembles y’ in terms of ‘X resemble
each other’ and thus translate every statement of the form (3.1) into a
statement of the form (2.6). The converse, however, is not true given that
(Rcumulativity) fails. We cannot define the predicate ‘X resemble each
other’ in terms of ‘x resembles y’ alone. Given this result, every resemblance
statement of the form (3.1) which seems to assert a resemblance between a
subject of the resemblance relation and an object of the resemblance relation
can be understood as a resemblance statement that asserts the resemblance
of some individuals without imposing any groupings between them, but not
vice versa.
It remains to argue that resemblances between more than two individ-
uals that are expressed by means of statements of the forms (2.7)-(2.9) do
not impose any groupings between the individuals of which resemblance is
asserted. Statements of the form (2.7) – X resemble y – involve a resem-
blance predicate that takes a plural term in its first argument position and
a singular term in its second argument position; in statements of the form
(2.8) – x resembles Y –, the resemblance predicate takes a singular term
in its first place and a plural term in its second place; in statements of the
form (2.9) – X resemble Y – the resemblance predicate takes a plural term
in both positions.
If it can be shown that (2.7)-(2.9) are analysable in terms of (3.1) – i.e.
in terms of “x resembles y” – , then (2.7)-(2.9) can be analysed in terms
of statements of the form (2.6) “X resemble each other”, since (Def1) is
intuitively valid.
We can follow Butchvarov’s suggestion that “x resembles y and z” is
analysable as “x resembles y and x resembles z”. In a similar vein, we
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would like “x and y resemble z” to be equivalent to “x resembles z and y
resembles z”.4 Thus:
(Def2) X resemble y iff for any z such that z is one of X, z resembles y.
(Def3) x resembles Y iff for any z such that z is one of Y , x resembles z.
(Def4) X resemble Y iff for any w and for any z such that w is one of X
and z is one of Y , w resembles z.
Whenever the free occurrences of plural variables ‘X’ and ‘Y ’ are replaced by
plural designators which denote each distributively every x that is among
the plurality, (Def2)-(Def4) are trivially valid. But what if they denote
otherwise? Consider the following instance of (2.9):
(3.2) The Rolling Stones resemble The Beatles.
It is not inconsistent to assert (3.2) and to deny at the same time that Keith
Richards resembles Paul McCartney. But if (Def4) were correct, it would
follow from (3.2) that Keith Richards resembles Paul McCartney. So (Def4)
can fail, and it is plausible that (Def2) and (Def3) can be violated in a
similar vein.
Some may think that (3.2) yields a violation of (Def4) because in (3.2)
we are not referring to the members of The Rolling Stones and the mem-
bers of The Beatles but to two individuals: the band called ‘The Rolling
Stones’, and the band called ‘The Beatles’. But we need not appeal to
the controversial claim that bands are distinct from the individuals that
compose them to explain why (3.2) is not incompatible with the judgement
that Keith Richards does not resemble Paul McCartney. For we can explain
the compatibility of these judgements in terms of collective denotation: in
(3.2), ‘The Rolling Stones’ denotesc The Rolling Stones, and ‘The Beatles’
denotesc The Beatles; i.e. they do not refer distributively to each member
of the band.
On the other hand, the resemblance verb ‘X resemble Y ’ is symmetrical
just as its singular counterpart (3.1) is. Given the symmetry of ‘X resemble
Y ’, the following follows from (3.2):
(3.3) The Rolling Stones and the Beatles resemble each other.
4see section 4 of chapter 2.
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The inference from (3.2) to (3.3) parallels the inference from “the F s resem-
ble the Gs” to (2.10) – “the F s and the Gs resemble each other” – that we
considered in sections 4 and 5 of the preceding chapter. There I have con-
cluded that, given the latter inference, ‘the F s and the Gs’ does not denote
collectively in (2.10). So we should also conclude that ‘The Rolling Stones
and The Beatles’ does not denote collectively in (3.3).5 Therefore, ‘The
Rolling Stones and the Beatles’ denotes distributively in (3.3). But ‘The
Rolling Stones and the Beatles’ cannot denote distributively every x and y
such that x is among the Rolling Stones and y is among the Beatles. For
otherwise it would be the case that Richards resembles McCartney, what
we denied. So ‘The Rolling Stones and the Beatles’ in (3.3) denotes dis-
tributively the bands, but not the members of the bands. Thus using Oliver
and Smiley’s apparatus, ‘The Rolling Stones and The Beatles’ denotesd The
Rolling Stones and The Beatles where ‘The Rolling stones’ denotec The
Rolling Stones and ‘The Beatles’ denotesc the Beatles.
(Def2)-(Def4) can fail. However, since (3.2) is clearly equivalent to (3.3),
the following translation schemes for (2.7)-(2.9) appear more promising pro-
vided we correctly fix the denotation of the plural terms:
(Def2′) X resemble y if and only if X and y resemble each other.
(Def3′) x resembles Y if and only if x and Y resemble each other.
(Def4′) X resemble Y if and only if X and Y resemble each other.
Let a compound plural variable be a plural variable obtained by connecting
variables with the word ‘and’. So ‘X and y’, ‘x and Y ’, and ‘X and Y ’ are
such compound plural variables. And let a substitution instance of a variable
be any term we substitute for this variable to saturate a predicate. First,
we should fix the denotation of plural terms in such a way that, in the right-
hand side of any instantiation of either of (Def2′)-(Def4′), the substitution
instance for the most complex compound plural variable – which is either
‘X and y’, ‘x and Y ’, or ‘X and Y ’ – refers distributively. Thus if we
substitute ‘the As and b’ for ‘X and y’ in (Def2′), ‘the As and b’ denotesd
the As and b; if we substitute ‘a and the Bs’ for ‘x and Y ’ in (Def3′), ‘a
5For if it did denote collectively, we could use (Rdistributivity) to deduce from (3.3)
that Keith Richards resembles Paul McCartney; which, we assumed, does not follow from
(3.2).
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and the Bs’ denotesd a and the Bs; and if we substitute ‘the As and the Bs’
for‘X and Y ’ in (Def4′), ‘the As and the Bs’ denotesd the As and the Bs.
Second, in any instantiation of either of (Def2′)-(Def4′), we should fix the
denotation of the substitution instance for ‘X’ and ‘Y ’ in such a way that
the substitution instance refers in the same way in the left- and right-hand
sides of the equivalence.
If we keep fixed the denotation of substitution instances for plural vari-
ables according to these conventions, (Def2′)-(Def4′) are valid on the as-
sumption that the transitive form of the resemblance verb is symmetrical.
If so, each non-comparative resemblance statement can be understood as
a statement of the form (2.6), since the right-hand side of each of (Def2′)-
(Def4′) is of this form. Every resemblance facts can be reported using the
monadic predicate ‘X resemble each other’, whereas, given the failure of
(Rcumulativity), it is not the case that every resemblance fact can be re-
ported using (only) a transitive resemblance verb that is to be saturated
by two terms. Since statements of the form (2.6) assert the resemblance of
individuals without imposing any groupings between these individuals, this
result provides a good reason to affirm that non-comparative resemblance
properties are not dyadic but monadic properties. So I endorse the view
that non-comparative resemblance is monadic and multigrade.
3.2 Are there asymmetrical resemblances?
Whether (Def1) is valid depends on the assumption that the transitive form
of the resemblance verb, ‘x resembles y’, is symmetrical. Is it?
An empirical study by Amos Tversky seems to provide a reason for
thinking that it should not be assumed that ‘x resembles y’ is symmetrical
(Tversky & Gati 1978). The hypothesis tested has three parts: (i) state-
ments like “a resembles b” are directional: in such statements, a occupies
the subject position (i.e. is the subject) and b occupies the referent position
(i.e. is the referent). (ii) In such directional statements, we tend to select
the most familiar object as the referent and the least familiar object as the
subject. (iii) Let a be the most familiar object and b be the least familiar
one. Then observers tend to ascribe a greater degree of resemblance to a and
b when a appears in the referent position than to a and b when a appears
in the subject position.
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To test the hypothesis, two groups of 77 subjects were instructed to
ascribe a degree of resemblance (between 1 (no similarity) to 20 (maximal
similarity)) to pairs of countries. Pairs of countries are such that the first ele-
ment a is conceived of as considerably more familiar than the second element
of the pair b. One group is asked to ascribe a degree of resemblance to the
pair (a,b) while the other group is asked to ascribe a degree of resemblance
to the pair (b,a). The data confirm that the average degree of resemblance
ascribed by members of the former group is in general sensibly greater than
the average degree of resemblance ascribed by members of the latter group.
Tversky concludes from these results that the assumption of symmetry of
the transitive form of the resemblance verb is not to be maintained.6
Lewis (1973, 51-2) provides a further argument against the assumption of
symmetry. Lewis’s argument is restricted to possible worlds but, if sound,
it would still show that the symmetry of resemblance is not universally
valid. Lewis suggests that the similarity of w1 to w2 may differ from the
similarity between w2 and w1 because, when the former is evaluated, the
contextually relevant properties are those properties which play a role in
the classification practices of inhabitants of w2, whereas when the latter
is evaluated, the contextually relevant properties are those which play a
role in the classification practices of the inhabitants of w1 (Lewis 1973, 51).
Since classification practices can vary from a world to another, whether a
property is contextually relevant may vary as well. Then if we assume that
resemblance is a matter of contextually relevant properties – that is, if we
interpret ‘elected property’ as meaning contextually relevant property –, it
can happen that w1 resembles w2 from the perspective of w2, while w2 does
not resemble w1 from the perspective of w1.
Lewis’s argument assumes the two first parts of Tversky’s hypothesis:
that statements of resemblance are directional, and that the most familiar
item, the most familiar world, is in general at the referent position. The new
element in Lewis’s argument is that the apparent failure of the symmetry
assumption is explicitly attributed to the context-relativity of resemblance,
which will be the main topic of chapter 6.
6Of course, what Tversky’s argument at best shows is that it is not the case that, for
all x and y, if x resembles y to degree d then y resembles x to degree d. Yet the latter
claim is consistent with the claim that, for any x and y, if x resembles y, then y resemble
x; which is the symmetry assumption for ‘x resembles y’.
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What generates apparent failures of the symmetry assumption is a shift
of context. When making a directional comparison, what we usually do
is electing the salient properties of the most familiar item. Considering
Lewis’s argument, the most familiar world at w1 is w1 itself, whereas the
most familiar world at w2 is w2. Thus when comparing w1 with w2 in w1,
we select the salient properties of w1 and consider whether w2 is similar to
w1 in these respects. Whilst when comparing world w1 with w2 in w2, we
select the salient properties of w2 and consider whether w1 is similar to w2
in these respects. Of course, the salient properties of w1 in w1 need not be
the salient properties of w2 in w2. This explains why in one world the two
worlds may be judged similar and in the other world dissimilar.
But if shifts of context explain apparent failures of the symmetry as-
sumption, then it should be concluded that the symmetry assumption does
not fail. For the symmetry assumption is an assumption about the validity
of inferences of the following form:
x resembles y.
Therefore, y resembles x.
Apparent failures of the symmetry assumption are due to the fact that the
context of evaluation of the premise is not the same as the context of evalua-
tion of the conclusion. Yet standard semantics teaches us to keep the context
fixed when we evaluate an argument for validity.7 If we follow standard se-
mantics on this point, then a genuine failure of the symmetry assumption
would be such that there is a context C within which it is both true that
“a resembles b” and false that “b resembles a”. Yet neither Tversky’s nor
Lewis’s argument supports the belief that there is such a genuine failure of
the symmetry assumption.8 Therefore, no good reason has been given to
drop the assumption that the transitive form of the resemblance verb is sym-
metrical, and I was justified in maintaining this assumption when arguing
that resemblance is monadic.
7A point vigourously held by Kaplan (1989).
8Some may also argue that the truth of the content of resemblance judgements is
independent of the context; cf. chapter 7. If the latter are right, then no failure of the
symmetry of the transitive form of the resemblance verb has been offered by Tversky and
Lewis.
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3.3 The adicity of comparative resemblance
So far I have restricted my attention to non-comparative resemblance, but
we also make judgements of comparative resemblance between individuals.
What is the adicity of comparative resemblance? In comparative resem-
blance judgements we compare the resemblance of some things with the
resemblance of some things. So if I am right that the resemblance of some
things is a monadic multigrade property of these things, it seems that com-
parative resemblance is multigrade and that its adicity is two. In other
words, comparative resemblance is dyadic and multigrade.
Here are illustrations of comparative resemblance statements:
(3.4) Cats resemble each other more than dogs do;
(3.5) Human beings resemble each other more than mammals do;
(3.6) French speaking cantons of Switzerland are more similar to each other
with respect to their unemployment rates than German speaking can-
tons are.
(3.4) and (3.5) are statements of overall comparative resemblance, while
(3.6) is a statement of comparative resemblance in some respect. I focus here
on statements of overall comparative resemblance. Such sentences compar-
ing the homogeneity of a population with the homogeneity of another are
quite common in our ordinary as well as in scientific discourse. At least
some initial plausibility is attached to the view that acts of comparing indi-
viduals in the way expressed by sentences (3.4)-(3.6) are constitutive of our
classification practices.
Sentences (3.4) and (3.5) explicitly involve a comparative resemblance
predicate which is a dyadic multigrade predicate of comparative resem-
blance. These statements have the following form:
(3.7) X resemble each other more than Y do.
The comparative predicate ‘resemble more than’ is called strict resemblance.
Here is the weak counterpart of (3.7):
(3.8) X resemble each other at least as much as Y do.
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The standard logic for comparative resemblance is that proposed by Tim
Williamson in (Williamson 1988). In Williamson’s notation, the primitive
comparative resemblance or similarity predicate is T (w, x, y, z) which is to
be read ‘w is at least as similar to x as y is to z’. The strict counterpart of
T is noted Tˆ (w, x, y, z)9 and is to be read ‘w is more similar to x than y is
to z’. The latter predicate is defined as follows:
Tˆ (w, x, y, z) ↔ T (w, x, y, z) & ¬T (y, z, w, x)
Statements of overall comparative resemblance between individuals clearly
compare the resemblance of some individuals with the resemblance of some
individuals. So if the resemblance of individuals is a binary and dyadic
relation, it is doubtless that comparative resemblance is a tetradic relation
holding between at most four individuals; and we may think of Williamson’s
predicate T as representing such a relation. But if the resemblance of indi-
viduals is not a binary and dyadic relation, as I have argued, but a monadic
multigrade property, then it seems that comparative resemblance is a dyadic
multigrade relation: it compares the resemblance of variably many things
with the resemblance of variably many things.
Nevertheless, if every statement of overall comparative resemblance is
representable in terms of Williamson’s primitive comparative resemblance
predicate, one might still prefer to conceive of weak comparative resemblance
as the semantic value of T , i.e. as a tetradic relation, on the grounds that we
should avoid commitment to multigrade relations if possible. I shall argue
that it is not the case that every comparative resemblance statement of the
form of (3.7) or (3.8) is representable in terms of T .
Consider (3.4), “Cats resemble each other more than dogs do”. (3.4) ex-
presses a generality, therefore, we might think that (3.4) can be represented
by means of the universal quantifier and T as follows:
(3.4′) ∀w, x, y, z(Cw&Cx&Dy&Dz → Tˆ (w, x, y, z)).
But (3.4′) cannot be a correct representation of (3.4) since (3.4) does not
imply (3.4′). For instance, suppose that two bulldogs, two twins, are more
similar to each other than some cats are. (3.4) is not inconsistent with this
hypothesis but (3.4′) is.
9This is the notation for strict similarity used by Hansson in (Hansson 1992).
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We might then try to represent (3.4) by combining universal and exis-
tential quantifiers as follows:
(3.4′′) ∀w, x(Cw&Cx→ ∃y, z(Dy&Dz& Tˆ (w, x, y, z))).
But (3.4′′) is not equivalent to (3.4) either. For it is possible that every cat
is more similar to every other cat than some dog is similar to some other dog
and yet dogs resemble each other more than cats do. Thus (3.4′′) is consis-
tent with the contradictory of (3.4). So (3.4′′) is not a correct representation
of (3.4) and any other combination of the universal and the existential quan-
tifiers won’t work, since any such combination of these quantifiers would fail
to express the generality intended in (3.4).
Some may suggest that the worry lies in the weak expressive power of
our existential and universal quantifiers and that if we help ourselves with
a generalised quantifier we could represent (3.4) in terms of T .10 For it may
seem that what “Cats resemble each other” means is that in general, every
two cats resemble each other more than every two dogs do.
But this does not seem right. In many contexts, it is correct to interpret
“the As resemble each other more than the Bs do” as “the average degree
of resemblance between every two As is greater than the average degree of
resemblance between every two Bs”. And in many contexts it is correct
to interpret “in general, every two As resemble each other more than every
two Bs do” as “in general, the degree of resemblance between every two As
is greater than the degree of resemblance between every two Bs”. Yet it is
clearly possible that, for some As and some Bs, it is true that in general, the
degree of resemblance between every two As is greater than the degree of
resemblance between every two Bs, while it is false that the average degree
of resemblance between every two As is greater than the average degree of
resemblance between every two Bs.
Suppose there are one hundred pairs of As and one hundred pairs of Bs.
Suppose that a degree of 0,99 is ascribed to ninety-nine pairs of As, while a
degree of resemblance of 0,01 is ascribed to the remaining pair of As; suppose
that a degree of 0,98 is ascribed to ninety nine pairs of Bs, while a degree
of resemblance of 1 is ascribed to the remaining pair of Bs. Then it is true
that in general, the degree of resemblance of every two As is greater than
10This is the strategy Williamson suggested to me at the Graduate Session of the Joint
Sessions of The Aristotelian Society and Mind Association 2006 (Southampton).
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the degree of resemblance of every two Bs but it is false that the average
degree of resemblance between every two As is greater than the average
degree of resemblance of every two Bs; the average degree of every two As
is equal to that of every two Bs. Therefore, given plausible interpretations
of statements of the form “the As resemble each other more than the Bs”
and “in general, every two As resemble each other more than every two Bs”,
we get the result that these two statements are not equivalent. Generalised
quantifiers are no more helpful than the usual quantifiers are.
Yet one may reply as follows to the last argument. It seems that state-
ments of the form “the As resemble each other more than the Bs do” are
correctly interpreted as “the average degree of resemblance between every
two As is greater than the average degree of resemblance between every two
Bs”. If so, if we can define a function of degree of resemblance in terms of
Williamson’s T ,11 then we get an indirect way to understand statements of
the form (3.8) in terms of a four-termed relation of comparative resemblance,
which is T .
But the general worry with this line of reply is that nothing grounds
the belief that statements of the form “the As resemble each other more
than the Bs do” are always interpreted in the same way. The interpretation
“the average degree of resemblance between every two As is greater than
the average degree of resemblance between every two Bs” seems to be the
intended one in some contexts, but there might be other contexts where
“the As resemble each other more than the Bs do” shall not be interpreted
in this way. For instance, there might be contexts where the latter is to be
interpreted as “the average degree of resemblance between every three As
is greater than the average degree of resemblance between every three Bs”.
Or consider “The Sex Pistols and The Clash resemble each other more than
The Rolling Stones and The Beatles do”. The latter usually is not to be
interpreted as “the average degree of resemblance between every two of The
Sex Pistols and The Clash is greater than the average degree of resemblance
between every two of The Rolling Stones and The Beatles”.
This worry has again to do with the fact that the denotation of plural
expressions can vary with the context. Once we try to represent state-
ments of the form (3.8) which involve plurals into a statement involving a
four-termed predicate of comparative resemblance ranging only over singu-
11As Williamson does in (Williamson 1988).
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lar terms, we irremediably impose a denotation to the plural terms these
statements involve. And if we do impose a denotation to their plural terms
when representing statements of the form (3.8), we run the risk that the im-
posed denotation is not the right one in some context, and we conflate the
semantic and the syntactic. However, if we represent statements of the form
(3.8) as they are, that is as statements involving a two-termed comparative
resemblance predicate ranging over plurals, then we impose no interpreta-
tion on these statements and no denotation to their terms so that we do not
conflate the semantic and the syntactic.
Moreover, as Williamson (1988, 458-9) insists, whether we can construct
a function of degree of resemblance depends on the cardinality of our com-
parative resemblance ordering, i.e. on the number of distinct places on the
ordering. If the cardinality of a comparative resemblance ordering is not
a countable subset of the set of the reals, then we cannot define a func-
tion of degree of resemblance ranging over this resemblance ordering. As
Williamson shows, no function of degree of resemblance under the usual or-
dering of the reals can give the similarity ordering of all possible worlds. So
let us quantify unrestrictedly over possible worlds and assert the plausible
(3.9) Some worlds, the φ-worlds, resemble each other more than other
worlds, the ψ-worlds, do.
(3.9) cannot be interpreted as
(3.9′) There are some worlds, the φ-worlds, and some worlds, the the ψ-
worlds, such that the average degree of resemblance between every two
φ-worlds is greater than the average degree of resemblance between
every two ψ-worlds.
Moreover, given the above discussion about the degrees of resemblance of
the As and the Bs, it is conceivable that there are φ-worlds and ψ-worlds
(where quantification is unrestricted) such that (i) “the φ-worlds resemble
each other more than the ψ-worlds do” is true of them, (ii) “for every w,
x, y, z, such that w and x are among the φ-worlds and y and z are among
the ψ-worlds, w resembles x more than y resembles z” is false of them, and
(iii) “in general, every two φ-worlds resemble each other more than every
two ψ-worlds” is false of them. If there are such worlds, then (i) cannot be
represented in terms of Williamson’s T . If one denies that there are such
worlds, then one gets the modal facts wrong.
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A logic for comparative resemblance which assumes as primitive a dyadic
multigrade comparative resemblance predicate of the form (3.8) would have
no such difficulties. For every statement of the form (3.8) would be repre-
sentable in this logic. Moreover in this logic we could represent any state-
ment we can represent by means of Williamson’s logic, since we can easily
define the primitive T in terms of the dyadic multigrade comparative resem-
blance predicate (3.8) as follows:
(DefT) T (w, x, y, z) =df w and x resemble each other at least as much as
y and z do.
Therefore, we are justified in conceiving of comparative resemblance as a
dyadic multigrade property for the following reasons. First, comparative
resemblance compares the resemblance of objects with the resemblance of
objects and the resemblance of objects is a monadic property of these ob-
jects. Second, we do not seem to be able to represent every statement of
the form (3.8) into a statement involving a four-termed predicate of com-
parative resemblance saturated only by singular terms while the converse
representation is easily performed.
In the long appendix to this thesis, I offer a logic for comparative resem-
blance that takes this result into account and assumes as primitive a dyadic
multigrade predicate of comparative resemblance.
3.4 Resemblance as a monadic multigrade prop-
erty
Non-comparative resemblance properties are monadic multigrade properties.
They impose no groupings on the individuals instantiating them, and the
number of individuals between which these properties hold varies on dif-
ferent occasions. In other words, non-comparative resemblance properties
are satisfied by 1-tuples of one or more individuals. Likewise, comparative
resemblance relations are dyadic multigrade relations in that they always
relate one group of individuals with one group of individuals, where the
number of individuals in each group varies on different occasions. In other
words, comparative resemblance properties are satisfied by ordered pairs of
a variable number of individuals.
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As I said when introducing Inegalitarianism in chapter 1, I follow Lewis’s
lead in conceiving abundant properties as sets of n-tuples of individuals,
though we may conceive of them otherwise, and my aim in this section is
to account for such multigrade properties in this general framework. Once
we conceive of properties as sets of n-tuples of individuals, no difficulty
is attached to the understanding of properties having a fixed arity. I said
that monadic and unary properties of individuals are sets of individuals. But
strictly speaking, since properties are sets of n-tuples of individuals, monadic
and unary properties are sets of singletons. Thus let P1 be an ordinary
monadic and unary property of individuals which is, for simplicity, had by
only four individuals: a, b, c, and d. Then, P1 is the set {{a}, {b}, {c}, {d}}.
Likewise, let P2 be a usual dyadic and binary relation which, for simplicity,
holds only between a and b, a and c, and b and d. Then P2 is the set
{<a, b>,<a, c>,<b, d>}.12
But how are we to understand multigrade properties in the set-theoretic
framework? I propose the following. For instance, let P3 be a monadic
multigrade property such that the following are its instances: a; a and b; c,
d, e; and b and e. P3 is identical to the following set:{{a}, {a} ∪ {b}, {c} ∪
{d} ∪ {e}, {b} ∪ {e}}.
The form of non-comparative resemblance properties is the same as that
of P3. Suppose that “a, b, and c resemble each other” is true for ‘a, b,
and c’ denotingc a, b, and c. Then, using the union operation and given
that resemblance is distributive, this means that a subset of the relevant
resemblance property is the following: {{a} ∪ {b} ∪ {c}, {a} ∪ {b}, {a} ∪
{c}, {b} ∪ {c}, {a}, {b}, {c}}.
The form of a dyadic multigrade property like comparative resemblance
properties can then be understood in an analogous way. Such a property is a
set of pairs of union sets. For instance, one of these dyadic multigrade prop-
erties is the following: {<{a}∪{b}, {c}∪{d}>,<a, {b}∪{c}∪{d}>,<{a}∪
{b} ∪ {c}, {b} ∪ {c} ∪ {d}>}.
I would like to end this section by introducing a possible drawback of this
proposal. Suppose that I assert “sets that are not members of themselves
12Armstrong (1997b, 163) has argued that the notion of order is still a relational notion,
and so by taking relations to be sets of ordered n-tuples one has not eliminated all rela-
tions. See (Rodriguez-Pereyra 2002, 57-60) for a reply, with which I agree, to Armstrong’s
argument.
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resemble each other”. This assertion seems meaningful and yet, according
to my proposal, it expresses no proposition.
For suppose that resemblance holds between the sets that are not mem-
bers of themselves. According to the proposal, this means that the union
set of the sets that are not members of themselves is a member of the set
with which I identify the resemblance property. But there is no union set of
the sets that are not members of themselves, given Russell’s paradox. If I
say that the sets that are not members of themselves do not resemble each
other and thus that the property of not being similar holds between them,
then it is the latter property which contains as a member the union set of
the sets that are not members of themselves. So “sets that are not mem-
bers of themselves resemble each other” has no truth-value and expresses no
proposition.13
If we admit that sets can resemble each other, then we can undermine
this difficulty by having a hierarchy of resemblance and difference properties.
There is a first-order resemblance property which is the set of the resembling
individuals. The members of this resemblance property are either singletons
whose member is an individual or unions of such singletons. There is a
second-order resemblance property which is the set of resembling sets of in-
dividuals. Then there is a third-order resemblance property which is the set
of resembling sets of sets of individuals, and so on and so forth. According
to this strategy, resemblance can hold between all n-tuples of individuals,
between all n-tuples of n-tuples of individuals that are not members of them-
selves, between all n-tuples of n-tuples of n-tuples of individuals that are
not members of themselves, and so on and so forth. But the resemblance
property will be different each time.14
13It should be noticed that “sets that are not members of themselves resemble each
other” also fails to express a proposition according to Tarskian semantics for plural lan-
guages. For in Tarskian semantics the interpretation of the plural term ”sets that are not
members of themselves”, where this term denotes collectively, is the union of these sets
(McKay 2006, 112).
14I am grateful to Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra for having suggested to me this line of
reply.
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Chapter 4
Resemblance, Resemblance
in Some Respect, and
Elected Properties
In the present chapter I attempt to put more flesh on the conceptual analysis
of the various notions of resemblance introduced in chapter 1. In section 1
I come back to the analysis of resemblance in terms of resemblance in some
respect introduced in chapter 2 and argue that resemblance in some respect
is a disjunctive matter. Given the disjunctive character of resemblance in
some respect I argue in section 2 that resemblance respects are not properties
but similarity orderings. In section 3 I distinguish two notions of minimal
resemblance. In section 4 I use the development of sections 1-3 to refine the
analysis of the other notions of resemblance.
4.1 Resemblance in some respect
In chapter 2 I endorsed the following analyses of collective resemblance and
pairwise resemblance:
(C3) the As (for more than two As) resemble each other iff the As resemble
in some respect.
(Pairwise) a and b resemble each other iff a and b resemble in some respect.
(C3) and (Pairwise) together yield the following analysis of resemblance:
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(MR′) the As (no matter how many they are) resemble each other iff they
resemble in some respect.
(MR′) is a correct and traditional analysis of resemblance. As I emphasised
in chapter 2, (C3) is a correct account of collective ascriptions of minimal
resemblance1 so that (MR′) is an analysis of minimal resemblance. Resem-
blance in some respect is necessary for there to be a resemblance between
individuals. And resemblance in some respect, provided it is resemblance in
some elected respect, is also sufficient for there to be a resemblance between
individuals, if anything is.2 Then by (MR) – the As minimally resemble
each other iff there is some resemblance between the As –, we get the result
that the As minimally resemble each other if and only if they resemble in
some respect.
In section 6 of chapter 2 I assumed that individuals resemble in some
respect if and only if they share an elected property. Yet as I said in footnote
16 of chapter 2, this assumption is a simplification. For resemblance in some
respect is disjunctive and the sharing of an elected property is sufficient
though not necessary for resemblance in some respect. If so, (MR′) gives
rise to a disjunctive account of minimal resemblance.
Many things can make individuals resemble in some respect. Given
Inegalitarianism and (MR′), the sharing of an elected property is sufficient
for resemblance in some respect, while the sharing of a merely abundant
property is not. The sharing of an elected property is both necessary and
sufficient for exact resemblance in some respect. However, in ordinary speech
inexact though close resemblance of elected properties appears sufficient
for resemblance in some respect (Searle 1959). We may sometimes, for
instance, agree that an orange individual resembles a red individual with
respect to colour, though they have distinct colours. They resemble in some
respect, but imperfectly. And their imperfect resemblance in some respect
is a resemblance in some elected respect if colours are elected properties.
Hence, individuals resemble in a common respect at least if they share
an elected property or have resembling elected properties. Is that all? No.
Statements like “Sam and Mary resemble with respect to their noses” are
1Where minimal resemblance is the kind of resemblance such that individuals resemble
each other if and only if there is some resemblance between them; cf. chapter 1.
2Here, as always, I assume an inegalitarian notion of resemblance respects such that
only an elected minority of respects – ways of comparing individuals – are genuine resem-
blance respects.
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well-formed, meaningful, and can be true or false. Yet noses are not prop-
erties, they are material parts of material individuals. Likewise, statements
like “Sam and Mary resemble with respect to their shoes” are well-formed,
meaningful, and can be true or false. Yet Sam’s shoes are neither properties
of Sam nor parts of Sam, but things he possesses. Once we consider such
statements it seems that parts and possessions of individuals can be elected,
just as properties can, in such a way that comparing individuals relative to
the relevant parts or possessions can motivate a judgement of resemblance
in some respect. Sam and Mary have more or less gerrymandered parts,
and we do not want gerrymandered parts to make for resemblance in some
respect between them. Likewise, Sam and Mary have gerrymandered pos-
sessions (e.g. a gerrymandered part of their shoes), and we do not want
such gerrymandered possessions to make for resemblances in some respect
between them.
Thus we get the following disjunctive analysis of resemblance in some
respect:
(RR) The As resemble in some respect iff (i) they share an elected prop-
erty, or (ii) they have resembling elected properties, or (iii) they have
resembling (elected) parts, or (iv) they have resembling (elected) pos-
sessions.3
Resemblances with respect to parts or possessions are labelled transferred
similarities by Husserl (1973, 192).4 Transferred similarities are opposed
to direct similarities. Direct similarities are resemblances in some respect
according to conditions (i) and (ii) of (RR). It is clear why transferred sim-
ilarities are said to be transferred. Sam and Mary resemble each other in
virtue of having parts or possessions (e.g. noses, shoes, etc.) which resemble
each other. We ascribe resemblance with respect to their noses to Sam and
Mary on the grounds that their noses have resembling or common proper-
3Of course, when we say that Sam and Mary resemble with respect to their noses
(or their shoes) we do not mean that they share an identical nose (or shoe), but only
that they have resembling noses (or shoes). It seems to me doubtful that we will say of
two individuals that they resemble in some respect because they have a common part or
common possession. Consider: “I and my arm resemble each in some respect by having
my hand in common.”
4Transferred similarities with respect to parts are also called partial similarities by D.
C. Williams (1997, 113).
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ties, or that they themselves have resembling parts. Then the resemblance
of the parts or possessions of Sam and Mary is transferred to Sam and Mary.
According to (RR), resemblance in some respect is a disjunctive notion.
And by (MR′) minimal resemblance is a disjunctive notion.
4.2 Respects of resemblance
On the basis of (RR) we can investigate what a resemblance respect is. Re-
semblance respects are traditionally conceived of as properties. Prior and
Searle have maintained that resemblance respects are determinable proper-
ties:
Determinates under the same determinable have the common re-
lational property, [. . . ], of characterising whatever they do char-
acterise in a certain respect. Redness, blueness, etc., all charac-
terise objects, as we say, “in respect of their colour”; triangular-
ity, squareness, etc., “in respect of their shape”. [. . . ] What this
suggests is that the “respects in which objects are to be char-
acterised”, to which determinable adjectives refer, are related to
the objects not less but more intimately than the determinate
qualities which “characterise” them in the strict and proper sense
of the term. (Prior 1949, 13)
If to say of any two objects x and y that they have a property
A entails that they resemble each other (are alike, are exactly
alike) with respect to (in respect of) B, then A is a determinate
of B. (Searle 1959, 152)
Contrary to this tradition I think that resemblance respects are not proper-
ties, neither determinable nor determinate properties. Transferred similari-
ties are what shows that resemblance respects cannot be properties.
Statements like “a and b resemble with respect to colour”, “Sam and
Paul resemble with respect to their age” at first glance suggest that respects
of resemblance and difference are determinable properties. But statements
like “Sam and Mary resemble with respect to their noses” or “Sam and Mary
resemble with respect to their shoes” may thus equally suggest that respects
of resemblance are not always properties of the compared individuals.
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If we consider transferred similarities, one may suggest that what it
means for some things to resemble with respect to their noses is for them to
resemble with respect to shape of nose; yet the shape of a nose is a property.
But resemblance with respect to noses is indeterminate in a way that resem-
blance with respect to shape of nose is not, and, depending on the context,
resemblance with respect to noses may include more than resemblance with
respect to shape of nose. In some contexts it may happen that in order to
resemble with respect to their noses individuals should not only have noses
having similar shapes but also noses having similar colours, similar sizes, or
similar parts. That is, the nose respect is multidimensional in a way that
the shape of nose respect is not, and the multidimensionality of the nose
respect can vary depending on the context.
It also seems wrong to identify the nose respect with the determinable
property of having a nose. This is so because for individuals to resemble
with respect to their noses is not the same thing as for them to resemble
with respect to their having a nose. In order to resemble with respect to
their noses, individuals must have similar noses, while in order to resemble
with respect to their having a nose, individuals only need to have a nose.
On the other hand, the nose respect, obviously, is not a nose, and thus
is not a part of individuals. Therefore, the nose respect, the respect in
which individuals resemble when we say that they resemble with respect to
their noses, is neither a determinable property of individuals nor a part of
individuals. But what can it be then?
My suggestion is that respects of resemblance are neither properties nor
parts nor possessions; they are resemblance orderings between elected prop-
erties, elected parts, or elected possessions. To say that Sam and Mary
resemble with respect to their noses is to say that they are close on the nose
similarity ordering. To say that a and b resemble with respect to colour is
to say that they are close on the colour similarity ordering. But the nose
similarity ordering is neither a part nor a property of people having a nose
and the colour similarity ordering is not a property of individuals having
colours, whereas the determinable property of being coloured is a property
of individuals having colours.
Of course, the property of being situated on the colour similarity ordering
is a property of individuals having colours, and to my mind the determinable
property of being coloured is rightly understood as the property of being lo-
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cated on the colour similarity ordering. But the property of being located
on the colour similarity ordering is not identical to the colour similarity or-
dering, and resembling with respect to being located on the colour similarity
ordering is not the same, i.e. does not have the same satisfaction conditions,
as resembling with respect to colour. This is the reason why I think that
‘colour’ in ‘resemble with respect to colour’ cannot be the designator for the
determinable property but must be the designator for the colour similarity
ordering.
If this is right, then the general terms that can follow the ‘in respect of’-
clause (like ‘colour’, ‘redness’, ‘age’, ‘shape’, ‘gender’, etc.) are general terms
for similarity orderings. What creates the misleading belief that resemblance
respects are determinable properties is that these general terms are also used
as nominalisations of the determinable properties being coloured, being red,
having an age. Yet, since the colour respect is the colour similarity ordering,
and since the determinable being coloured is not the similarity ordering but
the determinable property of being located on the similarity ordering, what
I contend is that general terms like ‘colour’ are ambiguous. They denote
different things depending on whether they are used in nominal position or
following the ‘in respect of’- or ‘with respect to’-clause; in nominal position,
they denote the determinable property, but following the ‘with respect to’-
clause they denote a similarity ordering.
Now what are similarity orderings? Similarity orderings can be conceived
of in two different ways. We can conceive of them as abstract entities akin
to abstract structure, or we can conceive of them as cognitive constructs,
conceptual maps that we use to classify objects and to perform induction. I
think that the second alternative is the right one, that similarity orderings,
resemblance and difference respects, are what Peter Ga¨rdenfors (2000) calls
conceptual spaces. These are cognitive maps used in various cognitive pro-
cesses. I will say more about these similarity orderings and, in particular on
the resemblance measure which grounds them, in chapter 6.
Phenomena of transferred similarity are interesting and usually ignored
by philosophers. But since transferred similarities are ultimately explained
in terms of direct similarities of elected parts or possessions of the compared
individuals I will focus on direct similarities which I call resemblances.
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4.3 Strong and weak minimal resemblance
Once we leave aside transferred similarities, (MR′) and (RR) give rise to
two notions of minimal resemblance, a strong one and a weak one:
(SMR) The As strongly minimally resemble each other iff the As share
some elected property.
(WMR) The As weakly minimally resemble each other iff (i) the As share
some elected property or (ii) the As have resembling elected properties;
where the As have resembling properties iff there is a series of elected
properties P1, . . . , Pn such that each of the As has exactly one of P1,
. . . , Pn, and P1, . . . , Pn resemble each other.
Strong minimal resemblance entails weak minimal resemblance. Minimal
resemblance can be interpreted as weak or strong, and this is part of the
reason why both (MR) and (MR′) are ambiguous. It is the strong notion of
minimal resemblance I made use of to undermine the binarist view of resem-
blance. But it should now be clear that if I had focused on the weak instead
of the strong notion of minimal resemblance, it would still have followed
that the binarist view of resemblance is illegitimate given the various ways
metaphysicians of properties can interpret the expression ‘elected property’.
Strong and weak minimal resemblance are both discussed in the philo-
sophical literature on resemblance. Armstrong (1978b, 96) analyses the re-
semblance of individuals as identity or resemblance of instantiated (sparse)
universals. Armstrong’s analysis is thus an analysis of weak minimal re-
semblance. On the other hand, Lewis (1986b, 60) describes qualitative sim-
ilarity as the kind of resemblance such that “sharing of them [the sparse
properties] makes for qualitative similarity [. . . ].” And any kind of min-
imal resemblance such that the sharing of elected properties is not only
sufficient but also necessary for instantiating it is a kind of strong minimal
resemblance. Rodriguez-Pereyra’s primitive resemblance relation also is a
strong minimal resemblance relation, since he admits that there is a neces-
sary connection between resemblance and commonality of sparse properties
(Rodriguez-Pereyra 2002, 64).
Strong and weak minimal resemblance are both genuine kinds of minimal
resemblance and have their distinctive virtues. Weak minimal resemblance
is plausibly closer to the property of minimal resemblance we ascribe to in-
dividuals in everyday life than strong minimal resemblance is. But strong
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minimal resemblance is useful in metaphysical applications of resemblance.
In my opinion, strong minimal resemblance is the notion of minimal resem-
blance the resemblance nominalist needs in order to explain the sharing of
an elected property.5 Lewis uses qualitative similarity to define duplication;
duplication itself being very helpful within his philosophy to solve various
difficulties that I will consider in chapter 8.
If your interest in resemblance consists in the analysis of our every-
day ascriptions of resemblance, then your focus should be on weak minimal
resemblance. If your interest in resemblance consists in some of the men-
tioned metaphysical applications of resemblance, then your focus should be
on strong minimal resemblance. My interest in resemblance consists in both,
and so I will pay attention to both kinds of minimal resemblance.
4.4 Resemblance in some respect and other kinds
of resemblance
Minimal resemblance is of course not the only kind of resemblance that can
be understood in terms of resemblance in some respect. Minimal difference
can be analysed thus:
(MD′) The As are minimally different from each other iff the As differ in
some respect.
(MD′) is as disjunctive as (MR′) is, since there are both direct and trans-
ferred minimal differences and since we can also conceive of direct minimal
differences as weak or strong. Understood as weak, minimal difference is
analysed thus:
(WMD) The As are weakly minimally different from each other iff there
is some x and some y such that x and y are among the As and x has
an elected property that y fails to have.
Understood strongly, minimal difference is as follows:
(SMD) The As are strongly minimally different from each other iff there
is a series of elected properties P1, . . . , Pn such that (i) each of the
As has exactly one of P1, . . . , Pn, (ii) P1, . . . , Pn are ordered on a
5Cf. chapter 9 of this study.
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same similarity ordering, and (iii) some properties among P1, . . . , Pn
do not resemble each other, i.e. do not occupy close positions on the
relevant similarity ordering.
Obviously, if a has some property P1 and b has some property P2 such
that P1 and P2 do not resemble each other, then each of a and b has a
property that the other fails to have. Therefore, strong minimal difference
entails weak minimal difference. On the other hand, it can be the case that
there is some elected property had by one of a and b that the other fails to
have, while every elected property of each of a and b resembles some elected
property of the other. Hence, weak minimal difference does not entail strong
minimal difference.
Let me turn to exact resemblance and difference now. Exact difference
is the dual of some minimal resemblance: individuals are exactly different
if and only if there is no resemblance between them. But the dual of which
minimal resemblance? Suppose that a and b share no elected property – and
thus fail to strongly minimally resemble – but are such that they resemble
very closely, though imperfectly, in every respect. In such a case we will
agree that a and b are closely similar to one another and therefore fail to be
exactly different. Since individuals can both fail to be strongly minimally
similar and fail to be exactly different, exact difference is not the dual of
strong minimal resemblance.
On the other hand, if some individuals have no resembling properties,
they are exactly different, and if they have some resembling properties, then
they are not exactly different. Therefore, exact difference seems to be rightly
conceived of as the dual of weak minimal resemblance rather than that of
strong minimal resemblance:
(ED′) The As are exactly different from each other iff the As do not weakly
minimally resemble each other; i.e. iff neither is it the case that the
As share an elected property nor is it the case that there is a series of
elected properties P1, . . . , Pn, such that each of the As has exactly
one of P1, . . . , Pn, and P1, . . . , Pn resemble each other.
Likewise, exact resemblance is defined as the dual of some notion of minimal
difference, but which notion of minimal difference? Suppose that a and b
share all their elected properties with the exception of P1 that is had by
a, and P2 that is had by b. And suppose that P1 and P2 resemble each
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other, but imperfectly. In that case, a and b are weakly minimally different
but they are not strongly minimally different. Do they resemble exactly?
Intuitively, the answer should be negative. For inexact resemblance in only
one respect, no matter how tiny this inexact resemblance may be, is enough
difference for denying that a and b are exactly similar. So individuals can
both fail to strongly minimally differ from each other and fail to resemble
exactly, from which it follows that strong minimal difference is not the dual
of exact resemblance. In order to resemble exactly, individuals must share
all their elected properties. Exact resemblance is to be analysed as the dual
of the weak notion of minimal difference thus:
(ER′) The As are exactly similar iff the As are not weakly different from
each other; i.e. share all their elected properties.
Finally, overall resemblance and overall difference also have to do with
resemblance and difference in some respect in that overall resemblance im-
plies minimal resemblance and overall difference implies minimal difference.
Overall resemblance and difference are the result of some computation of
resemblances and/or differences in some respect and the comparison to a
relevant standard for typicality. This description of the relationship be-
tween overall resemblance and resemblance in some respect is fairly vague
and indeterminate but we cannot provide a determinate analysis of overall
resemblance and difference in terms of resemblance in some respect. There
is no determinate account of overall resemblance and overall difference in
terms of resemblance and difference in some respect. For which computa-
tion of resemblances and/or differences in some respect gives rise to overall
resemblance is a matter of context. I will say more on this issue in chapters
6 and 7.
Chapter 5
Extended Formal Summary
of Preceding Results
In this chapter I propose to state formally the translation schemes of the
various forms of predications of resemblance and then to state formally the
properties of non-comparative resemblance that I have accepted so far: the
entailment relations between the various forms of non-comparative resem-
blance and difference statements, and the distributivity and cumulativity
properties. This will make things clearer. I will restrict my attention to
the properties of non-comparative resemblance because an extended logic of
comparative resemblance is provided in the appendix of this study.
5.1 The language
I will use two kinds of variables: singular variables, x, y, z, . . . each denote
one object; plural variables X, Y , Z, . . . each denote many (at least one) ob-
jects. Since the plural variables denote each at least one object, I could have
used only plural variables and let the context determine whether the plural
variable denotes exactly one object or more than one. Singular variables are
introduced only to add clarity.
The plural language I make use of is the one proposed by McKay (2006,
59-60):
• Basic elements
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– Relations (including predicate) symbols: Bn, Bn1 , B
n
2 , . . . , C
n . . . ,
for each n ≤ 1. ‘A’ is reserved for the designated logical relation
is/are among the;
– a countable infinity of singular constants: a, b, c, . . .;1
– a countable infinity of singular variables: x, y, z, . . .;
– a countable infinity of plural variables: X,Y, Z,X1, X2, . . .;
– unary sentential operator: ¬;
– binary sentential operator: &;
– basic quantifier: ∃.
• terms
– quantified variables are terms;
– constants are terms;
– if T1, . . . , Tn are terms, then bT1, . . . , Tne is a term.
• Clauses
– BnT1, . . . , Tn is a clause (where Bn is an arbitrary n-place rela-
tion symbol, and T1, . . . , Tn are arbitrary n-terms);
– T1AT2 is a clause;
– if G is a clause, then ¬G is a clause;
– if G and H are clauses, then G&H is a clause;
– if Q is a quantifier, v is a variable and G is a clause, then QvG is
a clause;
– a sentence is a clause without free variables.
Additional connectives and quantifiers are defined in the usual way. In
particular, the universal quantifier ∀ is defined as the dual of the existential
1It should be noticed that the syntax proposed by McKay contains only singular con-
stants. His explanation for this is given in footnote 6, page 59 of (McKay 2006). We might
follow Oliver and Smiley (2006) in treating ‘a’, ‘b’, ‘c’ as able to denote more than one
object, and thus as plural constants. The addition of plural constants to McKay’s syn-
tax would demand an enrichment of his semantics as well. Here the semantics proposed
by Oliver and Smiley (2006) would be helpful. However, I will not make use of plural
constants in formal discourse.
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quantifier ∃: ∀XF (X) ↔ ¬∃X¬F (X), where “∀XF (X)” is to be read “no
matter what some things, the xs, are, the xs are F”.2 Brackets ‘(’ and ‘)’
will be used to make the reading more comfortable, but when they aren’t
necessary for this purpose – for instance, around a term of the form ‘b. . .e’
–, they will be suppressed.
McKay (2006) proposes two semantics, a plural semantics and a set-
theoretic semantics, to interpret this language. I let the reader consult
(McKay 2006) for details on the semantics.
I add the following axioms concerning plural terms and the binary logical
predicate ‘A’ (Correia (2005)):
(Non-Emptiness) ∀X∃x(xAX);
(Extensionality) ∀X,Y (XAY ↔ ∀x(xAX → xAY ));
(Identity) ∀X,Y (X = Y ↔ (XAY & YAX));
(Comprehension) ∃xφ(x)→ ∃X ∀x(xAX → φ(x)).
5.2 Definitions
I use symbol R to represent the ambiguous non-comparative predicate ‘X
resemble each other’ so that the primitive scheme for predications of non-
comparative resemblance (2.6) can be represented thus:3
R(X)
Just as the predicate ‘X resemble each other’ can be interpreted as minimal,
exact, or overall, I take the predicate ‘R’ to be ambiguous for minimal,
exact, or overall resemblance. Different predicates corresponding each to
an interpretation of ‘X resemble each other’ will be offered in the following
section.
Here is the semi-formal restatement of definition (Def1)4 that defines the
singular and dyadic predicate ‘x resembles y’ in terms of ‘X resemble each
other’:
2This is the reading proposed by Boolos (1998a).
3(2.6) is the primitive scheme for predications of non-comparative resemblance because
the other forms of predications of non-comparative resemblance can by defined in terms
of (2.6); cf. section 1 of chapter 3.
4Cf. section 1 of chapter 3.
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(Def1*) x resembles y =df Rbx, ye
The following definitions are the semi-formal restatements of translation
schemes (Def2′)-(Def4′):
(Def2*) x resembles Y =df Rbx, Y e
(Def3*) X resemble y =df RbX, ye
(Def4*) X resemble Y =df RbX,Y e
Resemblance may also be comparative. I focus on weak resemblance here,
since strict (“X resemble each other more than Y do”) and equal (“X resem-
ble each other as much as Y do”) resemblance are definable in terms of weak
resemblance (“X resemble each other at least as much as Y do”). These def-
initions are offered in the appendix. Comparative resemblance statements
can be of the form “w resembles x at least as much as y resembles z”. But
they can also be of the following forms:
(5.1a) x resembles y at least as much as Z resemble each other;
(5.1b) x resembles Y at least as much as Z resemble each other;
(5.1c) X resemble y at least as much as Z resemble each other;
(5.1d) X resemble Y at least as much as Z resemble each other;
(5.1e) X resemble each other at least as much as y resembles z;
(5.1f) X resemble each other at least as much as y resembles Z;
(5.1g) X resemble each other at least as much as Y resemble z;
(5.1h) X resemble each other at least as much as Y resemble Z.
And they can be of the following forms:
(5.2a) w resembles X at least as much as y resembles Z;
(5.2b) W resemble x at least as much as Y resemble z;
(5.2c) W resemble X at least as much as Y resemble Z;
(5.2d) W resemble X at least as much as y resembles z;
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(5.2e) w resembles x at least as much as Y resemble Z;
(5.2f) W resemble X at least as much as Y resemble z;
(5.2g) W resemble X at least as much as y resembles Z;
and so on and so forth until we reach all the possible combinations of plural
and singular variables. There are 14 possible combinations involving four
variables, so the list will stop at (5.2n).
Because we cannot rephrase any statement of the form of (3.8) – “X
resemble each other at least as much as Y do”– in terms of Williamson’s
relation T , I propose to represent weak resemblance as a dyadic multigrade
predicate symbolized
WR(X,Y )
and to be read “X resemble each other at least as much as Y resemble each
other”. Williamson’s primitive relation of comparative similarity T can thus
be defined in terms of WR as follows:
(DefT*) T (w, x, y, z) =df WR(bw, xe, by, ze)
Then it is easy to see how to define the predicates (5.1a)-(5.1h) and (5.2a)-
(5.2n). The strategy used will be the same as the strategy used to define
the predicates (2.7)-(2.9). For simplicity I only give the definition of (5.1a),
(5.1e), (5.2a), (5.2c), (5.2d), and (5.2f):
(Def5) x resembles y at least as much as Z resemble each other =df WR(bx, ye,Z)
(Def6) X resemble each other at least as much as y resembles z =df WR(X,by, ze)
(Def7) w resemblesX at least as much as y resembles Z =df WR(bw,Xe,by, Ze)
(Def8) W resembleX at least as much as Y resemble Z =df WR(bW,Xe,bY,Ze)
(Def9) W resembleX at least as much as y resembles z =df WR(bW,Xe,by, ze)
(Def10) W resembleX at least as much as Y resemble z =df WR(bW,Xe,bY, ze)
Such definitions are all valid provided we follow the conventions regarding
the way the denotation of plural terms should be fixed that I introduced in
section 1 of chapter 3. If we follow them, then we see that the proposed
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plural logic for comparative resemblance which uses my primitive ‘WR’ can
represent absolutely every comparative resemblance statement.
This ends the statement of the definitions of the main ordinary language
resemblance predicates I focus on in this study.
5.3 Properties of resemblance and difference
Here I focus on the properties of the non-comparative resemblance and dif-
ference properties that were introduced in chapters 1 and 4.
5.3.1 Properties of resemblance
5.3.1.1 Reflexivity and transitivity for resemblance
Let ‘RSM ’, ‘RWM ’ ,‘RO’, and ‘RE ’ be respectively our predicates for strong
minimal resemblance, weak minimal resemblance, overall resemblance, and
exact resemblance. Reflexivity and transitivity are, first, properties of dyadic
relations but we can make sense of the claim that resemblance properties
have, or fail to have, these formal properties even if resemblance properties
are monadic and multigrade. Anything resembles itself exactly. Therefore,
exact resemblance is reflexive. Then since exact resemblance entails strong
minimal resemblance5, and since strong minimal resemblance entails weak
minimal resemblance6, strong minimal resemblance and weak minimal re-
semblance are reflexive. So we can assume the following:
(R1) ` ∀x RSMbx, xe
(R2) ` ∀x RWMbx, xe
(R3) ` ∀x REbx, xe
Overall resemblance, however, is non-reflexive. In other words, there may
be a context wherein individuals do not resemble themselves saliently more
than is typical. In these contexts, which are fairly extraordinary but not in-
conceivable, exact resemblance is the typical amount of resemblance. Since
individuals exactly resemble themselves, individuals do not resemble them-
selves more than is typical if exact resemblance is the typical amount of
resemblance. Thus, I shall maintain
5See principle (R23) below.
6See principle (R17) below.
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(R4) 0 ∀x RObx, xe7
Transitivity for resemblance, in plural terms, is the following property: no
matter what the xs, the ys, and the zs are, if the xs resemble the ys and
the ys resemble the zs, then the xs resemble the zs. Exact resemblance is
the only non-comparative property of resemblance that is transitive in this
sense. For if the xs share all their elected properties with the ys, and the
ys share all their elected properties with the zs, then the xs share all their
elected properties with the zs. Therefore:
(R5) 0 ∀X,Y, Z (RSMbX,Y e & RSMbY,Ze → RSMbX,Ze)
(R6) 0 ∀X,Y, Z (RWMbX,Y e & RWMbY, Ze → RWMbX,Ze)
(R7) 0 ∀X,Y, Z (RObX,Y e & RObY,Ze → RObX,Ze)
(R8) ` ∀X,Y, Z (REbX,Y e & REbY,Ze → REbX,Ze)
5.3.1.2 Distributivity of resemblance
I agree that (Rdistributivity) is to be maintained as a basic principle about
resemblance. (Rdistributivity) seems to me valid for minimal resemblance
and overall resemblance, but also for exact resemblance. I state formally the
distributivity of the various properties of resemblance as follows (where X
denotes collectively and where ‘x, yAX’ means that x is one of the xs and
y is one of the xs):
(R9) ` ∀X(RSM (X) → ∀x, y (x, yAX → RSMbx, ye))
(R10) ` ∀X(RWM (X) → ∀x, y (x, yAX → RWMbx, ye))
(R11) ` ∀X(RO(X) → ∀x, y (x, yAX → RObx, ye))
(R12) ` ∀X(RE(X) → ∀x, y (x, yAX → REbx, ye))
7Notice that a consequence of (R3) and (R4) is that exact resemblance does not entail
overall resemblance. Some may argue that if my account of overall resemblance yields
the denial that exact resemblance entails overall resemblance, then my account of overall
resemblance must be rejected, since it is counterintuitive. But this is a terminological
issue, my objector meaning simply something different from what I do by the expression
‘overall resemblance’. What I mean by this phrase is a resemblance property we very often
ascribe to individuals in everyday discourse, and that behaves itself just like tallness and
richness properties do. Now suppose that everybody is three feet tall. Then there is no
tall nor short person even if everyone is tall to the highest degree (for persons).
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5.3.1.3 Non-cumulativity of resemblance
In chapter 2 I have shown that (Rcumulativity)8 conflicts with (Nec)9 with-
out specifying how the resemblance predicate in both (Rcumulativity) and
(Nec) is to be interpreted. My rejection of (Rcumulativity) is not due to
the fact that resemblance in (Nec) and (Rcumulativity) were interpreted
differently, however. But this does not show that every non-comparative
resemblance property fails to be cumulative.
According to the analyses introduced in sections 3 and 4 of chapter 4,
it is clear that (Nec) is valid no matter whether we interpret the resem-
blance predicate involved in its antecedent as minimal, overall, or exact. So
whether a property of resemblance is cumulative or not depends on whether
we can construct an imperfect community such that any two members of the
community have this resemblance property but such that all the members
of the community do not have this resemblance property.
We can obviously construct an imperfect community with strong minimal
resemblance, since it is possible that every two members of a community
share an elected property though there is no elected property shared by all
of them. We can also construct an imperfect community with weak minimal
resemblance. For it is possible that every two members of a community
weakly minimally resemble each other though there is no respect in which
all the members of the community (exactly or inexactly) resemble.10 And
we can construct an imperfect community with overall resemblance: it is
possible that any two members of a community resemble each other saliently
more than is typical while it is not the case that all of them resemble each
other saliently more than is typical.11
8Where (Rcumulativity) is the claim that if any x and y such that x and y are among
the As (for arbitrary As) resemble each other, the As resemble each other.
9Where (Nec) is the claim that if the As (for arbitrary As) resemble each other, then
the As resemble in some respect.
10Suppose (i) that a and b (imperfectly) resemble with respect to shape and in no other
respect, (ii) that a and c (imperfectly) resemble with respect to colour and in no other
respect, and (iii) that b and c (imperfectly) resemble in size and in no other respect; where
each of these respects are similarity orderings of elected properties. Then a, b, and c form
such an imperfect community: any two of them are weakly minimally similar, but a, b,
and c are not.
11Suppose that resemblance in one respect is saliently more resemblance than is typical,
i.e. that the standard for typicality is exact difference. Then any imperfect community
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But we cannot construct an imperfect community for exact resemblance.
If any two members of a community exactly resemble each other, all the
members of the community exactly resemble each other. Exact resemblance
is thus cumulative. We shall thus accept the following:
(R13) 0 ∀X,x, y ((x, yAX → RSMbx, ye) → RSM (X))
(R14) 0 ∀X,x, y ((x, yAX → RWMbx, ye) → RWM (X))
(R15) 0 ∀X,x, y ((x, yAX → RObx, ye) → RO(X))
(R16) ` ∀X,x, y ((x, yAX → REbx, ye) → RE(X))
Some may suggest that if exact resemblance is both distributive and cumu-
lative, then exact resemblance can be understood as a binary relation. You
can represent exact resemblance as a binary relation, but still it is not a
binary relation. For, as I said in chapter 4, exact resemblance is the dual of
weak minimal difference. And we have a good reason to uphold that weak
minimal difference is not a binary relation: weak minimal difference is not
distributive (see below the non-distributivity of difference). If weak minimal
difference is not a binary relation neither is its dual.
5.3.2 Relations between resemblance properties
First, there is the relationship between weak minimal resemblance and strong
minimal resemblance. As emphasised in the previous chapter strong minimal
resemblance entails weak minimal resemblance but not vice versa.
(R17) ` ∀X (RSM (X) → RWM (X))
(R18) 0 ∀X (RWM (X) → RSM (X))
It is, of course, impossible for some things to resemble each other signifi-
cantly more than is typical if there is no resemblance between them. Overall
resemblance entails some kind of minimal resemblance, but it does not entail
both. Suppose that two individuals resemble very closely but inexactly in
every respect and that our standard for typicality is such that very close
resemblance in every respect is saliently more resemblance than is typical.
for weak minimal resemblance is an imperfect community for overall resemblance given
this standard.
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It follows that these two individuals resemble overall without being strongly
minimally similar. Therefore, overall resemblance does not entail strong
minimal resemblance, but entails weak minimal resemblance.
On the other hand, there can be a resemblance – be it strong or weak
– between some individuals without it being the case that these individuals
resemble each other saliently more than is typical. Thus we get:
(R19) ` ∀X (RO(X) → RWM (X))
(R20) 0 ∀X (RO(X) → RSM (X))
(R21) 0 ∀X (RWM (X) → RO(X))
(R22) 0 ∀X (RSM (X) → RO(X))
Obviously, individuals cannot share all their elected properties without shar-
ing some of them but can share some elected properties without sharing all
of them. Thus we get:
(R23) ` ∀X (RE(X) → RSM (X))
(R24) 0 ∀X (RSM (X) → RE(X))
And by (R17) we get:
(R25) ` ∀X (RE(X) → RWM (X))
(R26) 0 ∀X (RWM (X) → RE(X))
As I outlined when discussing the reflexivity of overall resemblance, exact
resemblance does not entail overall resemblance. It is clear also that overall
resemblance does not entail exact resemblance. Thus:
(R27) 0 ∀X (RE(X) → RO(X))
(R28) 0 ∀X (RO(X) → RE(X))
5.3.3 Properties of difference
5.3.3.1 Reflexivity and transitivity for difference
Let ‘DSM ’, ‘DWM ’, ‘DO’, and ‘DE ’ respectively stand for our predicates
of strong minimal difference, weak minimal difference, overall difference,
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and exact difference. Every property of difference is irreflexive. This is so
because anything is exactly similar to itself. So we can admit the following
principles:
(D1) ` ∀x ¬DSMbx, xe
(D2) ` ∀x ¬DWMbx, xe
(D3) ` ∀x ¬DObx, xe
(D4) ` ∀x ¬DEbx, xe
No property of difference is transitive. Thus:
(D5) 0 ∀X,Y, Z (DSMbX,Y e & DSMbY,Ze → DSMbX,Ze)
(D6) 0 ∀X,Y, Z (DWMbX,Y e & DWMbY,Ze → DWMbX,Ze)
(D7) 0 ∀X,Y, Z (DObX,Y e & DObY, Ze → DObX,Ze)
(D8) 0 ∀X,Y, Z (DEbX,Y e & DEbY,Ze → DEbX,Ze)12
5.3.3.2 The non-distributivity of difference
Is it the case that if some individuals differ minimally, then any two of them
do? First, since difference is irreflexive, when stating the distributivity or
non-distributivity of difference properties, we shall pay attention to consider
whether or not difference distributes over every two distinct individuals and
only over them.
Minimal difference is trivially distributive if we deny that numerically
distinct entities can be exactly similar, i.e if we maintain that numerical
distinctness entails minimal difference. For no matter what a, b, and c are,
if a 6= b 6= c and a, b, and c minimally differ from each other, then a and b
differ from each other, a and c do, and b and c do.
Once we allow numerically distinct entities to fail to differ minimally,
however, we can show that minimal difference fails to be distributive. Black’s
spheres13 have been thought of as exhibiting a plausible case of numerically
distinct entities that are exactly similar. Suppose (i) that Black’s spheres
12In order to see that (D5)-(D8) should be admitted, it suffices to suppose each time
that X = Z.
13Cf. (Black 1952).
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differ only with respect to their location, (ii) that having the same location is
a necessary condition for identity, and (iii) that the location of an individual
is not an elected property of this individual. Then we get the desired result:
they are numerically distinct, yet not minimally dissimilar, and thus exactly
similar.
Now let us call Black’s spheres ‘a’ and ‘b’. It is clearly true that a, b, and
The Eiffel Tower fail to resemble exactly. If so a, b, and The Eiffel Tower
weakly minimally differ from each other. On the other hand, a and b fail
to be weakly minimally dissimilar since they are exactly similar. Therefore,
weak minimal resemblance is not distributive. It is also plausible that a, b,
and The Eiffel Tower strongly minimally differ from each other – i.e. there
is a respect in which The Eiffel Tower and a, b fail to resemble – even if a
and b fail to strongly minimally differ from each other given that a and b
are exactly similar.
I will admit that minimal difference is not distributive because I admit
that numerically distinct entities can be truly judged exactly similar. That
numerically distinct entities can be truly judged exactly similar actually
derives from the anti-resemblist view introduced in chapter 7 and defended
in chapter 8. Notice, however, that the claim that numerically distinct
entities can be exactly similar is not equivalent to, and does not entail,
that there are indiscernible though numerically distinct entities. In order
to obtain the negation of the principle of identity of indiscernibles, some
further assumptions about the nature of properties are required, and it shall
also be specified whether indiscernibility is a matter of elected or abundant
properties. If indiscernibility is a matter of abundant properties, then the
identity of indiscernibles is trivially valid.14
Overall difference is not distributive either. One can reasonably maintain
both that a painting of Picasso, a painting of Kandinsky, and a painting
of Miro differ significantly more than is typical (in modern art) and that
the painting of Kandinsky and the painting of Miro are significantly more
similar than is typical (in modern art). Likewise, we can agree that John,
Jim, and the empty set are exactly different – that John, Jim, and the empty
set resemble in no common respect – but deny that John and Jim exactly
differ.
14For if a and b are numerically distinct, there necessarily is a set of which a is a member
and of which b is not a member; namely {a}. Therefore, non-identity entails discernibility,
if discernibility is a matter of abundant properties, and indiscernibility entails identity.
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It thus seems that while every kind of non-comparative resemblance is
distributive, no kind of difference is:
(D9) 0 ∀X(DSM (X) → ∀x, y ((x, yAX & x 6= y) → DSMbx, ye))
(D10) 0 ∀X(DWM (X) → ∀x, y ((x, yAX & x 6= y) → DWMbx, ye))
(D11) 0 ∀X(DO(X) → ∀x, y ((x, yAX & x 6= y) → DObx, ye))
(D12) 0 ∀X(DE(X) → ∀x, y ((x, yAX & x 6= y) → DEbx, ye))15
5.3.3.3 The cumulativity of difference
No matter how we interpret minimal difference, it is clear that if there is
some difference between every two of a, b, and c, then a, b, and c cannot be
exactly similar, and, therefore, there is a difference between a, b, and c. The
same holds for exact difference: if every two of some individuals are exactly
dissimilar, then these individuals are exactly dissimilar.
Failures of the cumulativity of overall difference are, however, conceiv-
able given standards for typicality in which a number of objects is specified.
Suppose that our standard for typicality is a standard for typicality of re-
semblance for pairs of objects. And Suppose that, in a given context, every
two individuals among a, b, and c differ saliently more than is typical for
pairs of objects of their kind. It does not make sense of course to say that
a, b, and c differ or not saliently more than is typical for pairs of objects
of their kinds since a, b, and c are three. So that in this context, when we
move from the comparison of every two individuals among a, b, and c to the
comparison of a, b, and c, we also move from a standard of typicality for
pairs of objects to a standard for typicality for groups of three objects. This
being stated, our assumption may be true, while it is false that a, b, and c
differ saliently more than is typical for groups of three objects of their kind.
Therefore, we should not commit ourselves to the cumulativity of overall
difference. Hence:
15It should be noticed that that difference properties are not distributive provides a
further argument to the view that resemblance properties are not binary properties. For
difference and resemblance properties must be of the same kind of properties. If difference
properties do not distribute, then we cannot define collective ascriptions of difference in
terms of pairwise ascriptions of difference alone which suggests that difference is not a
binary property. If difference is not a binary property, then why should we admit that
resemblance is?
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(D13) ` ∀X,x, y((x, yAX & x 6= y → DWMbx, ye) → DWM (X))
(D14) ` ∀X,x, y((x, yAX & x 6= y → DSMbx, ye) → DSM (X))
(D15) 0 ∀X,x, y((x, yAX & x 6= y → DObx, ye) → DO(X))
(D16) ` ∀X,x, y((x, yAX & x 6= y → DEbx, ye) → DE(X))
5.3.4 Relations between difference properties
I admit the following principles about the properties of weak and strong
minimal difference, overall difference, and exact difference.
(D17) ` ∀X (DSM (X) → DWM (X))
(D18) 0 ∀X (DWM (X) → DSM (X))
(D19) ` ∀X (DO(X) → DWM (X))
(D20) 0 ∀X (DO(X) → DSM (X))
(D21) 0 ∀X (DSM (X) → DO(X))
(D22) 0 ∀X (DWM (X) → DO(X))
(D23) ` ∀X (DE(X) → DSM (X))
(D24) 0 ∀X (DSM (X) → DE(X))
(D25) ` ∀X (DE(X) → DWM (X))
(D26) 0 ∀X (DWM (X) → DE(X))
(D27) 0 ∀X (DE(X) → DO(X))
(D28) 0 ∀X (DO(X) → DE(X))
Among these principles for difference, the controversial ones are (D20) and
(D27).
(D20) somewhat contradicts the intuition. For suppose again that a
and b share no property, but are such that they are closely similar in every
respect. In this case they fail to strongly minimally differ from each other
(though they weakly minimally differ from each other). I think that in this
case, the intuition is that we should deny that a and b are dissimilar overall,
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i.e. that they differ saliently more than is typical. And so, according to
this intuition, if things do not strongly minimally differ, they do not differ
overall; and thus if they differ overall, they strongly minimally differ. Yet
there might be an extravagant standard for typicality such that imperfect
match in at least one respect is sufficient for differing saliently more than is
typical. That such extravagant contexts are conceivable is the reason why I
endorse (D20). The reason why I accept (D27) is analogous.
5.3.5 Relations between resemblance and difference proper-
ties
There are interesting relationships between properties of resemblance and
properties of difference to be outlined. First, the following principles say
that weak minimal resemblance is the dual of exact difference and that
weak minimal difference is the dual of exact resemblance:
(RD1) ` ∀X (RWM (X)↔ ¬DE(X))
(RD2) ` ∀X (DWM (X)↔ ¬RE(X))
From (R17), (R18) and (RD1), we obtain the following:
(RD3) ` ∀X (RSM (X) → ¬DE(X))
(RD4) 0 ∀X (¬DE(X) → RSM (X))
And from (D17), (D18) and (RD2), we get the following:
(RD5) ` ∀X (DSM (X) → ¬RE(X))
(RD6) 0 ∀X (¬RE(X) → DSM (X))
From (D26) and (RD1) it follows that weak minimally similarity and
minimally difference are compatible, that is:
(RD7) 0 ∀X (DWM (X) → ¬RWM (X))
From (RD7), (RD1) and (RD2), the following follows:
(RD8) ` ∀X (RWM (X) & DWM (X) ↔ ¬RE(X) & ¬DE(X))
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Hence, there are individuals that neither resemble exactly nor differ ex-
actly, and these are the individuals that both weakly minimally resemble
each other and weakly minimally differ from each other. The following are
interesting principles about the relationship between exact and overall re-
semblance:
(RD9) ` ∀X (RE(X) → ¬DO(X))
(RD10) ` ∀X (DE(X) → ¬RO(X))
The validity of (RD9) and (RD10) is easily grasped. By (RD2) and dou-
ble negation, if some things resemble exactly, they fail to differ minimally.
Things that do not differ at all cannot conceivably differ significantly more
than is typical. Likewise, things which differ exactly do not resemble at all
and cannot resemble significantly more than is typical. The converses of
(RD9) and (RD10) are, however, invalid. Here are other principles concern-
ing overall resemblance:
(RD11) ` ∀X ( RO(X) → ¬DO(X))
(RD12) ` ∀X (DO(X) → ¬RO(X))
(RD13) 0 ∀X (¬RO(X) → DO(X))
(RD14) 0 ∀X (¬DO(X) → DO(X))
When things are neither similar overall nor different overall, I say that they
are neutrally similar. Let ‘RN ’ stand for our predicate of neutral resem-
blance, I state the following principles about it:
(RD15) ` ∀X (¬RO(X) & ¬DO(X) ↔ RN (X))
(RD16) ` ∀X (RE(X) & ¬RO(X) → RN (X))
(RD17) ` ∀X (DE(X) & ¬DO(X) → RN (X))
(RD15) is thought of as the definition of neutral resemblance. (RD16) and
(RD17) are derived principles. The proof of (RD16) runs as follows: suppose
that the As are exactly similar but fail to resemble overall, which is permitted
by (R27), and suppose that the As fail to be neutrally similar. Then by
(RD15) and classical logic, the As differ overall. It follows by (RD9) that
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the As do not resemble exactly which contradicts the hypothesis. Therefore,
the As neutrally resemble each other. The proof of (RD17) is symmetrical
and uses (D27) instead of (R27) and (RD10) instead of (RD9).
This ends the presentation of the main principles concerning non-com-
parative resemblance and difference. Further principles for non-comparative
resemblance and difference which involve comparative relations of resem-
blance are introduced in the last section of the appendix. The latter princi-
ples and the principles introduced in the present section together constitute
a logic for resemblance and difference from which a battery of further prin-
ciples could be derived.
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Chapter 6
The Context-Relativity of
Resemblance Judgements
Suppose that Sam judges that hippos and baleen whales (for short, whales)
resemble each other and Maria judges that they do not (where the meaning
of ‘resemble’ is fixed). Intuitively, I believe, under certain conditions it
is possible that neither Sam nor Maria has committed any fault. These
conditions would include that Sam and Maria both believe what they say,
and they believe so for good reasons. Now, let us imagine exactly such a case
and consider the following two judgements (where C1 and C2 are contexts):
(6.1) Sam (in C1): “Hippos and whales resemble each other.”
(6.2) Maria (in C2): “Hippos and whales do not resemble each other.”
Now if we want to maintain (and ex hypothesi we do) that neither Sam
nor Maria is at fault, we must conclude that the contexts C1 and C2 in
which judgements (6.1) and (6.2) are made are relevantly dissimilar. Such
faultless disagreements between judgements are often considered as being
the characteristic of context-relative judgements (Ko¨lber 2008). That there
can be faultless disagreements in resemblance judgements is the mark of the
context-relativity of our resemblance judgements, which is the topic of the
present chapter.
The aim of the chapter is to provide the conditions under which a dis-
agreement about resemblance would be faultless. Since faultless disagree-
ments between resemblance judgements can only be due to differences in
the contexts of assertion, if we can establish that there could be faultless
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disagreements between resemblance judgements, the belief that resemblance
judgements are context-sensitive is justified.
Here we must be careful with the terminology. In particular, we have
to take seriously the distinction between the propositional content of an
utterance as used in a context and the assertion the speaker makes by means
of that utterance – the judgement she makes. Whether the propositional
content of a resemblance judgement is context-relative is controversial and
will be considered in the next chapter. Whether the truth value of the
propositional content of a resemblance judgement is context-relative is even
more controversial and will also be considered in chapter 7. However, that
resemblance judgements, the assertion speakers make by means of utterances
like (6.1) and (6.2), are context-relative seems to be uncontroversial1 and it
is the context-relativity of resemblance judgements that I consider here.
In the first section of the chapter I review the various manners in which
our resemblance judgements can vary with the context. In the second sec-
tion I account for the context-relativity of resemblance judgements in terms
of relativity to a representational perspective. As I said above, faultless dis-
agreements between judgements are often considered as the characteristic
of context-relative judgements. In the final section of this chapter I provide
the conditions under which a disagreement between resemblance judgements
would be faultless.
6.1 Ways of varying
6.1.1 Contextually relevant properties
Suppose that Sam is a biologist working in cladistics. According to Sam, the
closest relatives of cetaceans are hippopotamuses. Whales and hippos shared
a common semi-aquatic ancestor that branched off from other artiodactyls
around 60 million years ago. So he judges that these animals are similar on
this basis. Suppose that Maria is an ethologist. What matters to her is the
behaviour of animals and she judges that hippos and baleen whales do not
resemble each other because they have fairly dissimilar behaviours: baleen
whales are solitary, hippos are not; whales migrate, hippos do not; whales
are carnivorous, hippos are herbivorous; etc. In Maria’s context, closeness
1Cf. the introduction of chapter 7. There I quote philosophers who deny that resem-
blance is context-relative but agree that our resemblance judgements are.
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in evolutionary ancestry is irrelevant to compare them. In Sam’s context,
the behaviour of animals is irrelevant to compare them. Therefore, it seems
that one contextual feature that can make resemblance judgements vary is
the relevance of properties of the compared individuals.
Importantly, Maria, in the context of her judgement, can agree that hip-
pos and whales are close in evolutionary ancestry. But, for her, closeness
in evolutionary ancestry does not make for a resemblance between animals.
According to Inegalitarianism2, elected properties are the properties which
matter for the resemblance of individuals. If so, that closeness in evolution-
ary ancestry does not make for a resemblance between animals in Maria’s
context means that closeness in evolutionary ancestry is not an elected prop-
erty of animals in Maria’s context. Therefore, it seems that, regarding our
everyday resemblance judgements at least, what it is for a property to be
elected is for it to be contextually relevant. Many things can make the
relevance of properties vary.
Barsalou (1982) has provided experimental evidence that the relevance
of properties varies depending on whether comparison classes are specified.
For example, a snake and a racoon were judged much less similar when
no explicit comparison class was given than when the comparison class of
pets was provided. The general idea underlying Barsalou’s experiments is
that properties that would not have been judged relevant otherwise turn
out contextually relevant once we specify a comparison class, and that, to
the extend that the compared objects share some of these newly relevant
properties, their resemblance is increased.
Linguistic contexts also seem to lead to variations in relevant properties
in young children. Landau, Smith, and Jones (1988) report the following
experiment: In the control context, the experimenter points to an object
and says “See this? Can you find another one?” In the linguistic context,
the experimenter says “See this wug? Can you find another wug?” Though
children never heard about wugs before, the linguistic context is, relative
to the control condition, associated with an increased tendency to make
resemblance judgements in terms of shape rather than size or texture. Three-
year-old children apparently know that in the context of a general term
shapes are more likely to be the relevant properties than sizes or textures
are.
2Cf. chapter 1 and chapter 4.
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Which properties are relevant also seem to vary depending on which
thing is compared with which. For instance, when comparing b with a,
some properties of b will appear relevant for the comparison which will then
turn out irrelevant when comparing b with a third individual c.3 Also,
as was acknowledged when discussing the symmetry of resemblance, the
relevant properties vary depending on which object in a comparison is the
most familiar, the most salient one. Since w1 is the most familiar world in
w1, when comparing w1 with w2 in w1 we will take as relevant properties
those which are salient from the perspective of w1. But since w2 is the most
familiar world in w2, when comparing w2 with w1 in w2 we will take as
relevant properties which are salient from the perspective of w2.
The kind of variations in relevant properties philosophers have mainly
focused on are variations relative to interests or goals. Consider the following
example from Goodman:
Suppose we have three glasses, the first two filled with colorless
liquid, the third with a bright red liquid. I might be likely to
say the first two are more like each other than either is like the
third. But it happens that the first glass is filled with water and
the third with water coloured by a drop of vegetable dye, while
the second is filled with hydrochloric acid – and I am thirsty.
(Goodman 1970, 445)
To make Goodman’s point more salient, Barry Taylor (2004, 248) invites us
to consider two situations in which goals appear to influence the relevance of
properties: (i) suppose S is an artist and that her particular goal is to find
glasses to be placed in an installation under construction. Then the relevant
properties, for S, would be colours, and she probably would judge the first
glass similar to the second but not to the third (where similarity is to be
interpreted as overall here). (ii) Suppose that S is thirsty and thus that her
main goal when considering the three glasses is to quench her thirst. Then
in such a case, S will take as relevant the property of quenching thirst and
judge the first glass similar to the third provided she is informed about the
content of the glasses.
Or consider Grandma’s judgement of resemblance I talked about in chap-
ter 1. Suppose that after she judged that my child and I resemble each other,
3See the extended report of experiments exhibiting this kind of variation in Medin,
Goldstone and Gentner (1993).
6. The Context-Relativity of Resemblance Judgements 113
I ask her “In which respect?” And suppose Grandma says “You are both hu-
man beings.” Typically, in this context, I would think that Grandma is out
of her mind if she thinks that being a human being is relevant to compare
my child with me and if she thinks that resembling in this respect justifies
her resemblance judgement.
Yet suppose that we have been invaded by human-shaped aliens, that
Grandma and I are aware of the invasion and that I suspect my wife to be a
human-shaped alien. In such circumstances, it is fairly relevant to compare
human-shaped individuals regarding whether they are genuine human beings
or not. For it appears to be a significant information that my child and I
are both human beings.
Therefore, which properties are relevant to judge that individuals re-
semble constitutes one way in which resemblance judgements are context-
relative and many things can make resemblance judgements context-sensitive
in this way. According to the accounts of the various resemblance proper-
ties offered in chapter 4 and if elected properties are conceived of as relevant
properties in the context of a resemblance judgement, it appears that this
kind of variations in relevant properties can induce variations in judgements
of minimal, overall, as well as exact resemblance and difference.
6.1.2 Relative weight of respects
The context-relative feature I consider in this section has been mainly em-
phasised by David Lewis when discussing his resemblance-based account of
the semantics for counterfactuals. It is the variation in importance attached
to the various relevant resemblance and difference respects:
It is the same sort of indeterminacy that arises if I say that
Seattle resembles San Francisco more closely than it resembles
Los Angeles. Does it? That depends on whether we attach more
importance to the surrounding landscape, the architecture, the
dominant industries, the political temper, the state of the arts,
the climate, the public transportation system, the form of the
city government, or what. Possible worlds are bigger than cities
(sometimes), and are capable of differing in a greater variety of
respects. (Lewis 1973, 92)
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The surrounding landscape of cities, their architectures, their dominant in-
dustries, etc. may all be relevant properties of cities when we are comparing
them. But still depending on our interests we can attach more importance
to the architecture of cities than to their dominant industries. And thus
we may attach more importance to the architecture respect, the similarity
ordering between architectures, than to the dominant industries respect, the
similarity ordering between dominant industries. To the extent that impor-
tance attached to this or that respect of resemblance varies, the comparative
resemblance of Seattle to San Francisco and Los Angeles varies relatively.
The respective weight of relevant resemblance respects is not arbitrary
but is somehow fixed by the task which is to be performed when compar-
ing objects. When discussing the Future Similarity Objection in (Lewis
1986a), Lewis explains how the importance of respects of resemblance be-
tween worlds should be fixed when evaluating the counterfactual “If Nixon
had pressed the button there would have been a nuclear holocaust.” The
system of weights Lewis has in mind in this context is the following:
1. It is of first importance to avoid big, widespread, diverse
violations of law.
2. It is of the second importance to maximize the spatio-
temporal region throughout which perfect match of par-
ticular fact prevails.
3. It is of the third importance to avoid even small, localized,
simple violations of law.
4. It is of little or no importance to secure approximate sim-
ilarity of particular fact, even in matters that concern us
greatly. (Lewis 1986a, 47-8)
However, the system of weights can be different in the context of evaluation
of other counterfactuals as Lewis insists in the Postscripts to (Lewis 1986a).
Notice that here I have talked about the relative importance attached
to relevant resemblance respects rather than to relevant properties. Rele-
vant properties may also be ordered relative to their importance. Plausibly,
the importance attached to relevant properties and relevant resemblance
respects covary. That is, if a resemblance respect r1 is, in some context,
judged more important than a resemblance respect r2, then the properties
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ordered on r1 are, in this context, judged more important than the properties
ordered on r2, and vice versa.
6.1.3 The resemblance of properties
According to the analysis provided in the third section of chapter 4, strong
minimal resemblance of individuals is a matter of shared elected proper-
ties and so is exact resemblance of individuals. But inexact resemblance
of elected properties is a sufficient ground for ascribing weak minimal re-
semblance to individuals and can be a sufficient ground for ascribing overall
resemblance to individuals. Is the resemblance of properties fixed or variable
in our resemblance judgements? Whether we judge some properties similar
or not also seems to vary with context.
Consider a, which is a carmine red book, and b, which is an orange
book, and assume that colours are, in the present context, elected properties.
Suppose that a and b stand both in a library where every other book is
blue. Entering into the library the resemblance in colour of a and b will
immediately strike us. But suppose now that a and b stand in a library
where every other book is a red book. Entering into the library, we will
rather immediately observe how much b is distinct in colour from any other
book, a being one of these other books. In this context, we will agree that
a and b are dissimilar in colour respect, that they have dissimilar colours,
given the assumed comparison class.4
Or consider Tom who is six months old and Tim who is eight months
old. Given the average length of human life, it seems correct to judge that
their respective ages resemble, and thus that Tom and Tim resemble in age.
But suppose that Tom and Tim are members of a population whose average
length of life is one year. In this case, we would certainly judge that a
difference of two months is a huge difference in age.
If we pay attention to these examples, it seems that judgements of re-
semblance between properties are judgements of overall resemblance between
properties. Whether we judge that the colour of the two books a and b re-
4One interesting feature of this example is that the perception of similarities seems no
more immune to context-sensitivity than our resemblance judgements are. Depending on
the environment of the compared objects, and thus of our comparison class, our perception
of resemblances varies. See the remarkable work of the Gestaltist Erich Goldmeier (1972)
for a study of perceived similarity of forms. Goldmeier shows in a very clear way how
groupings in context affect our perception of similarities of shape.
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semble each other depends on a standard which is here a class of comparison;
if the class of comparison is that of the books which compose the first li-
brary, then the colours of a and b are judged similar to each other; if the
class of comparison is that of the books which compose the second library,
then the colours of a and b are judged dissimilar to each other. Likewise,
whether Tom and Tim have resembling ages depends on a class of com-
parison, namely the species they belong to. It also seems that the reason
why the colours of books a and b immediately strike us as similar in the
first situation is that their resemblance is saliently greater than is typical
relative to the relevant comparison class. What is true here about colours
of books also seems true about the ages of Tom and Tim. So judgements
of non-comparative resemblance between properties can vary with shifts of
context.
Judgements of comparative similarity of properties are not immune of
context-sensitivity either. For instance, one may be justified, in some con-
text, in judging that primary colours resemble each other more than each of
them resembles any composed colour. For given our purposes we may em-
phasise features of primary colours which make them significantly similar.
In this case red should be judged more similar to blue than to orange. On
the other hand, if we focus on physical properties of colours, we would prob-
ably judge that the similarity ordering between colours matches the ordering
of colours on the colour spectrum. However, if we focus on perception, we
would judge violet more similar to red than to yellow, while violet is closer
to yellow on the colour spectrum than it is to red. There are different ways
to order colours relative to their closeness, and which closeness ordering be-
tween colours is the (relevant) similarity ordering between colours appears
to be a matter of context.
Or consider the architecture of towns. Architectures of towns are rela-
tively complex properties which can resemble and differ from each other in
different respects. Architectures of towns may resemble with respect to the
epoch at which the salient buildings have been built, with respect to the ma-
terials used, with respect to previous styles which influenced the architects,
with respect to the purpose of the salient buildings, with respect to how the
architecture is integrated in the surrounding landscape, etc. Given the com-
plexity of architectures, and provided that our comparative judgements of
resemblance, as Lewis emphasised, may vary depending on the importance
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attached to such and such respects, it is not difficult to imagine that our
judgements about whether the architecture of San Francisco resembles that
of Seattle more than it resembles that of Los Angeles can vary depending
on the context. Depending on whether we attach more importance to ma-
terials used or to the influence of previous styles, our agreement with the
latter judgement of comparative resemblance between properties of towns
could vary.
The first conclusion we should draw from the discussion of resemblance
judgements between properties is that the resemblance predicate they in-
volve seems to be an overall resemblance predicate; i.e. to judge some prop-
erties similar is to judge that they resemble each other saliently more than is
typical (given some standard). If so, judgements of non-comparative resem-
blance between properties are intrinsically context-relative as they involve
a reference to a standard. Second, judgements of comparative resemblance
of properties also may vary depending on our interests, i.e. depending on
which closeness ordering is relevant to be identified with the resemblance
ordering and depending on the relative importance of the various features
of properties under comparison.
6.1.4 Variations in computation
When making judgements of comparative or non-comparative overall re-
semblance, we compute relevant properties of the compared individuals to
evaluate whether they resemble each other more than other things do. There
is no evaluation of comparative resemblance and no measure of degrees of
resemblance without such a computation. And the way we compute relevant
properties to get a comparative evaluation of resemblance or a measure of
resemblance is also context-relative. More precisely, it seems that the way
we compute relevant properties may vary depending on the cognitive task
that is to be performed. When philosophers provide an account of how dif-
ferent relevant properties are computed to obtain a measure of resemblance,
they usually assume that the computation is additive; that is, that we add
features of resemblance, and sometimes that we subtract features of dissim-
ilarity to obtain a measure of resemblance.5 But researchers in cognitive
sciences have provided evidence that in categorisation processes matching
5See e.g. (Goodman 1970, 443), (Rodriguez-Pereyra 2002, 65-69), (Taylor 2004, 247)
and (Buras 2006).
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and mismatching relevant properties are combined multiplicatively rather
than additively (Medin and Schaffer (1978); Nosofsky (1992)).
In chapter 4 I argued that respects of resemblance are similarity order-
ings and I proposed to identify these similarity orderings with Ga¨rdenfors’s
conceptual spaces (2000). Now it is important to notice that Ga¨rdenfors does
not assume any determinate way of computing respects of comparison when
constructing his similarity orderings. The reason for this indeterminacy is
clear from the following:
A fundamental question about similarity that is often neglected
is: what kind of quantity is similarity?6 Among the few who
address the question, one can distinguish three major positions:
1. Realism: Similarity is something that exists objectively in
the world, independently of any perceptual or other cogni-
tive processes.
2. Conceptualism, empirical entity : Similarity is a cognitive
magnitude that can be measured directly in subjects. This
can be done, for example, by asking them “to rate the sim-
ilarity or dissimilarity of stimuli on some scale or to judge
which set of alternatives is more similar to some standard
stimulus” (Medin et al. 1993, 255).
3. Conceptualism, theoretical entity : Similarity is a cognitive
magnitude that is used as a theoretical entity in models
of categorisation, concept formation, and so forth. If we
follow Sneed’s (1971) analysis of theoretical entities, simi-
larity cannot be measured directly, but only determined by
applying a theoretical model.
[. . . ] The position adopted here is that similarity is best under-
stood as a theoretical entity used in cognitive models. According
to position 3, any measurement of similarity, direct or indirect,
will be based on some assumptions concerning the properties of
6The traditional view that similarity and dissimilarity are quantities has been con-
vincingly advocated by Meinong (1896). See (Guigon 2005) on Meinong’s account of
such quantities and the influence of his account on Russell’s theory of magnitudes and
measurement.
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a similarity relation. Such assumptions come from a more or less
explicit theoretical model. (Ga¨rdenfors 2000, 110)
Hence, it makes no sense for Ga¨rdenfors to ask which measure of similarity
is the right one independently of a theoretical model, and which theoretical
model is to be used depends on which theoretical application of similarity
we are interested in.
Even if we focus on additive computations of relevant properties, there
might be variations in ways of computing the elected properties. For in-
stance, in (Rodriguez-Pereyra 2002, 65) and (Buras 2006) we find a compu-
tation where only matching elected properties count to measure degrees of
resemblance. Rodriguez-Pereyra’s account of degrees of resemblance is as
follows:
(D) x and y resemble each other to degree n if and only if they
share n [sparse] properties. (Rodriguez-Pereyra 2002, 65)
But in (Hansson 1992, 406-7), for instance, we find three different ways of
measuring degrees of resemblance. Let ‘α’ be the set of elected properties of
a and ‘β’ the set of elected properties of b. Then the first measure of resem-
blance, called concurrence by Hansson, is simply defined as the intersection
of sets α and β; i.e. α ∩ β. The second measure of degrees of resemblance,
called the symmetrical difference of α and β, is defined thus: α ∆ β = (α\β)
∪ (β \ α).7 Finally, the dyadic difference between α and β is defined thus:
α ± β = {α \ β , β \α}. The latter measures are more properly called mea-
sures of difference than measures of resemblance for they firstly take into
account the mismatching properties. Yet resemblance may in some contexts
be a function of difference. For instance, it may be legitimate to judge that
the smaller the symmetrical difference of some things is, the greater their
resemblance is.8
Rodriguez-Pereyra’s as well as Hansson’s computations for degrees of re-
semblance only take into account exactly matching and mismatching (elected)
properties. But inexact resemblance of relevant properties can play a role
in our everyday resemblance judgements. As a non-biologist, I am firstly
7Where the set α \ β is the set of elected properties of a which contains all and only
elected properties of a that are not elected properties of b.
8Hansson (1992) argues that symmetrical difference is the computation which is the
best-suited to account for minimal changes of belief.
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focusing on shapes when I compare animals. So I may judge that hippos
resemble pigs more than they resemble whales on the grounds that hippos
and pigs seem to me more similar in shape than hippos and whales are. But
hippos and pigs do not have the same shape. An instance of a measure of
resemblance which takes into account comparative resemblance of properties
has been proposed by Williamson:
We decide that w overall-resembles x (at least) as much as y
overall-resembles z iff there are at least as many of the three
respects in which w resembles x more than y resembles z as there
are in which y resembles z more than w resembles x. (Williamson
1988, 463)
Such a computation of resemblance respects, however, generates failures of
the transitivity of comparative resemblance.9
Therefore, there are many available computations of relevant properties
giving rise to different measures of degrees of resemblance. As far as I can
see it is difficult to argue that one of them has a privileged status over
the others. Depending on the task we have to perform, depending on our
interests, and depending on the nature of the objects under comparison, it is
very probable that the computation of relevant properties we use to measure
the resemblance of individuals varies.
6.2 Representational perspectives
In the previous section I indicated various ways in which our resemblance
judgements can vary with the context. The examination of these ways of
varying yield the conclusion that the way we judge about the resemblance of
individuals and properties depend on our representation of the individuals
under comparison and of their surrounding. In some sense, it is trivial to
9“Suppose that in respect 1, u resembles v more than w resembles x and w resembles
x more than y resembles z; in respect 2, w resembles x more than y resembles z and y
resembles z more than u resembles v; in respect 3, y resembles z more than u resembles v
and u resembles v more than w resembles x. Then, by our criterion, u overall-resembles v
as much as w overall-resembles x (respects 1 and 3 vs. respect 2) and w overall-resembles
x as much as y overall-resembles z (respects 1 and 2 vs. respect 3), but u does not overall-
resemble v as much as y overall-resembles z (respect 1 vs. respects 2 and 3).” (Williamson
1988, 463). In the appendix, I indicate a situation wherein Williamson’s computation
seems correctly used.
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claim that judgements, whatever they are about, depend on representation.
Since judgements depend on what we mean by the words involved in the
judgement and since meanings, or concepts, are representational entities.
But resemblance judgements depend on representation not (only) in this
trivial sense. For even if we assume that the meaning of the words involved in
a resemblance judgement is fixed upon contexts, the way we judge about the
resemblance of individuals can still vary depending on our representation of
mind-independent reality. For instance, we can assume that Sam and Maria
mean the same thing by the words which compose the judgement “hippos
and whales resemble each other” when the former utters this judgement
and the latter utters its negation. Nonetheless, Sam’s representation of
hippos and whales is different from Maria’s representation of these animals
in that Sam’s representation of hippos and whales makes their having a
common ancestor relevant, whereas Maria’s representation of hippos and
whales makes their having a common ancestor irrelevant.
Let me use the phrase ‘representational perspective’ to refer to this spe-
cific complex cognitive state in which subjects stand when comparing in-
dividuals relative to their resemblance and which makes their resemblance
judgements vary with contexts. The representational perspective comprises
all and only these features which can make resemblance judgements vary
in the various ways emphasised in the previous section and in any other
conceivable way.
An important element of our representational perspective that has not
been mentioned yet but which is emphasised in the literature is that evo-
lution has had an important impact on the way we judge about the resem-
blance of objects.10 Resemblance judgements reveal themselves as extremely
important in the struggle for life. The survival of a population depends on
its capacity to make valuable resemblance judgements between predators
in the environment, and evolution selected those cognitive processes which
allow us to draw these patterns of resemblance in our environment which
are valuable for our survival.
Our representational perspective thus comprises our innate dispositions
to draw some patterns of similarity instead of others in our surrounding
which result from evolutionary processes. ‘Dispositions’ should not be taken
10See e.g. (Quine 1969), but also (Medin et al. 1993, 258): “Presumably, people’s
perceptual and conceptual spaces have evolved such that information that matters to
humans needs and goals can be roughly approximated by a similarity heuristics.”
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with too much ontological seriousness here. What I call an innate disposition
here is a bodily – genetically? – implemented memory of those inductions
that proved successful and those that proved not successful in the strug-
gle for life of our biological ancestors. This implemented memory might
be what Quine calls our innate norm of similarity, and these innate norms
of similarity, or innate similarity orderings, are certainly what Ga¨rdenfors’s
conceptual spaces are intended to represent (Ga¨rdenfors 2000). Describing
this implemented memory in more detail, which is a matter of cognitive
sciences rather than metaphysics, exceeds my competence, and the reader
should rely on Ga¨rdenfors’s book for precise references. These innate dispo-
sitions to draw patterns of resemblance seem to constitute the basic element
of a representational perspective, but other elements do complement the rep-
resentational perspective given the context-relative features that have been
outlined in the previous section.
As many authors have emphasised part of what makes judgements of
resemblance context-sensitive are the goals (Taylor 2004, 247-9), interests
(Goodman 1970), or purposes (McClure 1964) of agents. The purposes or
interests of an agent will also be part of his representational perspective
when the ascription of resemblance to be performed has to do with the
achievement of some goal or some specific interests of the agent. Of course,
it may happen that resemblance judgements are performed in the absence
of any explicit goal to be achieved. When hiking in Berner Oberland I
may judge two flowers particularly similar to each other without having
any particular interest in flowers. Evolutionary processes here explain why
I could judge so about flowers: judging about the resemblance of flowers
presumably had some non-negligeable importance in the struggle for life of
some of my ancestors.
Finally, several other features can be part of the representational per-
spective of an agent depending on the situation and the cognitive task to be
performed: a selection of relevant comparison classes attached to the indi-
viduals under comparison, the availability or lack of availability of general
terms applying to these individuals, the relative familiarity of the agent with
these individuals, and the relative salience of regions surrounding the indi-
viduals under representation. The list can and should perhaps be extended
with reference to further cognitive processes.
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The nature of representational perspectives and, more generally, of com-
plex cognitive states may be worrying. McClure (1964) conceives of pur-
poses relative to which ascriptions of resemblance and properties vary on
his account as universals. But contemporary advocates of universals such as
Armstrong who conceive of universals as sparse would certainly be reluctant
to think of complex entities like representational perspectives as universals.
Yet I see no reason to deny that distinct agents can occupy the same
representational perspective on distinct occasions, and thus I agree that
representational perspectives are repeatable in some loose sense. For agents
can share the same dispositions to draw patterns of similarity, the same
goals and interests, etc. I do not think that this means that representa-
tional perspectives must be universals implemented in agents, however. For
abundant properties, conceived of as sets of individuals, are also repeatable
in this loose sense. An abundant property can, and usually does, have many
instances: distinct individuals can ‘share’, in this loose sense, an abundant
property by being co-members of the set to which the property is identical.
Thus, I will conceive of representational perspectives occupied by subjects
as abundant properties of subjects.
Therefore, I interpret the claim that our resemblance judgements are rel-
ative to contexts as the claim that they are relative to the representational
perspective of agents when comparing objects relative to their resemblance
or difference. In other words, what it means for a resemblance judgement
to be context-relative is for it to be relative to a representational perspec-
tive. And if subjects disagree regarding a resemblance statement without
committing any fault, then this is so because the representational perspec-
tives they occupy are different. But what are the conditions for subjects to
disagree with regards to their resemblance judgements without committing
any fault? This is the topic of the next section.
6.3 Faultless disagreements between resemblance
judgements
In the present section, my aim is to account for what is in need for subjects
to disagree with regards to their resemblance judgements without being at
fault. For I said in the introduction of this chapter that the possibility of
faultless disagreements between judgements is the characteristic of context-
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relative judgements. Hence, if I can account for the conditions under which
a disagreement between resemblance judgements is faultless, I can clarify
what we mean by the context-relativity of resemblance judgements. And if
there can be such faultless disagreements, it is doubtless that resemblance
judgements are context-relative.
My account of the conditions under which a disagreement between resem-
blance judgements can be faultless is inspired by Barry Taylor’s conditions
for being stably warranted in making a similarity judgement (Taylor 2004,
247-9).11 I will first provide conditions for being warranted in making a re-
semblance judgement on the basis of Taylor’s account. Since, as I will argue,
subjects can be warranted in their resemblance judgements and disagree by
committing a fault, I will strengthen the warrant conditions in such a way
that if they still disagree, their disagreement can only be due to a difference
in the representational perspectives they are occupying. The strengthened
warrant conditions are what I call, following Taylor, conditions for being
stably warranted in making a resemblance judgement.
6.3.1 Warrant conditions for resemblance judgements
Resemblance judgements are context-relative, and I interpret the context-
relativity of resemblance judgements in terms of relativity to a representa-
tional perspective. When we judge that so and so about the resemblance
of objects, we do so relative to a representational perspective we are oc-
cupying. However, the representational perspective occupied by subjects
when comparing individuals is not sufficient to yield a resemblance judge-
ment between individuals. For instance, one’s representational perspective
determines, among other things, which properties are relevant to ascribe re-
semblance to individuals (e.g. given what our purposes are). However, that
such and such properties are relevant to ascribe resemblance to individuals
can be the basis of no resemblance judgement unless one believes that the
individuals under comparison have or fail to have some of these relevant
properties. Therefore, it is on the basis of our representational perspective
and beliefs together that we judge about the resemblance of individuals.
11Taylor only provides stable warrant conditions for judgements of overall resemblance
and my stable warrant conditions for judgements of overall resemblance are different from
his.
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That we judge about the resemblance of objects on the basis of such
beliefs is illustrated by Taylor’s example of the three glasses (2004, 247)
that I reproduced in section 6.1.1. Consider situation (ii) where S is thirsty.
In this situation, S judges relative to her goals that the first and third glasses
resemble each other more than either resembles the second glass, where the
first and third glasses contain water and the second contains hydrochloric
acid. S wouldn’t have judged so if she hadn’t believed that hydrochloric acid
is not the adequate substance to quench her thirst, whereas water is. If so,
among the beliefs on the basis of which S utters her resemblance judgement,
there is the belief that hydrochloric acid is not the appropriate substance to
quench thirst, while water is.
Warrant conditions for judgements of strong minimal resemblance, weak
minimal difference, and exact resemblance can thus be stated as follows
(where pr is the representational perspective occupied by the relevant subject
and B is the set of beliefs on the basis of which the subject makes her
judgement, no matter what these beliefs are):12
(Warrant RSM) A subject S is warranted in judging the As strongly mini-
mally similar (relative to pr and beliefs B) iff S is warranted in judging,
on the basis of beliefs B, that at least one pr-relevant property of the
As is had by each of them.
(Warrant DWM) A subject S is warranted in judging the As weakly min-
imally dissimilar (relative to pr and beliefs B) iff S is warranted in
judging, on the basis of beliefs B, that there is a pr-relevant property
P such that at least one of the As has P and at least one of the As
lacks P.
(Warrant RE) A subject S is warranted in judging that the As exactly
resemble each other (relative to pr and beliefs B) iff S is warranted in
judging, on the basis of beliefs B, that every pr-relevant property of
the As is had by all of them.
12Collective denotation is assumed in the following warrant conditions. It is not difficult
to modify these accounts accordingly when plural terms denote otherwise. For instance,
whenever ‘the As’ denotesd any two individuals among the As, then a subject S is war-
ranted in judging the As strongly minimally similar (relative to pr and beliefs B) iff S is
warranted in judging, on the basis of beliefs B, that every two As are such that there is
at least one pr-elected property which is had by both of them.
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In order to account for the warrant conditions for judgements of weak min-
imal resemblance, strong minimal difference and exact difference, we need
to account for what warrants resemblance judgements between properties.
As I emphasised in the section dedicated to judgements of resemblance
between properties, to judge that some properties resemble each other is
to judge that they resemble overall; that is, that they resemble each other
saliently more than is typical relative to the relevant standard. What makes
a standard relevant or not is, of course, the representational perspective of
agents. Certain criteria should also enter the picture to determine whether
some properties resemble more than some other properties do, given the
nature of overall resemblance. In other words, there must be some criteria
to determine the comparative resemblance of properties. These criteria may
be perceptual, or more complex, but are certainly determined by the repre-
sentational perspective of agents. Thus, the following provides the warrant
conditions for resemblance judgements between relevant properties (where
the pr-relevant standard is this standard among the set of standards of pr
which is relevant given the compared individuals and the goals or interests
of the subject):
(Warrant P.R.) A subject S is warranted in judging that properties P1,
. . . , Pn are pr-relevant properties which resemble each other (relative
to pr and beliefs B) iff S is warranted in judging, on the basis of
beliefs B, that P1, . . . , Pn are pr-relevant and that the resemblance
of P1, . . . , Pn saliently exceeds (relative to pr and B) the pr-relevant
standard.
The warrant conditions for judgements of weak minimal resemblance, strong
minimal resemblance, and exact difference can then be stated as follows:
(Warrant RWM) A subject S is warranted in judging the As weakly mini-
mally similar (relative to pr and beliefs B) iff S is warranted in judging,
on the basis of beliefs B, either (i) that there is at least one pr-relevant
property had by each of the As, or (ii) that there is a series of pr-
relevant properties P1, . . . , Pn such that each of the As has one of
them and such that the resemblance of P1, . . . , Pn saliently exceeds
(relative to pr and B) the pr-relevant standard.
(Warrant DSM) A subject S is warranted in judging that the As are
strongly minimally different from each other (relative to pr and be-
6. The Context-Relativity of Resemblance Judgements 127
liefs B) iff S is warranted in judging, on the basis of beliefs B, that
there is a series of pr-relevant properties P1, . . . , Pn such that (i)
each of the As has exactly one of P1, . . . , Pn, (ii) P1, . . . , Pn are
all ordered on a same pr-relevant similarity ordering, and such that
(iii) some properties among P1, . . . , Pn are such that their resem-
blance does not saliently exceed (relative to pr and B) the pr-relevant
standard.
(Warrant DE) A subject S is warranted in judging that the As exactly
differ from each other (relative to pr and beliefs B) iff S is warranted
in judging, on the basis of beliefs B, that there is no series of pr-
relevant properties P1, . . . , Pn such that each of the As has one of
them and such that the resemblance of P1, . . . , Pn saliently exceeds
(relative to pr and B) the pr-relevant standard.13
Finally, concerning judgements of overall resemblance and difference of in-
dividuals, subjects must also be warranted relative to the importance of the
pr-relevant properties and relative to the computation used. Let the resem-
bling weight of individuals be the resulting value that derives from the pr-
relevant additive or multiplicative computation of the comparatively more or
less important pr-relevant respects in which individuals are compared. De-
pending on what our representational perspective is the pr-relevant respects
that enter the computation can be either resemblance respects (respects in
which the compared individuals resemble), difference respects (respects in
which they differ), or both. Plausibly, the resembling weight of individuals
is also evaluated relative to a set of beliefs. Then:
(Warrant RO) A subject S is warranted in judging that the As resemble
overall (relative to pr and beliefs B) iff S is warranted in judging, on
the basis of beliefs B, that the resembling weight of the As (relative
to pr and B) saliently exceeds (relative to pr and B) the pr-relevant
standard.
(Warrant DO) A subject S is warranted in judging that the As differ over-
all (relative to pr and beliefs B) iff S is warranted in judging, on the
basis of beliefs B, that the resembling weight of the As (relative to pr
13Assuming that identical properties resemble each other, there is no need here for
specifying that the As must also fail to share any pr-relevant property.
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and B) is saliently inferior (relative to pr and B) to the pr-relevant
standard.
My characterisation of the resembling weight of individuals is indetermi-
nate. I shall insist that this indeterminacy is to be regarded as a virtue not
as a defect. It is indeterminate because the way we compute resemblance
and/or difference respects in everyday life is indeterminate and depends on
the cognitive task that is to be achieved. The flexibility of the warrant con-
ditions for overall resemblance and difference matches the way we adapt the
computation of resemblance and/or difference respects to the cognitive task
that is to be achieved.
Suppose now that Sam is warranted in judging that the Rolling Stones
and the Beatles weakly minimally resemble each other and that Maria is war-
ranted in judging that they do not weakly minimally resemble each other
because, relative to her representational perspective and beliefs, the Rolling
Stones and the Beatles have no resembling relevant properties. It may hap-
pen that Maria and Sam agree regarding which properties are relevant to
compare bands but that Maria falsely believes that the Rolling Stones is
a band playing folk music from Ireland. When she will realise her mis-
take, Maria will perhaps change her mind and agree with Sam’s judgement.
Therefore, that Sam is warranted in judging that j while Maria is warranted
in judging that ¬j (where ‘j’ stands for an arbitrary resemblance judgement
not for the content of such a judgement) is not sufficient for their disagree-
ment to be faultless.
6.3.2 Stable warrant conditions for resemblance judgements
The latter example illustrates that a necessary condition for a disagreement
between resemblance judgements to be faultless is that the beliefs relative
to which agents judge that so and so about the resemblance of individuals
are true beliefs.
Second, some restriction on the true beliefs B on the basis of which a
resemblance judgement is made is to be imposed. To avoid triviality, we
require that among the beliefs B to which a judgement of resemblance j is
relative, there are no beliefs about the truth of j. E.g., if S’s judgement is
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“a resembles b”, S’s true belief that “a resembles b” should not be taken as
one of the beliefs to which the truth of “a resembles b” is relative.14
Consider the example with the three glasses again and situation (ii) in
particular where S aims to quench her thirst. Suppose that there is a further
fact F such that the obtaining of F neutralised the devastating effects of
hydrochloric acid and makes it as refreshing as fresh water. Then it seems
that it is not the case in the context of S’s judgement that the content of
glass 1 resembles the content of glass 3 more than it resembles the content
of glass 2 (relative to S’s goal that is to quench her thirst and to her true
beliefs about the refreshing faculties of water and hydrochloric acid). If
hydrochloric acid has been made as refreshing as fresh water, glass 2 and 3
seem at least equally similar to glass 1 in the context of S’s ascription of
comparative resemblance.
In order to avoid this difficulty, we say, following Taylor (2004, 249),
that beliefs B′ defeat a subject warranted resemblance judgement relative
to the representational perspective she occupies and beliefs B if and only if
an occupier of this perspective with beliefs B ∪ B′ loses the warrant to the
judgement at hand.
Finally, let us say that S’s resemblance judgement is stably warranted
relative to pr and true beliefs B if and only if (i) S is warranted relative
to pr and B, and (ii) for any true beliefs B′ which defeat S’s resemblance
judgement, there are further true beliefs B′′ such that B′ ⊇ B′′ and such
that S is warranted in her resemblance judgement relative to pr and beliefs
B ∪ B′′ (Taylor 2004, 249). Therefore, stable warrant is warrant relative to
true beliefs for which there is no defeater.
The conditions for stable warrant of resemblance judgements can then be
provided simply by substituting ‘stably warranted’ for ‘warranted’ in both
14Taylor proposes a stronger restriction. He proposes to restrict B to beliefs that aren’t
about resemblance in order to avoid impredicativity (Taylor 2004, 248-249). If I under-
stand him correctly, I think that Taylor’s restriction is too strong. There are contexts
in which the belief that some individuals resemble each other is sufficiently informative,
relevant and interesting to justify a resemblance judgement between other individuals.
For instance, let the context be such that only physical properties are relevant, suppose
that we are justified in believing that Sam and Paul resemble each other, and suppose
that we know that George and Paul are identical twins. Then we have acceptable reasons
to judge that Sam and George resemble each other. In such circumstances it seems to
me relevant and legitimate to ground the evaluated resemblance judgement – Sam and
George resemble each other – on the belief that Sam and Paul resemble each other.
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the left-hand side and the right-hand side of each of the conditions (Warrant
RSM )-(Warrant DO). For illustration I give here the conditions for having
stably warranted judgements of strong minimal and overall resemblance.
(S-Warrant RSM) A subject S is stably warranted in judging the As
strongly minimally similar (relative to pr and true beliefs B) iff S
is stably warranted in judging, relative to true beliefs B, that at least
one pr-relevant property of the As is had by each of them.
(S-Warrant RO) A subject S is stably warranted in judging the As weakly
minimally similar (relative to pr and true beliefs B) iff S is stably
warranted in judging, relative to true beliefs B, that the resembling
weight of the As (relative to pr and B) saliently exceeds (relative to
pr and B) the pr-relevant standard.
Suppose now that Sam is stably warranted (relative to his representational
perspective pr) in judging that
(6.3) hippos and whales strongly minimally resemble each other
and that Maria is stably warranted (relative to pr ′) in judging that
(6.4) hippos and whales do not strongly minimally resemble each other.
Now Sam and Maria disagree about the resemblance of hippos and whales,
and Sam and Maria’s judgements seem inconsistent. Yet since (6.3) and
(6.4) are each stably warranted none of Sam and Maria is committing a
fault. They both have good, undefeated reasons to judge as they do about
the resemblance of hippos and whales. If so, we must conclude that differ-
ences in representational perspectives are what explains their disagreement.
That there can be such disagreements justifies the claim that resemblance
judgements are context-relative, and dependent on a representational per-
spective. Whether the propositional content of Sam’s judgement and the
propositional content of Maria’s judgement are genuinely inconsistent is an
issue I will address in the following chapter and in the first section of chapter
8.
Chapter 7
Resemblism and
Anti-Resemblism
7.1 Introduction
There exist two metaphysical views about the context-relativity of resem-
blance which have never been labelled or discussed in detail. The main
proponents of the one view are George McClure (1964), the Goodman of
‘Seven Strictures’ (1970), and, more recently, Barry Taylor (1993). I call
the view of resemblance they advocate Anti-Resemblism.1
Resemblism and Anti-Resemblism interpret the context-relativity of re-
semblance judgements in different ways. According to Resemblism, the
context-relativity of resemblance judgements is a purely pragmatic matter.
The context-relativity of resemblance is a matter of our practical concerns,
but practical concerns have nothing to do with ontology. This view about
resemblance is nicely expressed in the following quotation from Armstrong:
1It is noticeable that McClure (who is as far as I know the first and main advo-
cate of Anti-Resemblism) and Goodman are both anti-resemblist. For this shows that
Anti-Resemblism is not attached to any particular solution to the Problem of Universals.
Goodman denies that there are universals and conceives of properties as sets of n-tuples of
individuals in (Goodman 1970), whereas McClure admits that there are universals. But
McClure conceives of universals as abundant. According to him, there are at least as many
universals as there are predicates, and it is a certain class of mind-dependent universals,
namely purposes, that determine which universals play a role in resemblance facts. So an
anti-resemblist can be a nominalist or a realist about universals provided universals can
be conceived of as abundant.
131
132 7. Resemblism and Anti-Resemblism
So statements about the degree of resemblance of particulars
may presuppose a list or other criteria of what is to count as “one
property” or “one range of properties” in such situations. This
list or other criteria will usually reflect something as ontologi-
cally unimportant as our practical concerns. Practical concerns
may also lead us to distinguish between important and not-so-
important respects of resemblance and to weight the comparison
accordingly. (Armstrong 1978b, 98) [italics are mine]
Rodriguez-Pereyra also endorses Resemblism in the following passage:
Facts about resemblance between particulars are as objective as
facts about particulars having properties, and have nothing to
do with the language or system of representation we use. Re-
semblance is not, then, as Goodman believes, relative, variable,
and culture-dependent (although our judgements of resemblance
may be). (Rodriguez-Pereyra 2002, 20)
The anti-resemblist takes the opposite stance and disputes the distinction
between the ontology of resemblance and our practical concerns about re-
semblance: the ontology of resemblance cannot be utterly independent of our
judgements of resemblance. If resemblance judgements are context-relative,
then this is because resemblance itself is context-relative. Resemblance is
this attribute which matters for our practical concerns,2 and its ontology
cannot come totally apart from these concerns.
The two resemblists, Armstrong and Rodriguez-Pereyra, are radical in
that they seem to maintain that every resemblance fact obtains indepen-
dently of any representational perspective, independently of practical con-
cerns. But resemblists need not be that extreme.
Resemblism, as I conceive of it, is a view of resemblance which follows
from the carnivorous view of elected properties as sparse properties that I
introduced in chapter 1.3 The two quoted philosophers are philosophers who
2Where practical concerns may include theoretical concerns.
3According to the carnivorous view, whether a property is elected or not has nothing
to do with inductive practices, entrenchment or contextual relevance but is grounded in
its real, objective nature. Whether some individuals are identical in nature is an absolute
truth because whether a property is an elected one is an objective fact, a fact that is
independent of the way we, or any other cognizer, represent individuals.
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believe that there is a difference in nature between what I call elected prop-
erties and merely abundant properties. According to Armstrong, elected
properties are sparse universals; according to Rodriguez-Pereyra, elected
properties are sparse properties, where sparse properties are understood in
some indeterminate nominalist way.4
It does not follow from the carnivorous view of elected properties that
every resemblance fact obtains independently of any representational per-
spective. What follows from the carnivorous view of elected properties is
only that facts of strong minimal resemblance, facts of weak minimal dif-
ference, and facts of exact resemblance obtain independently of representa-
tional perspectives.
Individuals strongly minimally resemble each other if and only if they
share an elected property. Therefore, facts of strong minimal resemblance
are independent of any representational perspective if and only if whether
a property had by individuals is an elected one is independent of any rep-
resentational perspective. Some individuals are exactly similar if and only
if they share all their elected properties. Therefore, facts of exact resem-
blance are independent of any representational perspective if and only if
whether a property had by individuals is an elected one is independent of
any representational perspective. The same reasoning yields the conclusion
that facts of weak minimal difference obtain independently of any represen-
tational perspective if and only if the election of properties is independent
of any representational perspective.
However, it does not follow from the carnivorous view that every fact
of weak minimal resemblance obtains independently of any representational
perspective. For many facts of weak minimal resemblance between individ-
uals obtain in virtue of inexact, though close, resemblances of elected prop-
erties of individuals. Yet the carnivorous view of elected properties that I
described in chapter 1 remains silent about whether overall resemblance of
properties is a mind-independent matter.
4Rodriguez-Pereyra (2002, 60-2) does not commit himself to any analysis of sparse
properties as sets nor to any alternative analysis of sparse properties. For he thinks of
Resemblance Nominalism as a truthmaker analysis for ascriptions of sparse properties in
terms of resemblance and, as he argues, he need not commit himself to any analysis of
sparse properties to offer his truthmaker analysis. But, of course, sparse properties are
certainly not universals or tropes in his Resemblist Resemblance Nominalism.
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Let us call all and only resemblance facts of the former categories –
strong minimal resemblance, exact resemblance and weak minimal difference
– the core resemblance facts. The central idea of resemblism is thus that the
core resemblance facts are determined independently of any representational
perspective.
Every metaphysician who embraces the doctrine of sparse properties is
a resemblist in that sense. Among contemporary resemblists we find D. C.
Williams (1997), David Armstrong (1978b), Keith Campbell (1990), David
Lewis (1999a), Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (2002), Peter Simons (1994), and
many others.5
Then resemblists can disagree about whether the core resemblance facts
are the only resemblance facts that obtain independently of any represen-
tational perspective. I call moderate the resemblists who maintain that,
besides the core resemblance facts, there are resemblance facts whose ob-
taining depends on a representational perspective. I call radical the resem-
blists who maintain that every resemblance fact obtains independently of
any representational perspective.
On the other hand, the anti-resemblist maintains that every resemblance
fact depends on a representational perspective. For Anti-Resemblism is a
judgement-based view of resemblance. If S judges that the As resemble
each other and if no belief can defeat S’s warranted resemblance judgement
relative to the representational perspective she occupies, then the As resem-
ble each other, given her representational perspective. Now suppose that
S judged that the As resemble each other because she judges that the As
have the property P in common. Since S is stably warranted relative to her
representational perspective in judging that the As resemble each other, it
follows from our assumption and the conditions for stably warranted resem-
blance judgements that the As have the property P in common and that P
is a property such that individuals instantiating P resemble each other, ac-
cording to S’s representational perspective. Hence, P is an elected property
relative to S’s representational perspective. Therefore, Anti-Resemblism
yields a vegetarian view of elected properties, since whether a property is
elected or not depends on a representational perspective if resemblance does.
5This non-exhaustive list of authors illustrates the fact that Resemblism, just like Anti-
Resemblism, is independent of any particular positioning in the realist vs. nominalist
debate.
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The labels ‘Resemblism’ and ‘Anti-Resemblism’ should remind the reader
of a more familiar opposition in metaphysics: that between Essentialism
and Anti-Essentialism. There is an important parallelism between Resem-
blism and Essentialism on the one hand, and Anti-Resemblism and Anti-
Essentialism on the other hand, that may help to understand what these
two stances about resemblance are.
Just as Lewis (1968) takes Essentialism to be the doctrine that things
have real essences, i.e. that independently of the way things are conceived
of, described or referred to, there is a determinate fact of the matter about
an object’s de re modal properties, I take Resemblism to be the doctrine
that things have real resemblances, i.e. that independently of the way things
are represented, described or referred to, there is a determinate fact of the
matter about whether some things resemble each other or not; at least when
the core resemblance facts are concerned.
On the other hand, I take Anti-Essentialism to be the view according to
which there are no mind independent facts that constitute truthmakers for
de re modal propositions, and which looks to ways we conceive of, describe,
or refer to objects – mind-dependent facts – as the only viable truthmakers
for such propositions. Likewise, Anti-Resemblism is the view according to
which there are no mind-independent facts that constitute truthmakers for
ascriptions of resemblance or difference to objects, and which looks to the
ways we represent, compare, or refer to objects – mind-dependent facts – as
the only viable truthmakers for our ascriptions of resemblance.
The best way to characterise the debate between the resemblist and
the anti-resemblist is perhaps in terms of faultless disagreements between
resemblance judgements. As I characterised such disagreements in the final
section of the last chapter, whether such a disagreement is faultless is an
epistemological issue. Subjects disagree in their resemblance judgements
without committing a fault when and only when they each have good reasons
to judge that so and so about the resemblance of the compared individuals,
i.e. when and only when they are each stably warranted, relative to the
representational perspective they occupy, in judging that so and so about
the resemblance of the compared individuals.
I take the anti-resemblist to go further and contend that disagreements
between judgements expressing opposite ascriptions of resemblance can be
semantically faultless and faultless regarding the ontology. For instance, let
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Sam and Maria disagree about whether the As strongly minimally resemble
each other and assume that the propositional content of Sam’s judgement
is that the As strongly minimally resemble each other, while the proposi-
tional content of Maria’s judgement is that the As do not strongly minimally
resemble each other. According to Anti-Resemblism, Sam and Maria can
both be right about the resemblance facts. It can be so because, within
Anti-Resemblism, resemblance facts depend on a representational perspec-
tive and Sam and Maria can both be right relative to the representational
perspective they occupy.
On the other hand, Resemblism is such that if opposite resemblance
judgements express genuine ascriptions of resemblance,6 then some of these
judgements must be false. Thus, if the propositional content of Sam’s judge-
ment is that the As strongly minimally resemble each other and if the content
of Maria’s judgement is that the As do not strongly minimally resemble each
other, then either Sam or Maria gets the resemblance facts wrong. This is
so because, within Resemblism, strong minimal resemblance obtains inde-
pendently of any representational perspective.7
Before I begin the presentation of the two opposite views, I shall em-
phasise that I conceive of the debate between the resemblist and the anti-
resemblist as the most central debate in the metaphysics of resemblance.
The most central and most venerable debate in the metaphysics of proper-
ties, however, is arguably the debate between the nominalist and the realist.
As I outlined in footnotes in this section and as will become more evident in
what follows, the resemblist vs. anti-resemblist debate is orthogonal to the
debate between the nominalist and the realist. An answer to the question
raised by the debate between the resemblist and the anti-resemblist, namely
the question of whether resemblance facts are context-relative facts, does
not determine any positioning on the nominalist/realist debate, and vice
versa.
6At least when the focus is on the core resemblances.
7The resemblist, of course, can agree that there can be disagreements between re-
semblance judgements that are faultless regarding the resemblance facts. But as I will
describe in section 1 of chapter 8, according to the resemblist, the contents of resemblance
judgements are not genuinely opposite in such situations. For the resemblist takes the con-
tents of such opposite resemblance judgements to be consistent ascriptions of resemblance
in some respect and negations of ascriptions of resemblance in some respect, instead of
ascriptions of resemblance tout court.
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Once the focus is on resemblance, there is more agreement between an
anti-resemblist realist and an anti-resemblist nominalist than there is be-
tween an anti-resemblist realist and a resemblist realist (or between an anti-
resemblist nominalist and a resemblist nominalist). For one makes resem-
blance a mind-dependent matter and the other does not. Once we focus
on properties, there is more agreement between an anti-resemblist realist
and a resemblist realist (or an anti-resemblist nominalist and a resemblist
nominalist) than between an anti-resemblist realist and an anti-resemblist
nominalist. The reason for this is that the latter disagree on the nature of
properties, while the former do not.
The resemblist/anti-resemblist debate is the central metaphysical debate
once we focus on resemblance, and the question of whether resemblance facts
are context-relative is thus the main issue of the metaphysics of resemblance.
The nominalist/realist debate is the main debate once we focus on the na-
ture of properties and the question of the nature of properties is thus the
main issue of the metaphysics of properties. This is the reason why the
metaphysics of resemblance and the metaphysics of properties are distinct,
though not independent, philosophical issues.
7.2 Anti-Resemblism
Anti-Resemblism is first a metaphysical position, one about truthmakers
for ascriptions of resemblance. But before discussing anti-resemblist truth-
maker analyses for ascriptions of resemblance I shall indicate how the anti-
resemblist can account for the truth conditions of the propositional content
of resemblance judgements. In order to make clear that I am not giving
truth conditions for resemblance judgements but for the propositional con-
tent of resemblance judgements, I will follow the convention of using angled
brackets to form names of propositions. So 〈p〉 stands for the proposition
that p.
Anti-resemblists can disagree regarding the truth conditions for the con-
tent of resemblance judgements. As far as I know there are three main
ways to state anti-resemblist truth conditions for resemblance propositions.
Following the terminology of Iris Einheuser (2008), the contextualist anti-
resemblist puts the representational perspective within the propositional
content of resemblance judgements, the propositional relativist anti-resem-
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blist (for short, propositional anti-resemblist) puts the representational per-
spective alongside the world to evaluate resemblance propositions, and the
factual relativist anti-resemblist (for short, factual anti-resemblist) puts the
representational perspective within the world.
Each of these three accounts of the truth conditions for the content
of resemblance judgements has its advantages and drawbacks, and which
of them is correct should be determined by considering how they account
for the semantics of context-relative judgements in general rather than by
considering how they account for the truth conditions of the content of
resemblance judgements. But, focusing on resemblance, my preference goes
for the view introduced by Iris Einheuser in (Einheuser 2008), so-called
Factual Relativism, and its application to the semantics of the content of
resemblance judgements.
7.2.1 Contextualist anti-resemblist semantics
As an anti-resemblist, the contextualist anti-resemblist agrees that opposite
resemblance judgements can each be true. So it may be that Sam is right
when judging that
(6.3) hippos and whales strongly minimally resemble each other
and that Maria is right when judging that
(6.4) hippos and whales do not strongly minimally resemble each other.
The reason why they can both be right is that resemblance is relative to
a representational perspective and that Sam and Maria can both be right
relative to their respective representational perspective.
The contextualist agrees that Sam’s judgement and Maria’s judgement
are opposite, but he denies that the propositional contents of their judge-
ments are inconsistent. For the representational perspective is some sort
of hidden indexical, according to the contextualist. So let pr be the repre-
sentational perspective occupied by Sam and let pr ′ be the representational
perspective occupied by Maria. According to the contextualist, the propo-
sitional content of Sam’s judgement is not that hippos and whales strongly
minimally resemble each other but the following proposition:
(6.3′) 〈hippos and whales strongly minimally resemble each other relative
to pr〉.
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Likewise, the propositional content of Maria’s judgement is not that hippos
and whales do not strongly minimally resemble each other but the following
proposition:
(6.4′) 〈hippos and whales do not strongly minimally resemble each other
relative to pr ′〉.
Assuming that pr and pr ′ are distinct representational perspectives, (6.3′)
and (6.4′) are consistent. Thus, according to the contextualist, a single
judgement, e.g. “hippos and whales strongly minimally resemble each other”,
can express different propositions.
Since he puts the representational perspective within the propositional
content of resemblance judgements, the contextualist anti-resemblist gets
truth simpliciter for the propositional content of resemblance judgements,
i.e. he gets truth at a world, full stop. For illustration, I state here the
contextualist truth conditions for the content of judgements of strong min-
imal resemblance, overall resemblance, and exact resemblance (where ‘the
As’ is an arbitrary plural constant denoting collectively, pr is an arbitrary
representational perspective, and w is an arbitrary world):
(C-truth RSM) 〈the As strongly minimally resemble each other relative to
pr〉 is true at w iff in w there is a property P such that each of the As
has P and P is elected relative to pr, where ‘elected’ is interpreted as
relevant.
(C-truth RO) 〈the As resemble overall relative to pr〉 is true at w iff in
w the resembling weight of the As (relative to pr) saliently exceeds
(relative to pr) the standard that is pr-relevant.
(C-truth RE) 〈the As exactly resemble each other relative to pr〉 is true at
w iff in w every property that is instantiated by some of the As and
that is elected relative to pr is a property instantiated by each of the
As.8
8The contextualist truth conditions for the propositional content of the other forms of
resemblance judgements can be obtained analogously by putting the representational per-
spective within the content. As far as I know the contextualist form of Anti-Resemblism
has never been maintained though McClure (1964) and Goodman (1970) have maintained
a similar form of Contextualism according to which the hidden indexical is not a repre-
sentational perspective but a respect of comparison. I discuss this form of Contextualism
in the first section of chapter 8.
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The main advantage of the contextualist proposal is that it gets truth sim-
pliciter for the content of resemblance judgements. But such a semantic
contextualism has been found objectionable for various reasons.9 A first
criticism is that the contextualist seems to distort the content of the ut-
terances of Sam and Maria, for it claims that Sam and Maria assert (and
believe) propositions that concern their own representational perspectives,
even though it seems that they are merely comparing hippos and whales
without their assertions having any reflective content.
Another problem concerns attitudes and speech reports. If the judge-
ment “hippos and whales strongly minimally resemble each other” were
indexical in such a way that it expresses different propositions in (6.3) and
(6.4), then we should expect speech-reports of such utterances to be sensi-
tive to this difference. For example, if Oscar utters the words “I am hungry”
at 12 noon, then a report by Alistair: “Oscar said that I am hungry” would
not correctly report Oscar’s utterance, because ‘I’ in the report would refer
to Alistair. Similarly, if at 2 p.m. Oscar reports his own 12 noon utterance
with the words “I said that I am hungry”, then the report would be incor-
rect, or at least very odd because of the use of the present tense of ‘am’.
As Ko¨lber emphasises the following general rule articulates some of these
principles of speech reporting:
(SR) If a sentence s is indexical in such a way that an utterance
of s in context C1 expresses a different proposition from an ut-
terance of s in a context C2, then an utterance by someone A of
s in C1 cannot be correctly reported in C2 by using the form of
words ‘a said that s.’ (where ‘a’ is some term referring to A).
(Ko¨lber 2008, 13)
However, if Maria reports Sam’s judgement by saying “Sam said that hip-
pos and whales strongly minimally resemble each other”, her report would
clearly be correct. So it seems that the contextualist must make the ad hoc
move that (SR) fails for reports on resemblance judgements if he aims to
maintain that the representational perspective is a hidden indexical in the
content of resemblance judgements.
A further worry concerning resemblance is that, given the contextualist
account and provided propositions represent the states of affairs they seem
9Cf. (Ko¨lber 2008) and (MacFarlane 2005).
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to represent, resemblance appears to be a relation between individuals and a
representational perspective. If you think that resemblance is a binary and
dyadic relation between an individual and an individual, then the contextu-
alist account makes resemblance a ternary relation between two individuals
and a representational perspective. If you think of resemblance as a monadic
multigrade property of individuals as I do, the contextualist account makes
resemblance a dyadic multigrade relation between many individuals and a
representational perspective. Intuitively, this is wrong. Resemblance is a
property of individuals, not a relation between individuals and a represen-
tational perspective.
Following the contextualist, there is no such fact as the fact that I and my
child resemble each other. There is the fact that I and my child resemble each
other relative to my representational perspective, and there is the fact that
I and my child resemble each other relative to Grandma’s representational
perspective, but nothing like the fact that I and my child resemble each
other. This seems wrong to me.
None of the latter objections shows that the contextualist position is
untenable, but they reveal how much of a departure it requires from ordinary
ways of thinking about the relation between judgements, propositions, and
indexicals, and about resemblance itself.
7.2.2 Propositional anti-resemblist semantics
According to the propositional anti-resemblist, when Sam judges that hip-
pos and whales strongly minimally resemble each other, the content of his
judgement is that hippos and whales strongly minimally resemble each other.
And when Maria judges that hippos and whales do not strongly minimally
resemble each other, the content of her judgement is that hippos and whales
do not strongly minimally resemble each other. So the judgement “hip-
pos and whales strongly minimally resemble each other” expresses the same
proposition in both judgements. However, the latter proposition is true
relative to Sam’s representational perspective and false relative to Maria’s
representational perspective.
According to the propositional anti-resemblist, the content of resem-
blance judgements is not true simpliciter, but true at a world and relative to
a representational perspective. Therefore, the propositional anti-resemblist
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would propose the following truth conditions for the content of judgements
of strong minimal resemblance, overall resemblance, and exact resemblance:
(P-truth RSM) 〈the As strongly minimally resemble each other〉 is true at
w and relative to pr iff, in w and relative to pr, there is a property
P such that each of the As has P and P is elected, where ‘elected’ is
interpreted as relevant.
(P-truth RO) 〈the As resemble overall〉 is true at w and relative to pr iff, in
w and relative to pr, the resembling weight of the As saliently exceeds
the relevant standard.
(P-truth RE) 〈the As exactly resemble each other〉 is true at w and relative
to pr iff, in w and relative to pr, every property that is instantiated by
some of the As and that is elected is a property instantiated by each
of the As.10
Propositional Anti-Resemblism seems to be the view defended by Taylor in
(Taylor 2004). The very advantage of the propositional relativist account is
that resemblance judgements express what they seem to express, but such
a relativism is also objectionable.
First, considering the proposed semantics, it seems that the truth prop-
erty, if there is such a property, is here a ternary – and plausibly triadic
– relation between a proposition, a world, and a representational perspec-
tive. But obviously the propositional relativist does not maintain that every
truth is relative. Some truths, for instance mathematical truths, are true
simpliciter. If we focus on the latter truths, the truth property (if there
is such a property) rather looks like a binary – and plausible dyadic – re-
lation between a proposition and a world. Now validity is preservation of
truth. The inference from “2 + 2 = 4” and “hippos and whales resemble
each other” to “2 + 2 = 4 and hippos and whales resemble each other” is
clearly valid. Yet which truth property is preserved in this inference? Is it
the binary property or the ternary property?
If the latter reasoning constitutes an objection, the objection is not con-
clusive. For the propositional anti-resemblist can maintain that truth is a
10The propositional anti-resemblist truth conditions for the content of the other forms
of resemblance judgements can be obtained analogously by putting the representational
perspective alongside the world.
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multigrade property, and that it is this property which is preserved in the
inference. Depending on the kind of proposition we are considering we can
add more or less parameters to determine the truth of the proposition: a
world, a representational perspective, but also a time, a spatial location,
and so on and so forth.
A stronger worry concerns the role played by representational perspec-
tives within the propositional relativist framework.11 On the standard ac-
count of propositions, propositions are the representational contents of in-
dicative sentences on an occasion of use and so are ultimately linked with
the facts they represent or misrepresent. However, by putting the represen-
tational perspective alongside the world, the propositional anti-resemblist
semantics has for consequence that the representational perspective does
not determine what the world is and thus does not determine which states
of affairs obtain in a world. If the representational perspective partly deter-
mines whether a proposition about the resemblance of objects is true but if
the representational perspective does not help determining the fact that is
represented by the latter proposition, then the link between a proposition
and the fact it represents is broken, or at least this link is not what we
standardly think it is.
For instance, which state of affairs is represented by the proposition
〈hippos and whales strongly minimally resemble each other〉 which is true
relative to Sam’s representational perspective and false relative to Maria’s
representational perspective? It cannot be the state of affairs that hippos
and whales strongly minimally resemble each other. For whether the propo-
sition is true depends on a representational perspective, but whether a state
of affairs obtains, whether it is a fact, only depends on the way the world
is. Since the world is not determined by the representational perspective, it
cannot be that there is a state of affairs (the state of affairs that hippos and
whales strongly minimally resemble each other) that obtains dependently
on a representational perspective and does not obtain dependently on an-
other representational perspective. Therefore, 〈hippos and whales strongly
minimally resemble each other〉 does not represent the state of affairs that
hippos and whales strongly minimally resemble each other because there is
no such state of affairs, according to the propositional anti-resemblist.
11Cf. (Einheuser 2008, 200-2). Einheuser does not consider resemblance judgements
but epistemic modals and judgements of taste.
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We may think that here the representational perspective selects what
state of affairs a proposition represents as obtaining. So, relative to Sam’s
representational perspective, 〈hippos and whales strongly minimally resem-
ble each other〉 represents the fact that hippos and whales strongly min-
imally resemble each other relative to Sam’s representational perspective.
Likewise, relative to Maria’s representational perspective, the proposition
that hippos and whales strongly minimally resemble each other represents
the non-obtaining state of affairs that hippos and whales strongly minimally
resemble each other relative to Maria’s representational perspective. If so,
the proposition itself does not represent any determinate state of affairs,
and this seems to be a significant departure from the standard account of
propositions.
In order to maintain the standard account of propositions, the proposi-
tional anti-resemblist should claim that what the proposition represents is
an objective fact of the world. Thus the proposition 〈hippos and whales
strongly minimally resemble each other〉 represents the fact that there is
a property shared by hippos and whales. The problem then is that con-
tradictory propositions – 〈hippos and whales strongly minimally resemble
each other〉 and 〈hippos and whales do not strongly minimally resemble each
other〉 – correctly represent the same fact.
Again, none of the latter objections shows that Propositional Anti-
Resemblism is untenable. But they show that the view leads to an im-
portant departure from the standard conception of the relationship between
propositions and states of affairs.
7.2.3 Factual anti-resemblist semantics
Factual Relativism, which is the view proposed by Einheuser (2008), is an
improvement on both Contextualism and Propositional Relativism, or so I
believe. Its application to resemblance, Factual Anti-Resemblism, displays
considerable advantages for the metaphysics of resemblance I am endorsing.
Contrary to Contextualist Anti-Resemblism, Factual Anti-Resemblism does
not require a modification of my account of resemblance: I can maintain
that resemblance is a monadic property of individuals instead of a rela-
tion between individuals and a representational perspective. Contrary to
Propositional Anti-Resemblism, Factual Anti-Resemblism puts the repre-
sentational perspective within the world so that I can take representational
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perspectives to be part of the truthmakers for the content of resemblance
judgements without assuming that representational perspectives are part of
the resemblance facts.
Moreover, according to Factual Anti-Resemblism, the judgement that
hippos and whales strongly minimally resemble each other expresses the
proposition that hippos and whales strongly minimally resemble each other,
and the latter proposition represents the fact that hippos and whales strongly
minimally resemble each other. It is arguably a desirable result of a theory
of resemblance that judgements of resemblance express what they seem to
express and that the content of these judgements represent the resemblance
facts they seem to represent. As we will see in the first section of the next
chapter, this is a result that Resemblism fails to get.
In Factual Relativism, a world is represented as an ordered pair. The
first member of such a pair is what Einheuser (2008, 190) calls a substra-
tum. When resemblance is the issue, the second member of such a pair is a
representational perspective. We shall think of the substratum as the mind-
independent part of the world. The substratum is a world of individuals and
properties, and the contribution of the substratum to the resemblance facts
is that it determines which individuals exist and which properties individ-
uals have and fail to have. The second contributing factor, the representa-
tional perspective, is a collection of physiological and psychological features
of agents as I described in section 2 of chapter 6. Following Einheuser,
we say that a representational perspective induces resemblance facts over a
substratum.
Let thus s@ be the actual substratum. And suppose that Sam occupies
the representational perspective pr and that Sam’s judgement (6.3) is true.
Then the world at which Sam’s judgement is true is the world <s@, pr>.
This is the world in which pr induces the resemblance facts over s@, and in
this world it is a fact that hippos and whales strongly minimally resemble
each other, full stop. It differs from the world in which Maria’s judgement
is true, for Maria’s judgement is true at world <s@, pr ′>. And in the latter
world, it is a fact that hippos and whales do not strongly minimally resemble
each other, full stop.
According to Factual Anti-Resemblism, different worlds with the same
substratum coincide in their mind-independent facts, but can come apart in
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the facts that are induced by representational perspectives, among which we
find the resemblance facts.12
Since the representational perspective is here part of the world, the fac-
tual anti-resemblist gets truth simpliciter, that is truth at a world, full stop.
The factual anti-resemblist truth conditions for the content of resemblance
judgements, which I will assume in the following chapters, are the following
(where s is an arbitrary substratum):
(F-truth RSM) 〈the As strongly minimally resemble each other〉 is true at
w = <s, pr> iff in w there is a property P such that each of the As
has P and P is elected.
(F-truth DWM) 〈the As are weakly minimally dissimilar〉 is true at w =
<s, pr> iff in w there is a property P such that at least one of the As
has P, at least one of the As lacks P, and P is elected.
(F-truth P.R.) 〈P1, . . . , Pn are properties which resemble each other〉 is
true at w = <s, pr> iff in w P1, . . . , Pn resemble each other saliently
more than the relevant standard.
(F-truth RWM) 〈the As weakly minimally resemble each other〉 is true at
w = <s, pr> iff in w there is a property P such that each of the As
has P and P is elected, or (ii) there is a series of properties P1, . . . ,
Pn such that each of the As has one of them, such that P1, . . . , Pn
resemble each other, and P1, . . . , Pn are elected.
(F-truth DSM) 〈the As are strongly minimally different from each other〉
is true at w = <s, pr> iff in w there is a series of properties P1, . . . ,
Pn such that (i) each of the As has exactly one of P1, . . . , Pn, such
that (ii) there is a relevant similarity ordering on which each of P1,
12It is then a question whether Factual Anti-Resemblism requires the rejection of some
form of Materialism: if the substratum can remain fixed while the representational per-
spective varies, then the representational perspective, which is at least partly a mental
entity, does not co-vary with the mind-independent reality. And if you think of super-
venience in terms of co-variation and of Materialism in terms of supervenience as Lewis
(1999a) does, then it looks like Factual Anti-Resemblism leads to the rejection of Materi-
alism. Nevertheless, which representational perspective is occupied can still be explained
in terms of physical facts: biological facts. So if we conceive of Materialism as a the-
ory of explanation, rather than a theory of co-variation, Factual Anti-Resemblism and
Materialism seem compatible.
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. . . , Pn is ordered, and (iii) some properties among P1, . . . , Pn do not
resemble each other.
(F-truth RO) 〈the As resemble overall〉 is true at w = <s, pr> iff in w the
resembling weight of the As saliently exceeds the relevant standard.
(F-truth DO) 〈the As differ overall〉 is true at w = <s, pr> iff in w the re-
sembling weight of the As is saliently inferior to the relevant standard.
(F-truth RE) 〈the As exactly resemble each other〉 is true at w = <s, pr>
iff in w every elected property that is instantiated by some of the As
is a property instantiated by each of the As.
(F-truth DE) 〈theAs exactly differ from each other〉 is true at w = <s, pr>
iff in w there is no series of properties P1, . . . , Pn such that (i) each
of the As has one of them, (ii) each of P1, . . . , Pn is elected, and (iii)
P1, . . . , Pn resemble each other.
Given that worlds are ordered pairs, there are two ways the resemblance
facts can vary in Factual Anti-Resemblism. Suppose that Maria says:
(7.1) hippos and whales might have been strongly minimally similar.
Then (7.1) is ambiguous. For (7.1) can be interpreted as meaning that if
hippos and whales had had in common a property they lack but which is
relevant relative to Maria’s representational perspective, then hippos and
whales would have been strongly minimally similar. But (7.1) can also be
interpreted as, if the representational perspective had been otherwise, then
hippos and whales would have been strongly minimally similar (given the
properties they actually have).
In order to account for this ambiguity, I follow Einheuser (2008, 194-5)
in introducing two sets of modal notions. First, we have the notion of s-
possibility ♦s which tracks possible variations in the substratum. Second,
we have the notion of pr-possibility ♦pr which tracks possible variations of
the representational perspective:
(7.2) ♦sφ is true at w = <s, pr> if and only if there is a substratum s′ such
that φ is true at w′ = <s′, pr> (i.e. iff φ is true at some world that
differs from w only in virtue of the substratum, if it differs at all).
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(7.3) ♦prφ is true at w = <s, pr> if and only if there is a representational
perspective pr ′ such that φ is true at w′ = <s, pr ′> (i.e. iff φ is true at
some world that differs from w only in virtue of the representational
perspective, if it differs at all).
Note that the apparatus allows for a straightforward semantics for ‘relative
to every representational perspective’ or ‘in every context’. Suppose we
judge that electrons resemble each other in every context, i.e. relative to
every representational perspective. Then we introduce an operator of pr-
necessity 2pr. The semantics for 〈2pr electrons resemble each other〉 is as
follows:
(7.4) 〈2pr electrons resemble each other〉 is true at w = <s, pr> if and
only if, for any representational perspective pr ′, 〈electrons resemble
each other〉 is true at w′ = <s, pr ′> (i.e. iff 〈electrons resemble each
other〉 is true at every world that differs from w only in virtue of the
representational perspective, if it differs at all).
But some may object that Factual Anti-Resemblism is threatened by infer-
ences involving premises that are not true relative to the same notion of
world. For some truths, for instance mathematical truths, seem to be true
only relative to the substratum. If so, 〈2 + 2 = 4〉 is true at w, where w is
a traditional world, that is just a substratum. However, 〈hippos and whales
strongly minimally resemble each other〉 is true relative to a world, where
the world is an ordered pair having for members a substratum and a rep-
resentational perspective. But then what is the notion of world relative to
which 〈2 + 2 = 4 and hippos and whales strongly minimally resemble each
other〉 is true?
The factual anti-resemblist’s answer is that the conjunction is true rel-
ative to a world conceived of as an ordered pair having for members a
substratum and a representational perspective because both premises are.
The representational perspective, truly, does not contribute to the truth of
〈2+2 = 4〉 in the considered course of reasoning. But the latter is not incom-
patible with the fact that in the considered course of reasoning, 〈2 + 2 = 4〉
is also true relative to a world conceived of as an ordered pair having for
members a substratum and a representational perspective. It is one thing to
say that the representational perspective of the world does not contribute
to such a truth, it is another thing to say that such a truth is not relative
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to a world which has for part a representational perspective. The factual
anti-resemblist agrees with the former, but disagrees with the latter.
I think that Factual Anti-Resemblism is an improvement on both Propo-
sitional Anti-Resemblism and Contextualist Anti-Resemblism because here
the judgement expresses the proposition it seems to express and the propo-
sition represents the state of affairs it seems to represent, and because here
resemblance is what it seems to be: a property of individuals, full stop. In
what follows, I will assume the factual anti-resemblist account of the truth
conditions for the content of resemblance judgements. So the truthmaker
analyses I propose are truthmaker analyses for the content of resemblance
judgements understood according to Factual Anti-Resemblism. There are
several plausible candidate truthmaker analyses.
7.2.4 Truthmaking in Anti-Resemblism
Assuming the factual relativist version of Anti-Resemblism, the content of
resemblance judgements is made true by the mutual effort of the substratum
and the representational perspective. Yet there is still room for disagreement
between anti-resemblists regarding what the truthmakers for the content of
resemblance judgements are. There are various positions in the logical space,
and I just state here the most obvious truthmaker account of our ascriptions
of resemblance. Thus (where truth is truth at a world understood in the
factual relativist way):
(TM RSM) What makes it true that the As strongly minimally resemble
each other is that there is at least one property had by each of the As
that is elected.
(TM RWM) What makes it true that the As weakly minimally resemble
each other is either (i) that there is at least one elected property had
by each of the As, or that (ii) there is a series of elected properties P1,
. . . , Pn such that each of the As has one of them and such that the
resemblance of P1, . . . , Pn saliently exceeds the relevant standard.
(TM DWM) What makes it true that the As weakly minimally differ from
each other is that there is an elected property P such that at least one
of the As has P and some of the As lacks P.
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(TM DSM) What makes it true that the As strongly minimally differ from
each other is that there is a series of elected properties P1, . . . , Pn
such that (i) each of the As has one of P1, . . . , Pn, (ii) there is a
relevant similarity ordering on which each of P1, . . . , Pn is ordered,
and (iii) the resemblance of some properties among P1, . . . , Pn does
not saliently exceed the relevant standard.
(TM RO) What makes it true that the As resemble overall is that the
resembling weight of the As saliently exceeds the relevant standard.
(TM DO) What makes it true that the As differ overall is that the resem-
bling weight of the As is saliently inferior to the relevant standard.
(TM RE) What makes it true that the As exactly resemble each other is
that every elected property of the As is had by all of them.
(TM DE) What makes it true that the As exactly differ from each other is
that there is no series of elected properties P1, . . . , Pn such that each
of the As has one of them and such that the resemblance of P1, . . . ,
Pn saliently exceeds the relevant standard.
According to these truthmaker explanations, the election of properties, which
is relative to a representational perspective, partly makes it true that indi-
viduals resemble or differ. The substratum on the other hand, makes it true
that individuals have the properties they have.
The metaphysical view that I discuss in the last chapter of this study,
and which I call Vegetarian Resemblance Nominalism, denies at least (TM
RSM ). According to the vegetarian resemblance nominalist (for short, the
V-resemblance nominalist), strong minimal resemblance of individuals is
what explains their having elected properties (where elected properties are
conceived of in a vegetarian way and properties are conceived of in a nom-
inalistic way). The V-resemblance nominalist may agree that other, less
fundamental, kinds of ascriptions of resemblance are explained in terms of
elected properties. But he specifically denies that ascriptions of strong min-
imal resemblance are to be explained in terms of elected properties because,
according to him, it is the resemblance of the P-individuals (which is de-
termined by a representational perspective) which makes it true that P is
elected.
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Since I believe Nominalism is true, the most plausible and attractive
alternative to this V-Resemblance Nominalism is to my mind the vegetar-
ian counterpart of Natural Class Nominalism, that we may call Vegetarian
Elected Class Nominalism (for short V-Class Nominalism). The V-class
nominalist is an anti-resemblist who maintains (TM RSM ) and thus ex-
plains strong minimal resemblance in terms of the sharing of an elected
property. But the V-class nominalist denies that elected properties differ
in nature from merely abundant properties, and thus, assuming that abun-
dant properties of individuals are sets of individuals, maintains that elected
properties are sets of individuals. According to V-Class Nominalism what
explains that a property P is elected is the representational perspective pr,
and the explanation of why some individuals have the property P is a matter
of the substratum (the mind-independent part of the world): the individuals
themselves.
But we may also conceive of an Anti-Resemblist Realism about Univer-
sals akin to the position defended by McClure (1964) or an Anti-Resemblist
Realism about Tropes. However, given the vegetarian view of elected prop-
erties to which Anti-Resemblism yields, these realisms incur commitment to
abundant universals or tropes and, what is more interesting, are such that
the sharing of a universal or the instantiation of exactly similar tropes is
not sufficient for strong minimal resemblance. This is McClure’s proposal.
According to him, in order to get resemblance from the sharing of a uni-
versal by the compared individuals, subjects must also have purposes that
make the shared universal relevant; where purposes are themselves univer-
sals instantiated by subjects. So an anti-resemblist realist about universals
has a more complicated, but to my mind much more plausible, account of
resemblance than its resemblist counterpart.
Given the latter remarks on Anti-Resemblist Realism, we see that a
further plausible anti-resemblist metaphysics of resemblance can be such
that it denies (TM RSM ), explains why a property is elected in terms of
resemblance (which is determined by the representational perspective), and
maintains that there are universals in an abundant way. There is nothing in-
compatible, in Anti-Resemblism, between Realism about Universals and an
explanation of the instantiation of elected properties in terms of resemblance.
So an explanation of ascriptions of elected properties to individuals can be an
explanation in terms of resemblance and nevertheless fail to be nominalist.
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However, an anti-resemblist explanation of ascriptions of elected properties
in terms of resemblance which admits an abundance of universals will have
most of the defects of V-Resemblance Nominalism without having its advan-
tages. For it would be much less economical than V-Resemblance Nominal-
ism but would roughly explain the election of properties as V-Resemblance
Nominalism does. Nevertheless, that such an anti-resemblist position is con-
ceivable shows how little the anti-resemblist/resemblist debate is constrained
by the realist/nominalist debate.
7.3 Resemblism
Resemblism, as I conceive of it, is a consequence of the carnivorous view of
elected properties as sparse properties. I shall thus begin my presentation
of Resemblism by a presentation of the sparse view of elected properties.
7.3.1 The real joints of nature
Let me first emphasise that the belief in an objective realm of sparse prop-
erties would not have yield Resemblism, if sparse properties had not been
conceived of as the properties that are linked with resemblance. Someone
might have said that there is an objective elite of properties, called sparse
properties, that capture the causal relations between objects but which have
nothing to do with resemblance facts. Such a view is possible, but it is not
the view of advocates of sparse properties who ascribe to sparse properties
the role of being elected properties, i.e. the role of being those properties
that are linked with resemblance. This view goes back at least to Plato and
has been stated by Lewis in the following terms:
[The abundant properties] pay no heed to the qualitative joints,
but carve things up in every which way. Sharing of them has
nothing to do with similarity [. . . ]. The sparse properties are
another story. Sharing of them makes for qualitative similarity
they carve at the joints, they are intrinsic, they are highly spe-
cific, the sets of their instances are ipso facto not entirely miscel-
laneous, there are only just enough of them to characterise things
completely and without redundancy. (Lewis 1986b, 59-60)
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There are several and important disagreements between proponents of the
sparse view of properties regarding the individuation of these properties13
and it is difficult to provide an uncontroversial account of them. To simplify
the matter I shall make the following assumptions about them: the sparse
properties of an individual are the most natural properties of this individ-
ual. Sparse properties are neither disjunctive, nor negative, nor conjunctive.
Sparse properties are not determinable properties but lowest determinate
properties of individuals.14 Sparse properties are intrinsic, highly specific.
They carve reality at its natural joints and nowhere else.
The most controversial claim in this list is that I use a notion of sparse
properties which is relative to the individual which instantiates it: the sparse
properties of an individual are the most natural properties of that individual.
This characterisation of sparse properties makes use of Lewis’s notion of
naturalness of properties which permits degrees but does not correspond to
Lewis’s own. Lewis uses the labels ‘sparse properties’ and ‘perfectly natural
properties’ synonymously, and according to him perfectly natural properties
are the most natural properties of the most basic, simplest individuals.
Some may, as Lewis and others do, prefer to restrict the label ‘sparse
properties’ to the perfectly natural ones. My preference for assuming that
the sparseness of a property is relative to the individuals that have it is
that on the assumption that complex individuals can resemble each other,
my account of strong minimal resemblance (SMR) turns out false if elected
properties are identified with Lewis’s perfectly natural properties. So fol-
lowing Lewis’s account of sparse properties would require a modification of
(SMR) in the presentation of Resemblism.15 Yet I prefer to take the liberty
of modifying Lewis’s account of sparse properties in the proposed way on
the grounds that a modification of (SMR) would suggest that the resemb-
13On this issue see (Schaffer 2004).
14There are disagreements between resemblists on this point. Hirsch maintains that
determinables that are not even highest determinables, like being red are sparse in (Hirsch
1993). But the orthodoxy among resemblists seems to be that determinables are not
sparse; see e.g. (Armstrong 1978b, 117-9) and (Rodriguez-Pereyra 2002, 48-9).
15This modification of (SMR) would take the following form: the As strongly minimally
resemble each other iff (i) they share an elected property or (ii) there is an elected property
which is shared by at least one proper part of each of the As. Modifying (SMR) in
this way makes every strong minimal resemblance between complex individuals a kind of
Husserl’s transferred similarity: it is a similarity based on the direct similarity of parts.
On transferred similarity, see section 1 of chapter 4.
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list and the anti-resemblist are talking past each other when talking about
resemblance, which I think is not the case.
So the sparse properties of an individual are the most natural properties
of this individual; where the most natural properties of an individual are
these properties of an individual which are definable in the least complicated
fashion out of the perfectly natural properties. In other words, the sparse
properties of an individual are the simplest16 Boolean constructs out of the
perfectly natural properties.
Once we admit objectively sparse properties, the context-relativity gets
out of the picture, at least regarding the core resemblance facts. Again, I
will begin by giving truth conditions for ascriptions of resemblance: first for
the core ascriptions of resemblance, then for other kinds of ascriptions of re-
semblance relative to the moderate and radical resemblist views respectively.
Finally, I will consider truthmakers.
7.3.2 Resemblist truth-conditions for core ascriptions of re-
semblance
Here again the provided resemblist truth conditions are truth conditions for
propositions about the resemblance and difference of individuals. However,
it is not clear whether these truth conditions correspond to the truth con-
ditions for the content of resemblance judgements, at least when everyday
resemblance judgements are the concern. For in Resemblism the content of
resemblance judgements need not be what it seems to be.17
Since the core resemblances are those resemblances that are ultimately
linked with the instantiation of sparse properties, and since whether a sparse
property is wholly determined by the mind-independent world, i.e. the sub-
stratum, the truth of ascriptions of core resemblances is wholly determined
by the mind-independent world. To make it clear that we are here talking
of mind-independent worlds, I say that propositions are here true at a world
w = s, where s is an arbitrary substratum.
(R-Truth RSM) 〈The As strongly minimally resemble each other〉 is true
at w = s iff in w there is a property P such that P is a sparse property
(relative to the As) and such that all the As instantiate P.
16Though I have no clue regarding how simplicity is to be measured here.
17See below section 1 of chapter 8.
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(R-Truth DWM) 〈The As weakly minimally differ from each other〉 is true
at w = s iff in w there is a property P such that P is a sparse property
(relative to the As) and such that there is some of the As which has
P and another of the As which lacks P.
(R-Truth RE) 〈The As resemble exactly〉 is true at w = s iff in w for all
property P such that P is sparse (relative to the As), if some of the
As has P then each of the As has P.
I take every resemblist to agree with each of (R-Truth RSM )-(R-Truth RE).
Regarding the truth conditions for other kinds of ascription of resemblance,
resemblists disagree relative to the radicality of their resemblist view.
7.3.3 Moderate resemblist’s truth conditions for other as-
criptions of resemblance
At one end of the resemblist scale is the view that the core ascriptions of
resemblance, and only the core ascriptions of resemblance, are made true
by the mind-independent world. Regarding other kinds of ascription of re-
semblance, their truth value is dependent on a representational perspective
because every other form of ascription of resemblance is, or involves, an
overall ascription of resemblance between individuals or properties and be-
cause overall resemblance is a context-dependent matter. This is the view I
call Moderate Resemblism.
Nevertheless, the moderate resemblist’s truth conditions for non-core
ascriptions of resemblance, even if context-sensitive, are not the same as
the anti-resemblist ones. For the anti-resemblist maintains that whether a
property is elected depends on a representational perspective, whereas the
resemblist contends that the election of a property is an objective matter
since elected properties are sparse properties. What the moderate resemblist
contends is that the resemblance of sparse properties, the relative impor-
tance of sparse properties, and the computation of sparse properties we use
to evaluate the overall resemblance of individuals are each dependent on a
representational perspective and help determining the non-core resemblance
facts and the truth of non-core ascriptions of resemblance.18
18I tend to think that Lewis is a moderate resemblist of the presented kind. He never
explicitly described himself as such of course, but Lewis’s views on natural properties
and on counterpart theory appear to conflict if Lewis accepts any other stance in the
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I will state the moderate resemblist truth conditions for the remaining
ascriptions of resemblance, according to the factual relativist framework I
adopted when presenting Anti-Resemblism. So the truth of propositions
is here relative to a world understood as an ordered pair constituted of a
substratum and a representational perspective, but the contribution of the
representational perspective is not the same as it is within Anti-Resemblism.
So (where ‘MR-truth’ stands for moderate resemblist’s truth):
(MR-Truth RWM) 〈The As weakly minimally resemble each other〉 is true
at w = <s, pr> iff in w (i) there is a property P such that P is a sparse
property (relative to the As) and such that all the As have P, or (ii)
there is a series of sparse properties P1, . . . , Pn such that each of
the As has one of them and such that the resemblance of P1, . . . , Pn
saliently exceeds the relevant standard;
(where the representational perspective’s contribution consists only in the
resemblance of P1, . . . , Pn and the determination of the standard of re-
semblance for the relevant properties). From (MR-Truth RWM ) we get the
following moderately resemblist truth conditions for exact difference:
(MR-Truth DE) 〈The As exactly differ from each other〉 is true at w =
<s, pr> iff in w (i) there is no property P such that P is a sparse
property and such that each of the As has P, and (ii) there is no series
of sparse properties P1, . . . , Pn such that each of the As has one of
them and such that the resemblance of P1, . . . , Pn saliently exceeds
the relevant standard.
The moderate resemblist’s truth conditions for strong minimal difference are
as follows:
resemblist/anti-resemblist debate. Anti-Resemblism conflicts with his views on natural
properties, and a Radical Resemblism would make his counterpart theory essentialist,
while Lewis claims that it is anti-essentialist.
Todd Buras (2006) recently argued that Lewis’s admission of sparse properties makes
counterpart theory essentialist. If I am right, Buras’s reasoning is not conclusive because it
involves premises that only a radical resemblist would admit. In particular, it involves the
premise that one, and only one, computation of the sparse properties gives us an objective
evaluation of the comparative resemblance of individuals. But a moderate resemblist need
not admit that there is an objectively privileged way of computing the sparse properties,
and Lewis may have been, and should have been to prevent inconsistency, a resemblist of
the moderate kind.
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(MR-Truth DSM) 〈The As strongly minimally differ from each other〉 is
true at w = <s, pr> iff in w there is a series of sparse properties P1,
. . . , Pn such that (i) each of the As has exactly one of P1, . . . , Pn,
(ii) P1, . . . , Pn occupy a position on a same pr-relevant similarity
ordering, and (iii) the resemblance of properties P1, . . . , Pn does not
saliently exceed the relevant standard.
Finally, regarding overall resemblance and difference, the moderate resemb-
list agrees that the truth of such resemblance statements is sensitive to the
relative importance attached to such and such sparse properties in a given
context, to the relevant computation of the sparse properties, and to the
relevant standard.
Let a sparse respect be defined as a similarity ordering of sparse proper-
ties. Let then the resembling weight* of individuals be the resulting value
that derives from the pr-relevant additive or multiplicative combination of
the comparatively more or less important pr-relevant sparse respects in
which individuals are compared. Here again, the pr-relevant respects may
be either sparse resemblance respects, sparse difference respects, or both
depending on what the pr-relevant computation is. Then the moderate re-
semblist truth conditions for statements of overall resemblance and difference
are as follows:
(MR-Truth RO) 〈The As resemble overall〉 is true at w = <s, pr> iff in w
the resembling weight* of the As saliently exceeds the relevant stan-
dard.
(MR-Truth DO) 〈The As differ overall〉 is true at w = <s, pr> iff in w
the resembling weight* of the As is saliently inferior to the relevant
standard.
7.3.4 Radical resemblist’s truth conditions for other ascrip-
tions of resemblance
At the other extreme of the resemblist scale is the radical resemblist. The
radical resemblist maintains that every resemblance fact is an objective fact
and thus that every ascription of resemblance is true relative to the mind-
independent world only.
Radical Resemblism can take two forms. The radical resemblist can
maintain that the only resemblance facts are core resemblance facts: facts
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of strong minimal difference, facts of weak minimal difference, and facts
of exact resemblance. Then though there are resemblance judgements like
judgements of overall resemblance which wrongly suggest that there are
other resemblance facts, these judgements either express no proposition or
express a proposition that represents no resemblance fact. According to
this strategy, every resemblance fact is an objective fact but there are sig-
nificantly less resemblance facts than the anti-resemblist and the moderate
resemblist believe.
But the radical resemblist can also maintain that there are facts of weak
minimal resemblance, overall resemblance and difference. However, this rad-
ical resemblist should contend that I failed to correctly grasp what overall
resemblance of individuals and properties is, since I made overall resem-
blance intrinsically context-sensitive. Overall similarity, this radical resem-
blist should maintain, is a comparative notion of resemblance, as I think it
is, but is wholly determined by the mind-independent world.
The candidates for alternative notions of overall resemblance of indi-
viduals and properties which are the best-suited to be close enough to my
notions of overall resemblance without being intrinsically context-relative
are the following:
(OR′) Some individuals/properties resemble overall iff they are more simi-
lar to each other than they differ from each other.
(OD′) Some individuals/properties differ overall iff they differ from each
other more than they resemble each other.
The analysis of overall resemblance (OR) provided in chapter 1 can be seen
as an external account of overall resemblance in that overall resemblance is
determined by the comparison of the resemblance of some individuals with
an external standard. On the other hand, (OR′) provides an internal ac-
count of overall resemblance. Obviously, these accounts are not equivalent.
Here what determines the overall resemblance of some things is the internal
comparison between their resemblance and their difference. If the resem-
blance exceeds the difference, then the compared things resemble overall.
If the difference exceeds their resemblance, then the compared things differ
overall. If neither of them is the case, things are neutrally similar.19
19In (Taylor 2004, 247), Taylor actually provides an internal account of context relative
overall resemblance on the line of (OR′). So an anti-resemblist can agree with (OR′) and
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There are two reasons why I prefer (OR) to (OR′). First, the virtue
of (OR) and (OD) is their relative indeterminacy which nicely matches the
indeterminacy of the way resemblance and/or difference respects are com-
puted relative to the cognitive task that is to be achieved. (OR′) and (OD′)
are comparatively less indeterminate mainly because they suggest that re-
semblance and difference respects always matter both in the evaluation of
overall resemblance. So if we embrace (OR′), we run the risk that sometimes
overall resemblance is not evaluated as (OR′) says it should; for instance,
when only resemblance respects are relevant.
Second, as I already emphasised, it seems reasonable to think that the
predicates ‘resemble overall’ and ‘differ overall’ have the same behaviour as
vague predicates such as ‘tall’ and ‘rich’. ‘Tall’ and ‘rich’ are vague in that
we get a sorites by assuming, as seems at first sight plausible about them,
that a tiny loss of height (or richness) cannot bring it about that tall (or rich)
people lose their tallness (or richness). I think that ‘resemble overall’ is vague
in just the same way: we get a sorites about overall resemblance because it
is at first sight plausible to assume that a tiny loss of resemblance cannot
bring it about that individuals that are similar overall lose their overall
resemblance. But, according to (OR′), ‘resemble overall’ cannot yield such
a sorites since (OR′) introduces a clear boundary to the result that if a tiny
loss of resemblance brings it about that things cross the boundary, they lose
their overall resemblance. Some may think of this result as an advantage of
(OR′), I think the contrary because it shows that (OR′) distorts the way we
judge about resemblance.
(OR′) and (OD′) still appeal to comparative resemblance, and if the
radical resemblist wants objective truth conditions for overall resemblance
statements, he must argue that there is an objective similarity ordering. In
order to account for overall resemblance of properties in particular, the re-
semblist must argue that there is an objective measure of the comparative
resemblance of properties. I have no clue as to how such an objective mea-
sure would look so I will allow myself to state the radical resemblist’s truth
conditions for the resemblance of properties, weak minimal resemblance,
strong minimal difference and exact difference of individuals thus (where
maintain that the internal resemblance and difference are determined by the representa-
tional perspective.
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‘w = s’ is here to signify that the world is conceived of as a substratum or
mind-independent world):
(RR-Truth P.R.) 〈P1, . . . , Pn are properties that resemble each other〉
is true at w = s iff in w P1, . . . , Pn resemble each other more than
they differ from each other.
(RR-Truth RWM) 〈The As weakly minimally resemble each other〉 is true
at w = s iff in w either (i) there is a property P such that P is a sparse
property (relative to the As) and such that all the As instantiate P or
(ii) there is a series of sparse (relative to the As) properties P1, . . . ,
Pn such that each of the As has one of them and such that P1, . . . ,
Pn resemble each other.
(RR-Truth DSM) 〈The As strongly minimally differ from each other〉 is
true at w = s iff in w there is a series of sparse (relative to the As)
properties P1, . . . , Pn such that (i) each of the As has exactly one
of P1, . . . , Pn, (ii) P1, . . . , Pn are ordered on a same (objectively
determined) similarity ordering, and (iii) P1, . . . , Pn do not resemble
each other other.
(RR-Truth DE) 〈The As are exactly different〉 is true at w = s iff in w
there is no series of sparse (relative to the As) properties P1, . . . , Pn
such that each of the As has one of them and such that P1, . . . , Pn
resemble each other.
Now concerning comparative resemblance of individuals, advocates of sparse
properties provided candidate objective measures for comparative resem-
blance of individuals.
Oliver (1996, 52) has proposed that the degree of resemblance of individ-
uals has to be a ratio of the sparse properties shared to the sparse properties
unshared. It might look as follows:
(dR) The As resemble each other to degree dr if and only if m/n = dr,
where m is the number of sparse properties shared by the As and n is
the average number of properties had by them.20
20See (Rodriguez-Pereyra 2002, 67-9) for other accounts of degrees of resemblance based
on Oliver’s proposal. My (dR) is somewhat similar to the account of degree of resemblance
called (D2) by Rodriguez-Pereyra. However, (dR) is not threatened by the objection
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However, Rodriguez-Pereyra proposes the following measure of degrees of
resemblance:
(D) The As resemble each other to degree n if and only if they have n
[sparse] properties in common. (Rodriguez-Pereyra 2002, 65)
The choice between (dR) and (D) will depend on whether you think that un-
shared sparse properties have anything to do with resemblance. Rodriguez-
Pereyra (2002, 67-9) denies that they do. It should also be noticed that these
two measures for degrees of resemblance between individuals do not take into
account imperfect but sufficient resemblance of properties. In other words,
these are measures constructed on a strong notion of minimal resemblance.
So a resemblist who, like Armstrong (1978b, 96), thinks that imperfect re-
semblance of sparse properties plays an objective role in the determination
of degrees of resemblance, would have to provide another measure.
Parallel to (dR) and (D) we find two possible objective measures of
degrees of difference:
(dD) The As differ from each other to degree dd if and only if p/n = dd,
where p is the average number of sparse properties had by the As but
not shared by all of them and n is the average number of properties
had by them.
(D-) The As differ from each other to degree n if and only if their average
number of unshared sparse properties is n, where the average number
of unshared sparse properties is obtained by calculating the average of
properties that each of the As does not share with the other As.
Pairs (dR)-(dD) and (D)-(D-) provide truth conditions for the radical resem-
blist’s internal notions of overall resemblance and difference of individuals.
Since I do not want to enter the resemblist debate about which of the pairs
(dR)-(dD) and (D)-(D-) is the real resemblance measure, I state the radical
resemblist truth conditions for overall resemblance and difference thus:
(RR-Truth RO) 〈The As resemble overall〉 is true at w = s iff in w the
degree of resemblance of the As is greater than the degree of difference
of the As.
Rodriguez-Pereyra addresses to (D2) because it appeals to the average number of proper-
ties had by the As instead of simply their number of properties.
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(RR-Truth DO) 〈The As differ overall〉 is true at w = s iff in w the degree
of difference of the As is greater than the degree of resemblance of the
As.
7.3.5 Truthmaking in Resemblism
As I endorse anti-resemblism, Moderate Resemblism seems to me closer to
the truth. However, I do not want to enter the debate between these two
forms of Resemblism since I endorse neither of them. For this reason, I
restrict my attention to the truthmakers for the core ascriptions of resem-
blance which are ascriptions of strong minimal resemblance first, but also
weak minimal difference and exact resemblance.
What makes it true that some individuals resemble or differ according to
the resemblist account? The alternative resemblist truthmaker accounts of
ascriptions of resemblance are those provided by the proponents of alterna-
tive solutions to the Problem of Universals which endorse the sparse view of
elected properties and which I roughly introduced in section 6 of chapter 2.
The resemblist can take strong minimal resemblance as primitive and facts
of strong minimal resemblance as brute, i. e. grounded purely in existence
facts, and then explain instantiation of sparse properties and ascriptions of
other properties of resemblance in terms of this primitive. This is what a
carnivorous resemblance nominalist does.
The alternative consists in endorsing some of the classical views about
the nature of sparse properties that are Realism about Universals, Realism
about Tropes, or Natural Class Nominalism, and then explain ascriptions of
resemblance in terms of the favoured account of sparse properties. These dif-
ferent metaphysics of properties and accounts of objective resemblances be-
tween individuals are well-known and well-described in the literature; there
is no need for restating them here.
So far so good for the presentation of Resemblism and Anti-Resemblism.
The two views are irreducibly opposed; therefore, we must make a choice.
Chapter 8
In Defence of
Anti-Resemblism
The remaining of this study, that is, the present chapter and the following,
focuses on the core ascriptions of resemblance in order to avoid undesired
complexities pertaining to differences between Moderate Resemblism and
Radical Resemblism.
When the focus is on core ascriptions of resemblance, Resemblism and
Anti-Resemblism are radically opposite philosophical positions. One makes
resemblance facts objectively determined by the mind-independent world,
the other makes resemblance facts partly determined by a representational
perspective.
We must choose between these two views of resemblance, and in this
chapter I argue in favour of Anti-Resemblism. There are three main rea-
sons why I endorse Anti-Resemblism. First, it provides an explanation
of the context-sensitivity of our resemblance judgements. Second, Anti-
Resemblism, allied with Nominalism, provides the most powerful meta-
physics of resemblance by the usual standards. Finally, I do not believe
in the objective realm of natural joints and sparse properties, and this is a
reason not to endorse Resemblism.
First, I display the advantages of the anti-resemblist position over the
resemblist positions, then I discuss arguments in favour of Resemblism and
undermine them.
163
164 8. In Defence of Anti-Resemblism
8.1 Resemblism and the context-relativity of re-
semblance judgements
An explanation of the context-relativity of resemblance judgements is an ex-
planation of why there can be faultless disagreements between resemblance
judgements. In other words, it is an explanation of why agents can make
opposite resemblance judgements and be each stably warranted in their re-
spective judgement, i.e. be each such that they have committed no fault
when judging as they did. Anti-Resemblism provides such an explanation.
There can be faultless disagreements between resemblance judgements be-
cause each of the opposite judgements expresses a true proposition repre-
senting an obtaining resemblance fact (though these facts obtain in different
worlds conceived of as pairs whose members are a substratum and a repre-
sentational perspective). But Resemblism, according to which the truth of
ascriptions of resemblance depends on no mind-dependent feature of reality
is not in itself an explanation of the context-sensitivity of our judgements.
Does it matter in a metaphysical debate? I think that it matters a lot.
Following Armstrong’s lead (Armstrong 1997a, 101), many metaphysi-
cians agree that accounting for so-called ‘Moorean facts of apparent same-
ness of type’ is “compulsory in the philosophical examination paper” (Lewis
1999a, 20). Armstrong thinks that Moorean facts of apparent sameness
of type should be denied by no philosopher on the grounds that they are
believed, with certainty, by common sense and he takes these facts as con-
stituting “a prima facie case for postulating universals” (Armstrong 1997a,
101).
I suggest that the fact that our resemblance judgements are context-
sensitive, the fact that there can be faultless disagreements between resem-
blance judgements, is no less Moorean than facts of apparent sameness of
type. It is a fact that no philosopher should deny and it is a fact that
actually no resemblist denies.1 For it is a common sense truism, a com-
mon experience we all share, that whether we judge that so and so about
the resemblance of objects depends, for instance, on which respects we are
focusing on. Then clearly, if Moorean facts of apparent sameness of type
1See the quotations from Armstrong and Rodriguez-Pereyra in this first section of
chapter 7. Eli Hirsch (1993), who is a resemblist, maintains that the context-sensitivity
of resemblance judgements is much more restricted than the anti-resemblist thinks it is.
But as I argue in section 3.3 of the present chapter, Hirsch’s argument is not conclusive.
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constitute a prima facie case for postulating universals, Moorean facts of
faultless disagreements between resemblance judgements constitute a prima
facie case for Anti-Resemblism as well. This is the reason why an account of
Moorean facts of faultless disagreements between resemblance judgements,
i.e. an explanation of the context-relativity of resemblance judgements, is
compulsory for a theory of resemblance, if not in the philosophical exami-
nation paper.
How would a resemblist explanation of the context-sensitivity of resem-
blance judgements look like? Consider again Sam who judges that
(6.3) hippos and whales strongly minimally resemble each other
and Maria who judges that
(6.4) hippos and whales do not strongly minimally resemble each other.
Let the representational perspective occupied by Sam be pr and the rep-
resentational perspective occupied by Maria be pr ′ and suppose that the
disagreement between Sam and Maria is faultless. In other words, suppose
that they are both stably warranted, relative to the representational per-
spective they occupy, in judging what they judge: their judgements have no
defeater.2
The (factual) anti-resemblist explains that the disagreement is faultless
by saying that the propositional contents of (6.3) and (6.4) are each true
at some world, and that these propositions are true because they represent
each a fact of the world. Thus the propositional content of (6.3) – namely,
〈hippos and whales strongly minimally resemble each other〉 – is true at
w = <s@, pr> because in the latter world it is a fact that hippos and whales
strongly minimally resemble each other. And the propositional content of
(6.4) – 〈hippos and whales do not strongly minimally resemble each other〉 –
is true at w = <s@, pr ′> because in the latter world it is a fact that hippos
and whales do not strongly minimally resemble each other.
Now what is the content of judgements (6.3) and (6.4), according to the
resemblist? The content of Sam’s judgement cannot be that hippos and
whales strongly minimally resemble each other relative to Sam’s represen-
tational perspective. For in Resemblism, strong minimal resemblance is not
2Cf. section 3 of chapter 6. Sam is stably warranted (relative to pr) in judging (6.3) if
and only if he is stably warranted in judging (on the basis of true beliefs) that there is a
contextually relevant property shared by hippos and whales.
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relative to a representational perspective. But in Resemblism it cannot be
that the content of (6.3) is that hippos and whales strongly minimally re-
semble each other and the content of (6.4) is that hippos and whales do not
strongly minimally resemble each other, as I shall argue.
Suppose for reductio that the content of (6.3) is 〈hippos and whales
strongly minimally resemble each other〉 and that the content of (6.4) is
〈hippos and whales do not strongly minimally resemble each other〉. In
Resemblism the truth of an ascription of strong minimal resemblance is
wholly determined by the mind-independent world, the substratum. Since
the propositions 〈hippos and whales strongly minimally resemble each other〉
and 〈hippos and whales do not strongly minimally resemble each other〉
are inconsistent, either of them is false at the actual (mind-independent)
world. This means that there is a fact in the mind-independent world that
makes either 〈hippos and whales strongly minimally resemble each other〉
or its negation true. Suppose that this fact makes it true that 〈hippos and
whales strongly minimally resemble each other〉. Then an occupier of the
representational perspective pr ′ that is aware of this fact loses the warrant
to the judgement (6.4) which by assumption expresses the proposition that
hippos and whales do not strongly minimally resemble each other. If so,
by the definition of a stably warranted judgement,3 Maria is not stably
warranted in judging (6.4). For she could come to believe something that
would make her lose the warrant to her judgement. Yet we assumed that
Maria was stably warranted when judging (6.4). If we assume now that
there is a fact that makes true the content of Maria’s judgement, we get
the result that Sam’s judgement is not stably warranted contrary to the
assumption. Reductio complete.
If the content of Sam’s judgement is neither that hippos and whales
strongly minimally resemble each other relative to Sam’s representational
perspective nor that hippos and whales strongly minimally resemble each
other, what is the content of this judgement? According to the resemb-
list, though (6.3) looks like an ascription of strong minimal resemblance,
3S’s resemblance judgement is stably warranted relative to pr and true beliefs B if and
only if (i) S is warranted relative to pr and B, and (ii) for any true beliefs B
′ which defeat
S’s resemblance judgement, there are further true beliefs B′’ such that B′ ⊇ B′′ and such
that S is warranted in her resemblance judgement relative to pr and beliefs B ∪ B′′.
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it is is an ascription of (exact) resemblance in some respect.4 ‘With re-
spect to’-clauses are hidden indexicals in our resemblance judgements, and
resemblance judgements are incomplete judgements of resemblance in some
respect.5 Hence, the content of Sam’s judgement is of the following form:
(6.3′′) 〈hippos and whales (exactly) resemble with respect to r1, . . . , rn〉.
And the content of Maria’s judgement is of the following form:
(6.4′′) 〈hippos and whales do not (exactly) resemble with respect to r1′,
. . . , rn′〉.
Now the disagreement between Sam and Maria is faultless because respects
r1, . . . , rn are distinct from respects r1′, . . . , rn′ and because (6.3′′) and
(6.4′′) are both true.
The resemblist strategy to explain the context-relativity of resemblance
judgements has some similarities with the contextualist anti-resemblist view,
and have similar drawbacks. First, judgements of resemblance do not (al-
ways) express what they seem to express: some judgements of minimal re-
semblance, those that are context-relative, do not express ascriptions of min-
imal resemblance but ascriptions of resemblance in some respect. Second,
since the resemblist tells us that (6.3) and (6.4) are indexical in such a way
that “hippos and whales strongly minimally resemble each other” expresses
different propositions in (6.3) and (6.4), we should expect speech-reports
of these judgements to be sensitive to the indexical difference according to
the rule (SR).6 But speech-reports of resemblance judgements are not sensi-
tive to this difference since Maria can correctly report Sam’s judgement by
saying “Sam said that hippos and whales strongly minimally resemble each
other.”
None of these worries shows that the resemblist explanation of the context-
relativity of resemblance judgements is untenable. Yet I shall argue that it
is untenable because it is false.
4Exact resemblance in some respect is required because, since the judgement is one of
strong minimal resemblance, imperfect resemblance in some respect would not suffice to
make the judgement faultless.
5This view that judgements of resemblance tout court are incomplete and elliptical for
judgement of resemblance in some respect is popular among philosophers, and not only
among resemblists: e.g., Searle (1959), McClure (1964, 181), Goodman (1970), and more
recently Heil (2003, 152) have all endorsed this view.
6Cf. section 2.1 of chapter 7.
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Suppose that I judge that
(8.1) my DNA resembles that of my (biological) father.
Let us interpret (8.1) as a judgement of strong minimal resemblance to avoid
complications. Interpreted as such, I know that (8.1) is true about me. The
reason why I know that (8.1) is true about me is not that my father and I
made any DNA test, since we did not. My knowledge of (8.1) is only due
to my very poor knowledge of evolution theory and genetic science. Since I
know the basics of genetic science and given our biological interests in DNAs,
I know that (8.1) is true. Let us call my actual representational perspective
‘pr’. So I am stably warranted (relative to pr) in asserting (8.1).
On the other hand, we can well imagine a context in which we are in-
terested in specific features of DNAs in such a way that, in this context, I
would be stably warranted relative to our scientific interests in judging that
my DNA does not (strongly minimally) resemble that of my father. If there
can be such a context, (8.1) is not immune of context-relativity: there could
be faultless disagreements about (8.1). If so and according to the resem-
blist explanation of the context-sensitivity of resemblance judgements, the
content of (8.1) is a proposition of the following form:
(8.1′) 〈the DNA of Ghislain Guigon and the DNA of Ge´rard Guigon (ex-
actly) resemble with respect to r1, . . . , rn〉.
Suppose then that the content of (8.1) is a proposition of the form (8.1′).
Then it is not possible for me to know that (8.1) is true without knowing
every proposition of the form (8.1′), since I cannot not know that a judge-
ment is true without knowing that its content is true. Yet I know that (8.1)
is true but I fail to know every proposition of the form 〈the DNA of Ghislain
Guigon and the DNA of of Ge´rard Guigon (exactly) resemble with respect
to r1, . . . , rn〉. I fail to know the latter because in order to know in which
respects my DNA and that of my father resemble, my father and I would
have to make a DNA test. But we made no such test. Therefore, the content
of my judgement (8.1) cannot be a proposition of the form (8.1′).
The resemblist may reply that when we judge in the absence of epistemic
access to any respect of comparison – what is the case when I assert (8.1) –
the content of the judgement is an indeterminate ascription of resemblance
in some respect. If so, the content of (8.1) is the following proposition:
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(8.1′′) 〈there is at least one respect in which the DNA of Ghislain Guigon
and the DNA of Ge´rard Guigon (exactly) resemble〉.
But consider the following counterfactual situation. In the counterfactual
world, Ghislain Guigon has the DNA he actually has and so does Ge´rard
Guigon. But in the counterfactual world a branch of genetic science has
emerged which proved so successful in predictions about hereditary diseases
that ordinary people think about this branch of genetic science as the genetic
science given their interest in health care. Now the relevant respects of com-
parison between DNAs according to this branch of genetic science are much
more restricted than they actually are because many features of genotypes
have been found irrelevant regarding the predictions we are interested in:
predictions about hereditary diseases. Since they are so restricted it is not
at all trivial that my DNA resembles that of my father in the counterfactual
situation. Suppose then that, in this world, Ghislain Guigon makes a DNA
test because he wishes to know whether he has inherited diseases from his
father. Now suppose that Ghislain Guigon is no more aware of genetics in
this world than he actually is. So he cannot interpret the test and asks the
laboratory assistant whether he could have inherited some diseases from his
father. The laboratory assistant, who knows how to interpret the test and
which respects are relevant given the development of genetics and Ghislain
Guigon’s interests but does not want to lose time in explanations with him,
answers: “No, your DNA and that of your father do not resemble at all.”
Reassured, Ghislain Guigon leaves the test to the laboratory and goes back
home.
After the test, Ghislain Guigon is stably warranted in judging that his
DNA does not (strongly minimally) resemble that of his father relative to his
representational perspective (let us call it pr ′). For his judgement is based
on the true belief that there is no (relevant) respect in which his DNA and
that of his father resemble – which belief is itself based on the true belief
that the laboratory assistant was sincere and is competent – and because
the latter belief has no defeater; since it is a fact that his DNA and that of
his father resemble in no relevant respect.
In the counterfactual situation, Ghislain Guigon is stably warranted (rel-
ative to pr ′) in denying (8.1) without having any epistemic access to the
relevant respects in which the DNAs of human beings can resemble or fail
to resemble. If so, the content of the judgement he denies is not:
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(8.1′) 〈the DNA of Ghislain Guigon and the DNA of Ge´rard Guigon (ex-
actly) resemble with respect to r1, . . . , rn〉.
For he is stably warranted in denying no such proposition, according to our
assumption that he has no epistemic access to respects in which DNAs can
resemble or differ. In particular, he has no true belief on the basis of which
he is warranted in denying such a proposition. According to the resemblist’s
reply to the claim that the content of (8.1) cannot be (8.1′) when I am stably
warranted (relative to pr) in asserting (8.1) in the absence of any epistemic
access to respects in which DNAs can resemble or differ, the content of (8.1)
should then also be the following in the counterfactual context:
(8.1′′) 〈there is at least one respect in which the DNA of Ghislain Guigon
and the DNA of Ge´rard Guigon (exactly) resemble〉.
Therefore, (8.1) has the same content in a context wherein I am stably
warranted (relative to pr) in asserting it and in a context wherein I am
stably warranted (relative to pr ′) in denying it; however, my DNA and that
of my father are the same in the actual world and in the counterfactual
situation. It follows that either (i) (8.1′′) can vary in truth value depending
on the representational perspective since there is no change in my DNA
and that of my father to explain the change in truth value, or (ii) there
is one context in which I am committing a fault when judging about the
resemblance between my DNA and that of my father.
Consider (i). Asking whether some things exactly resemble in some re-
spect in Resemblism amounts to asking whether these things share a sparse
property. Since whether my DNA and that of my father share some sparse
property is independent of any representational perspective, it is not plausi-
ble that the resemblist maintains that (8.1′′) can vary in truth value depend-
ing on the representational perspective I occupy. Moreover, there would be
no point in maintaining that whether some things resemble in some respect
is context-relative and denying that whether some things resemble tout court
is context-relative.7
7However, notice that a traditional anti-resemblist who, like McClure and Goodman,
endorses the view that ascriptions of resemblance are incomplete ascriptions of resem-
blance in some respect should maintain that (8.1′′) varies in truth value depending on the
representational perspective. But then this anti-resemblist will have to say whether (8.1′′)
is to be evaluated according to the propositional relativist framework or according to the
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Therefore, (ii): the resemblist should contend that there is one context in
which I am committing a fault when judging about the resemblance holding
between my DNA and that of my father. If this is so, then there is a fact
in (the actual or counterfactual) mind-independent world that makes (8.1′′)
true in one world and false in another. But my DNA and that of my father
is the same in both worlds. So what is this fact? Moreover, if there is such a
fact, then I am not stably warranted in asserting (8.1) either in the actual or
in the counterfactual situation contrary to the hypotheses. For I could come
to believe something that would make me lose the warrant to my judgement.
So unless the resemblist is ready to claim that the counterfactual situation I
described is not a possible one,8 we should conclude that the content of my
judgement (8.1) is neither a determinate nor an indeterminate ascription of
resemblance in some respect.
The resemblist account of the context-relativity of (strong minimal)
resemblance judgements fails. Therefore, the resemblist, contrary to the
anti-resemblist, fails to address the compulsory demand for an account of
Moorean facts of context-relative resemblance judgements.9
factual relativist framework. So the traditional anti-resemblist strategy has most of the
defects of the contextualist strategy I presented in the previous chapter but does not have
its advantages. Factual Anti-Resemblism, in which resemblance judgements have the con-
tent they seem to have and in which the content of a resemblance judgement represents the
fact it seems to represent, is an improvement on the traditional form of Anti-Resemblism.
8The only way the resemblist could motivate the idea that the counterfactual situation
I described is not a possible one consists in maintaining that the fictional geneticists ought
to be wrong in thinking that the relevant comparison respects are what they think they are.
Then I am not stably warranted in denying (8.1) in the counterfactual situation because
the geneticists themselves are not stably warranted in their resemblance judgements. But
I cannot see any good reason to warrant this normative claim. Perhaps the resemblist
would say that they ought to be wrong because the respects of comparison that should be
relevant in every science are the sparse respects; and since DNAs of immediate ancestors
can resemble in sparse respects, and since my DNA and that of my father are the same in
both situations, then the fictional scientists are wrong about the respects of comparison
they take as relevant.
Here I can only call for scientific humility. The metaphysician has no authority to assert
a normative judgement about what scientists should take as relevant or not. And it is
doubtless that biologists, among which we find geneticists, can find relevant properties
that are not sparse according to the standard accounts of sparse properties: having a
common ancestor who lived 60 million years ago is not a sparse property of hippos and
whales.
9When introducing the debate between Resemblism and Anti-Resemblism I emphasised
its parallelism with the debate between Essentialism and Anti-Essentialism. Contempo-
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8.2 The most powerful metaphysics of resemblance
That Anti-Resemblism explains the context-sensitivity of our resemblance
judgements while Resemblism does not explain it makes Anti-Resemblism
more explanatory than Resemblism in at least one respect. Other things
make Anti-Resemblism the most powerful metaphysics of resemblance when
combined with Nominalism: Anti-Resemblist Nominalism scores better than
any alternative metaphysics of resemblance with respect to ontological econ-
omy, commitment to ad hoc ontology, and explanatory power.
A good metaphysics by the usual standards is a coherent metaphysics
which explains what it purports to explain without multiplying entities be-
yond necessity and by avoiding ad hoc ontology. Indeed, an Anti-Resemblist
Nominalism is the best metaphysics of resemblance by these standards: it
explains everything it purports to explain without multiplying entities be-
yond necessity and without commitment to any ad hoc ontology. When
arguing for the superiority of Anti-Resemblist Nominalism in this section, I
will assume for the sake of the argument that none of the metaphysics I com-
pare is incoherent or implausible. It is the purpose of the remaining of the
present chapter and of the following chapter to show that Anti-Resemblist
Nominalism is coherent and plausible.
Consider the resemblist realist vs. the resemblist nominalist. The resem-
blist nominalist accounts for facts of resemblance but does so by assuming
brute primitive facts. These brute facts are either brute resemblance facts,
according to Resemblist Resemblance Nominalism, or brute facts of mem-
bership in some natural class, according to Natural Class Nominalism. Why
does it happen then that some individuals resemble while others do not? Re-
semblist resemblance nominalists offer no explanation for these differences.
Why does it happen that two individuals are co-members in some natural
class while others do not? Natural class nominalists offer no explanation
for these differences. In Resemblist Nominalism, some crucial differences
between individuals have no difference-makers.
rary essentialists like Laurie Paul agree that accounting for the context-variability of our
de re modal intuitions is “the most threatening antiessentialist objection to essentialism”
(Paul 2004, 181). And Paul proposes an essentialist account of this sort of context-
variability. I think resemblists should not think otherwise about the context-relativity of
resemblance judgements, and, if I am right, they fail to account for it.
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On the other hand, the resemblist realist about universals or tropes
appeals to no such brute necessities and explains what there is to explain:
that individuals resemble each other while other individuals do not, that
individuals share (or at least seem to share according to Realism about
Tropes) properties while others do not.10 But the resemblist realists do so
by appealing to some ad hoc ontology: an ontology of universals or tropes.11
The resemblist nominalist avoids commitment to such an ad hoc ontology
and is superior in this respect, but the resemblist realist seems to explain
more. And it is pretty difficult to evaluate by rational means which virtue
should be favoured: absence of ad hoc ontology or explanatory power.12
10But to my mind Realism about Tropes pushes the problem back instead of solving it
since then it is the resemblance of tropes which turns out primitive.
11Cf. (Rodriguez-Pereyra 2002, 210-21).
12The realist Hossack (2007) has recently argued that it is the realist who scores better
than the resemblist nominalist regarding avoidance of an ad hoc ontology: “As serious
metaphysics, sets seem dubious at best, and possibilia merit only an incredulous stare.
Whatever initial reluctance one may feel about believing in the real existence of universals,
at least they are less difficult to believe in than the Set Nominalist’s alternative offering
of sets plus possibilia.” (Hossack 2007, 38-9).
I do not discuss possibilia here because I will argue that the nominalist can avoid
commitment to non-actual possibilia when discussing the Coextension Difficulty in chapter
9. So let us discuss whether universals are less difficult to believe in than sets alone. I
think there are plenty of reasons why, contrary to Hossack’s judgement, it is less difficult
to believe in sets than in universals, but I shall focus on two of them. The first thing
is that sets supervene on individuals. Their existence is wholly determined by that of
their members. Universals, however, do not supervene on concrete individuals as such.
Aristotelian realists, of course, maintain that the existence of universals depends on the
individuals that have them. But the dependence is at best only generic since the existence
of a universal does not depend on the existence of any particular instance of it: all the
instances of a universal can be annihilated and, provided a new instance of the universal
comes into being, the universal can continue to exist. However, the existence of a set is
wholly grounded in the singular existence of its members. If one member is annihilated
so is the set. Since the dependence of sets on individuals appears thinner than that of
universals on individuals, it should be less difficult to accept sets than universals once we
accept individuals. Also, if we follow Lewis’s lead (Lewis 1991), we can understand a set
as a mereological fusion of its members and we can understand composition as some sort
of collective identity between a whole and its parts. A set, and thus a nominalist property,
turns out to be identical to the many individuals that have it. Taking this stance, the
nominalist is committed to no more than concrete individuals, and sets turn out to be no
less dubious than concrete individuals are. However, universals are far from being no less
dubious than concrete individuals are.
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Take the anti-resemblist realist about universals now, that is George Mc-
Clure, vs. the resemblist realist about universals. Just like the resemblist
realist, the anti-resemblist realist has an explanation for differences in re-
semblance and for the difference between individuals that share an elected
property (conceived of as an abundant universal) and individuals that in-
stantiate no common elected property; these are explained in terms of pur-
poses which are themselves universals (McClure 1964). The superiority of
Anti-Resemblist Realism over Resemblist Realism is that the former, con-
trary to the latter, explains the context-relativity of resemblance and avoids
commitment to an ad hoc realm of objectively privileged properties with
superpowers: the realm of sparse properties. The anti-resemblist realist
avoids such an ad hoc ontology because cognitive processes of selection of
properties relative to a representational perspective is, in Anti-Resemblism,
what plays the role of the resemblist realm of sparse properties.13 However,
Anti-Resemblist Realism, as it incurs commitment to abundant universals,
is quantitatively less economical than Resemblist Realism. Yet my opinion
is that if a theory t scores better than a theory t′ regarding its explanatory
power and avoidance of ad hoc ontology, while t′ only scores better than t
regarding quantitative economy – thus the number of entities of a given kind
–, then t is superior to t′. But nowadays popularity of Resemblist Realism
shows that metaphysicians can think otherwise.
Consider now the anti-resemblist nominalist vs. the anti-resemblist re-
alist. The anti-resemblist nominalist can explain everything the realist can
explain. For the nominalist can explain differences in resemblance and differ-
ences in commonality of elected properties without recourse to brute necessi-
ties in terms cognitive processes of representation. Moreover, both theories
explain the context-relativity of resemblance judgements. However, Anti-
Resemblist Nominalism scores much better than Anti-Resemblist Realism
regarding ontological economy and commitment to an ad hoc ontology. For
the nominalist needs no ad hoc realm of universals or tropes to explain
what the realist explains. The anti-resemblist nominalist’s ontology is made
of individuals, some of them having representational capacities, and sets
whose existence is wholly grounded in individuals.14 The superiority of
13In section 5 of the present chapter, I shall argue, following Taylor (1993), that the
theoretical advantages of sparse properties can be recovered using a vegetarian, i.e. anti-
resemblist, substitute for them.
14See the preceding footnote for the comparison between sets and universals.
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Anti-Resemblist Nominalism over Anti-Resemblist Realism is thus evident:
the former explains as much as its rival with fewer tools.
But then Anti-Resemblist Nominalism is also clearly superior to its re-
semblist rivals. The anti-resemblist nominalist explains more than the re-
semblist realist because it explains facts of resemblance and facts of instan-
tiation of elected properties but also explains, contrary to the resemblist,
the context-relativity of resemblance judgements. And the anti-resemblist
nominalist does so without admitting the ad hoc realm of properties objec-
tively elected by reality to be the elite of properties, and without admitting
any suspicious kind of entities like universals and tropes. More explanatory
power, no ad hoc ontology, qualitative economy: these are the features of
Anti-Resemblist Nominalism.
Finally, Anti-Resemblist Nominalism is also a better metaphysics of re-
semblance than its resemblist counterpart is. The anti-resemblist and the
resemblist nominalist have the same ontology made of individuals and sets.
But the anti-resemblist nominalist appeals to no brute differences, avoids
commitment to the ad hoc objective realm of sparse properties, and ex-
plains the context-relativity of resemblance judgements. What are brute
necessities in Resemblist Nominalism are explained by the representational
perspective in Anti-Resemblist Nominalism.
All these features should make Anti-Resemblist Nominalism the most
attractive project of a metaphysics of resemblance and show that the project
is well worth defending. The remaining of the present chapter defends Anti-
Resemblism against objections raised by the resemblist. In the following
chapter, I develop an anti-resemblist, or vegetarian, resemblance nominalist
project.
8.3 Objections to Anti-Resemblism
There are two resemblist strategies to object to Anti-Resemblism. The re-
semblist can argue against Anti-Resemblism as a theory of resemblance,
or, since Resemblism is a corollary of the sparse view of elected properties,
he can use any argument to the conclusion that there is an objective di-
vide between sparse and abundant properties as an argument in favour of
Resemblism. I shall first discuss arguments against Anti-Resemblism as a
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theory of resemblance and then arguments in favour of the sparse/merely
abundant divide.
8.3.1 The internality of resemblance
One of the main motives for Resemblism is plausibly the view that resem-
blance is internal to the individuals that instantiate it. For metaphysicians
seem to have the strong intuition that resemblance is such an internal prop-
erty15 and Anti-Resemblism makes it external.16
What exactly is an internal property? Following Armstrong (1989, 43)
and Mulligan (1998, 344) we might say that a property is internal when,
given certain entities with certain natures, the property must hold between
these entities. Resemblance is internal because there is no possible world,
according to Armstrong (1989, 44), in which the objects remain unaltered
but in which their resemblance varies.
If external is the negation of internal, then Anti-Resemblism, of course,
makes resemblance external. For even in our own world it happens that
objects remain unaltered whereas their resemblance varies from one con-
text to another if the representational perspective of the agents ascribing
resemblance to objects varies. So just as Armstrong (1989, 44) as objected
that, according to Resemblance Nominalism, “Resemblance would have to
be what it is not: an external relation.” he could have objected to Anti-
Resemblism that, according to it, resemblance is what it is not: an external
property. Yet what grounds Armstrong’s certitude that resemblance is in-
ternal?
I guess that the ground for this certitude is that it seems odd that hip-
pos and whales can change in resemblance without there being any change
in hippos and whales. But the anti-resemblist has a natural explanation
of this oddity given that resemblance is, according to the theory, a mat-
ter of representation. Since faultless disagreements between resemblance
15Of course, in the literature it is said that resemblance is an internal relation instead
of an internal property, but I talk of internal property here since, as I argued, resemblance
is a monadic property.
16It should be noticed that resemblance is not external according to every form of Anti-
Resemblism. For, according to the contextualist anti-resemblist, resemblance is internal
to its relata, where its relata are individuals and a representational perspective. But this
is different from what the resemblist believes. For the resemblist believes that resemblance
is internal to the individuals that resemble each other, full stop.
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judgements make it plausible that our resemblance judgements can vary in
virtue of differences in representational perspectives, it is also plausible that
resemblance can vary for the same reason.
Another motivation for the view that resemblance is an internal property
is to be found in (Mulligan 1998). Mulligan, by means of several examples,
shows that there is an intuitive difference between two categories of relations,
the thick ones, and the thin ones. Clearly, resemblance is to be classified as
a thin relation, according to him, and I agree with him that resemblance is
thin, even if I do not agree that it is a relation. Then he discusses different
ways of articulating the difference between thin and thick relations. (i) Thin
relations are topic-neutral,17 thick relations are not. (ii) Thin relations are
formal, thick relations are material. Mulligan disapproves these two ways of
articulating the distinction because the present account of topic-neutrality
is too vague to be satisfactory and because the formal/material distinction
relies on controversial claims about relations which have a logic and relations
which have no logic.
Since he thinks that the previous ways of characterising the thin/thick
distinction are inappropriate, Mulligan claims that the best way of articu-
lating the distinction consists in conceiving thin relations as internal, and
thick relations as external. If resemblance truly is a thin property and if thin
properties are internal, so is resemblance. Yet the anti-resemblist denies the
conclusion and should thus deny that thin properties are all internal if he
agrees, as I do, that resemblance is a thin property.
The anti-resemblist is justified in conceiving resemblance as a thin prop-
erty if the idea that thin properties are the properties which are topic neu-
tral18 can be made clearer. For resemblance clearly is topic-neutral in the
strongest sense of the term: resemblance is a property that can hold between
entities of any kind whatsoever, and resemblance is so no matter whether
Anti-Resemblism or Resemblism is true. It is true that, presently, there is
no satisfactory account of topic-neutrality, but we may hope for better days.
Perhaps, there is no determinate way to be a thin property: some proper-
ties are thin in that they are internal but not strictly speaking topic-neutral;
some properties, like resemblance, are thin in that they are topic-neutral but
not internal. If so, the category of thin properties is a disjunctive one, but
17Cf. (Ryle 1954, 115f).
18Or the properties about which we have a topic-neutral concept.
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I do not think that this constitutes a challenge. At any rate, it does not
constitute a challenge to Anti-Resemblism but only to possible taxonomies
of properties.
It is not the purpose of this study to determine what thin properties are.
What matters here is that Anti-Resemblism makes resemblance external,
whereas the resemblist maintains that resemblance is internal. Unless we
beg the question in favour of an objective divide between sparse and merely
abundant properties, and thus Resemblism, I can think of no good reason
to believe that resemblance is internal. For the empirical evidence that
resemblance judgements are context-relative provides a prima facie case for
Anti-Resemblism and the view that resemblance is not internal.
8.3.2 The fallacy of generalising from borderline cases
But perhaps I am wrong in thinking that empirical evidence confirms Anti-
Resemblism in the view that resemblance is context-relative. This is Hirsch’s
strategy against Anti-Resemblism (Hirsch 1993, 71). According to Hirsch,
anti-resemblists like Goodman commit a “fallacy of generalising from border-
line cases” when they say that resemblance judgements are context-relative.
They commit such a fallacy because they focus on few cases such that re-
semblance seems to vary with context and generalise to every judgement
of resemblance. But there are clear-cut cases of judgements of resemblance
following Hirsch.
Let us examine Hirsch’s alleged context-insensitive judgements of resem-
blance to see whether they really are so. Hirsch focuses on judgements of
comparative resemblance:
(a) Whenever a is identical to b but a is not identical to c, then a and b
resemble each other more than a and c do.
(b) Whenever a and b are duplicates but c is not a duplicate of a, then a
and b resemble each other more than a and c do.
(c) Whenever a and b resemble in many respects, whereas a and c resemble
in few respects, then a and b resemble each other more than a and c
do.
(d) Whenever a and b share more natural properties than a and c do, then
a and b resemble each other more than a and c do.
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Consider the following instance of the antecedent of (a): a and b are identical,
whereas a and c aren’t identical but exact duplicates; i.e., in resemblist
terms, a and c share all their sparse properties.19 If the resemblist is right
that resemblance is a matter of sparse properties, then what follows from
our assumption is that a and b resemble each other as much as a and c do
which contradicts the consequent of (a). If so, if (a) is valid, then this result
seems to falsify Resemblism.
Moreover, Lewis has rejected (a) for theoretical reasons. Lewis (1986b,
227) considers the possibility that the actual world is a world of one-way
eternal recurrence with a first epoch but no last. Suppose that I live in the
seventeenth epoch. It is true that I might have lived in the fifteenth epoch.
The only way to leave room for this possibility in counterpart theory is by
rejecting the postulate that an individual has only one counterpart in its
own world, and thus by admitting that, within the actual world, there is
a y such that y is not identical to x but such that y resembles x as much
as x resembles itself. Lewis’s rejection of the postulate according to which
one individual can have more than one counterpart in its own world, entails
the rejection of the postulate that whenever a is identical to b but a is not
identical to c, then a resembles b more than it resembles c. But Lewis was a
resemblist! Therefore, the validity of (a) is controversial among resemblists,
and if (a) were valid, this would constitute a problem for the resemblist.
Now, consider (b). (b) is question-begging because the relation of dupli-
cation has been introduced by Lewis in (Lewis 1999a, 25-9) as an objective
kind of resemblance purely determined by sparse or natural properties. That
is, two individuals are duplicates whenever they share all their sparse prop-
erties. Thus (b) begs the question since the antecedent of (b) involves a
context-insensitive property of resemblance, namely duplication, which is
a purely resemblist construct. Moreover, resemblists disagree about cases
of the form of (b). Suppose degrees of objective resemblance are to be
measured using Rodriguez-Pereyra’s definition (D).20 Now let a and b be
duplicates such that each of them instantiates three sparse properties, and
let c be such that it instantiates seven sparse properties among which we
find the three sparse properties instantiated by a and b. By (D) a and b,
which are duplicates, resemble each other to degree 3 and a and c, which
19This situation is plausible according to the doctrine of sparse properties because du-
plicates can still differ relative to merely abundant properties like extrinsic properties.
20See sections 6.1.4 and 7.3.4 on (D) and (Rodriguez-Pereyra 2002, 77) on this point.
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are not duplicates, resemble each other to degree 3, what contradicts (b).
Therefore, (b) begs the question, and that the consequent of (b) follows from
its antecedent is controversial among resemblists.
Consider cases of the form of (c). Even if it were true that the conse-
quent of (c) follows from the antecedent – what is unlikely since resembling
in a very important respect can make for more similarity than resembling
in many relevant but far less important respects does –, this won’t prove
that cases of the form of (c) are clear-cut and context-insensitive. For the
anti-resemblist has plenty of reasons to think that (c)’s antecedent is context-
relative, and if he is right, the consequent of (c) is also context-relative. For
(c) to constitute a counterexample to Anti-Resemblism, it must be argued
that its antecedent is context-insensitive. In the absence of such an argu-
ment, (c) does not threaten the anti-resemblist.
Finally, are cases of the form of (d) clear cut cases of comparative resem-
blance? They are, . . . provided we assume that there is an objective distinc-
tion between the sparse properties and the others. But that there is such a
distinction is what Hirsch, as a resemblist, has to prove. Presenting (d) as a
clear-cut case of comparative resemblance, again, is question-begging, since
it assumes the distinction between sparse and merely abundant properties
from which Resemblism follows.
Hirsch’s counterexamples are hardly persuasive. Moreover, his strategy
would not be conclusive even if he had displayed genuine examples of re-
semblance judgements that are true in every context. For it is one thing
to claim that some judgements are true in every context; yet it is another
thing to claim that the latter are true independently of any context.21 Anti-
Resemblism is not the view that no ascription of resemblance is true in every
context, it is the view that their truth-value is context-dependent as it is
partly determined by a representational perspective. As I emphasised when
introducing Factual Anti-Resemblism in section 2.3 of chapter 7, the anti-
resemblist can account for ascriptions of resemblance that are true in every
context, and thus relative to every representational perspective, using the
operator ‘2pr’. Therefore, Anti-Resemblism could be true even if it were the
case that some or even most resemblance judgements, and their contents,
are true in every context.
21Compare: it is one thing to say that assertions, once true, are true eternally, it is
another to say that they are timelessly true.
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8.4 Speculative arguments for sparse properties
Any argument to the conclusion that there is an objective distinction be-
tween sparse and abundant properties is ipso facto an argument for Resemb-
lism, at least once we admit, as resemblists usually do, that sparse properties
are those properties that have to do with the resemblance of individuals. So
we should consider how advocates of the objective divide between sparse
and merely abundant properties argue for their view.
First, there are intuitions. When considering such properties as being
grue and being gricular (which is analysed as being green or circular) we
have the intuition that these properties are not genuine, that they are merely
disjunctive, that they are not intrinsic, that they do nothing for the similar-
ity of their bearers (Hirsch 1993, 66-7), that they do not make their bearers
have something identical (Armstrong 1989, 82). I agree that we have such
intuitions. These intuitions, however, do not show that there is an objec-
tive distinction between sparse properties and merely abundant ones, that
the mind-independent reality privileges some properties instead of others.
These intuitions would show that there is an objective distinction between
sparse and merely abundant properties, if arguments to the premise that
we have the strong belief that something exists to the conclusion that this
thing exists were valid. But they are not. These intuitions do not establish
that there is an objective distinction between genuine and pseudo properties.
Nevertheless, they constitute an undeniable prima facie case in favour of the
objective distinction between sparse and merely abundant properties just as
Moorean facts of faultless disagreements between resemblance judgements
constitute a prima facie case for Anti-Resemblism.
However, the difference between the resemblist and the anti-resemblist
on this point is that the anti-resemblist can explain our intuitions in favour
of the objective divide between properties, whereas the resemblist does not
satisfactorily explain the context-relativity of our resemblance judgements.
The anti-resemblist can argue that the properties we intuit as genuine are the
ones which proved the most helpful in the struggle for life and in predictions.
Or he can argue that some properties are thought of as genuine and others
as not genuine using Goodman’s notion of entrenchment (Goodman 1983).
The more entrenched is the predicate or general term having as semantic
value the property P, the more genuine P appears to us. In any case,
182 8. In Defence of Anti-Resemblism
which properties appear to us as genuine and which do not appear as such
is determined by our representational perspective.
Second, there is the argument according to which the objective reality is
economical and elegant, and that since some properties are redundant rela-
tive to other properties, reality is such that only non-redundant properties,
the fundamental ones, exist. These fundamental properties are the sparse
properties understood as perfectly natural.
This idea that nature is economical and elegant does not seem really
justified when we pay attention to the object of empirical sciences. From
the point of view of empirical sciences, nature rather seems to be extremely
complex, uneconomical and even messy.22 But even if the objective real-
ity were economical and if some properties were somewhat redundant and
superfluous relative to others, this line of argument would not target Anti-
Resemblist Nominalism, but only Anti-Resemblist Realism. To admit an
abundance of universals or tropes is uneconomical, but to admit an abun-
dance of sets of individuals is just inescapable once we admit sets and given
the cardinality of individuals.
Given the latter reply, some resemblist may argue against Nominalism
that we need a substantive kind of entities to play the role of properties:
universals or tropes. If she succeeds, if properties are universals or tropes,
and if the anti-resemblist must admit an abundance of properties, then Anti-
Resemblism is threatened by worries of quantitative economy. But as I
emphasised in section 2 of the present chapter, this lack of quantitative
economy is balanced by an increased explanatory power and the absence of
commitment to an ad hoc objective distinction between sparse properties
and merely abundant properties.
One standard argument against nominalists who deny that properties
are of a substantive kind is that it reverses the order of explanation. This
line of argument has been taken by Armstrong (1978a, 36), Mellor (1997,
262), and more recently by Molnar in the following passage:
The nominalist’s formalist substitute for a robust explanation
faces an obvious Euthyphro question: Do some things freeze
when cooled to 0◦C because they satisfy the predicate ‘freezes
when cooled to 0◦C’ [or alternatively, because they are members
of the set of things that freeze when cooled to 0◦C], or do these
22On this point, see (Rescher 2000).
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things satisfy the predicate ‘freezes when cooled to 0◦C’ [or alter-
natively, are members of the set of things that freeze when cooled
to 0◦C] because they in fact freeze when cooled to 0◦C? Once
formulated the question looks easy to answer. Surely a belongs
to the extension of ‘F’ because of some property or properties it
has, and not conversely. (Molnar 2003, 23-4)23
The worry with this traditional argument is that the nominalist does not
have to accept the terms of the addressed question. If the nominalist accepts
the question, then he commits himself to the claim that there are two kinds
of entities: predicates or sets of individuals on the one hand, and properties
on the other hand. Truly, if the nominalist admits that these kinds of
entities are distinct, a problem may be raised. But if a nominalist identifies,
as I do, properties with sets of individuals (or alternatively with predicates)
Molnar’s questions do not make much sense. If a is identical with b, it is
neither a which explains b nor b which explains a. So the nominalist theory
I favour is not the target of this traditional objection.
Another line of argument against the nominalist view I endorse and
which is in favour of Realism about Tropes concerns perception. Mulligan,
Simons, and Smith argue that opposite theories of properties must account
for cases where we seem to see and hear tropes, i.e. cases we report with
descriptions like ‘the scarletness of the table’.24 They are right that we must
account for such cases.
My reply to this objection is a traditional one: we do not perceive the
scarletness of the table; what we perceive is that the table is scarlet. And
perceiving that the table is scarlet is nothing but perceiving that the table
is one of the many scarlet individuals. But adapting an example of theirs
(1984, 307), Mulligan, Simons, and Smith could reply that Susan may see
the scarletness, but fail to recognise that it is the table’s one. This is true,
but we can account for the case saying that Susan sees that something is
scarlet without recognising that this something is the table. And seeing that
something is scarlet is just seeing something which is one of the many scarlet
individuals.
23Parentheses are mine.
24This is the example discussed in (Rodriguez-Pereyra 2002, 93). The example used in
(Mulligan et al. 1984) is ‘the smile that just appeared on Rupert’s face’. But I agree with
Rodriguez-Pereyra that the scarletness of the table is a clearer example of a trope than
the smile that just appeared on Rupert’s face is.
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Nef (2006, 181-1) provides a further example of what he takes to be a
perception of a free-floating trope, i.e. a trope that has no bearer: the twin-
kling of the screen at the moment of a collision of particles that annihilated
each other.25 This example can be interpreted as an example of a perception
of a free-floating trope only if we think of the twinkling as a property of the
annihilated particles. If the example must be interpreted in this way, then
here we cannot say that what we see is something twinkling. But we need
not interpret the example in this way, and grammar rather suggests that the
twinkling is a property of the screen, which is not annihilated, rather than a
property of the particles. The twinkling is a trace on the screen of the event
which ended with the annihilation of the particles. Particles do not twinkle,
it is a region of the screen which twinkles, and perceiving the twinkling of a
region of the screen is just perceiving that that region of the screen twinkles.
This further example is no more convincing than the others.
Finally, one may claim that some properties are causally non-efficacious
while other properties are causally efficacious. These properties that are
causally efficacious are the sparse ones. Yet that a property is causally
efficacious need mean no more than that the individuals which have it are
causally efficacious in virtue of having it; that is, in virtue of being among
the many individuals the set of which is the property in question.
There exist many other arguments against Nominalism that I cannot
discuss here without going too far away from the topic of the present study
and that have been discussed in many other essays. My opinion is that the
mentioned arguments are the strongest ones but are not conclusive. Any-
way, even if some argument against Nominalism proves conclusive, then my
attitude would be to endorse the abundant view of universals or tropes that
follows from Anti-Resemblism rather than the sparse view of universals or
tropes defended by the resemblist. For even if it is true that Anti-Resemblist
Realism is less economical than its resemblist rival, the lack of economy is
only quantitative: it admits more entities of the kinds of entity already ad-
mitted by the resemblist. And I consider that this lack of quantitative econ-
omy is less problematic than the inability to explain the context-relativity
of resemblance judgements, and the resemblist commitment to an ad hoc
objective realm of elite properties.
25The translation is mine. The French says “La scintillation de l’e´cran lors d’une collision
de particules qui se sont mutuellement ane´anties.”
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8.5 The resemblist utilitarian case for belief
I do not believe in the objective distinction between sparse and merely abun-
dant properties and in the present section I explain why I need not believe
in this distinction. The content of this section is more or less a summary of
Barry Taylor’s paper “On Natural Properties in Metaphysics” (Taylor 1993)
reproduced also in (Taylor 2006). I apologise for such a rephrasing, but my
agreement with Taylor on these issues is so widespread and his argument
so important for the general claim of this chapter that I shall restate his
argument without much modifications.
The best argument for the view that there is an objective divide between
sparse properties and merely abundant properties is that it is very useful to
believe such a thing. This is a utilitarian case for belief. Lewis is a specialist
of this line of argument and his utilitarian argument for the carnivorous
divide between sparse and non-sparse properties is very impressive given
the long list of applications of this distinction.26
Sparse or natural properties are used to define duplication (Lewis 1999a,
25-9) which itself is used to defend humean supervenience (Lewis 1986c, ix),
and formulate other supervenience claims like Minimal Materialism (Lewis
1999a, 33-9). Sparse properties are also useful to analyse lawhood (Lewis
1999a, 39-45) and they provide an objective constraint on interpretation that
allows us to solve puzzles about the content of thought and language (Lewis
1999a, 45-55). But first of all, the doctrine is useful to account for Moorean
facts of commonality of type and is compulsory for systematic philosophy.
Therefore, if the doctrine of sparse properties has as corollary Resemblism,
it is better to sustain Resemblism than to deprive ourselves of the benefits of
the objective divide between the sparse and the merely abundant properties.
Taylor (1993) has argued that most of the alleged benefits of the doctrine
of sparse properties can be recovered with a vegetarian substitute for sparse
properties and that the benefits we cannot recover in this way do not make
a very strong utilitarian case for belief in favour of sparse properties.
Taylor proposes his vegetarian substitute because he finds “these joints
[of nature] utterly mysterious, the manner of the carving entirely arcane”
(Taylor 1993, 88). I agree with him. Taylor’s vegetarian substitute to the
doctrine of sparse properties is relativised to theories. The substitutes for
26See Lewis (1986b) and (1999a), but also Oliver (1996, 38-44) and Taylor (1993).
186 8. In Defence of Anti-Resemblism
the natural properties are the T -cosy properties – those properties that are
cosy relative to a theory T .27 T -cosy properties are defined in terms of T -
cosy predicates, these predicates being the predicates which play the most
central classificatory roles within T . The method favoured by Taylor to make
this idea clear is in terms of the deductive connections between predicates
revealed in an axiomatic formulation of a theory T . The reader can consult
Taylor’s paper for more details.
Taylor’s vegetarian view is a form of Anti-Resemblism. For the T -cosy
properties are the properties that are elected, contextually relevant, relative
to a representational perspective in which things are represented accord-
ing to theory T . As such, the T -cosy/non-T -cosy divide, like the division
between the sparse and the other properties, separates properties relative
to their importance. But while the resemblist’s division is absolute and
grounded in an allegedly objective difference in nature, the vegetarian T -
cosy/non-T -cosy divide is relative to theories and is grounded in human
classification practices.
Does the relativised divide between the T -cosy properties and the non-T -
cosy ones have the same benefits as the absolute divide between the sparse
properties and the merely abundant ones? To answer the question, Tay-
lor accurately notices, we should distinguish Lewis’s use of the doctrine of
sparse or natural properties to solve problems which are idiosyncratic to
his own philosophy and the applications of the doctrine to solve genuine
philosophical problems. For instance, we need not endorse Lewis’s point of
view regarding humean supervenience, his Modal Realism, or his definition
of events:
‘Bypassing Lewis’s uses of natural properties’ does not mean
reaching a similar conclusion to Lewis himself on all issues, though
without benefit of natural properties. Sometimes, indeed, this
may be the way to go; on other occasions, and particularly when
Lewis’s application of the notion is to address questions highly
internal to his own metaphysic, the foe of natural properties may
just dismiss Lewis’s position as irredeemably tainted by false ide-
ology. The question is whether the sum of the positions thus
adopted on specific issues constitutes (or can be embedded in)
27T need not be a scientific theory. Following Taylor, T can also be an axiomatic
regimentation of common-sense.
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a coherent, prima facie adequate, alternative to Lewis’s philoso-
phy. (Taylor 1993, 93-4)
The objective distinction between sparse and merely abundant properties is
in the first place used by Lewis to define duplication. And it is duplication
which is highly useful in Lewis’s philosophy to define divergent worlds and
Determinism, to formulate supervenience theses such as Humean superve-
nience and Minimal Materialism, and to distinguish between genuine and
pseudo-events.28 As Taylor emphasises (1993, 94) we can parody Lewis’s
definition of duplication using T -cosy properties to define a notion of T -
duplication. From this vegetarian substitute for duplication, we get substi-
tutes for all the notions and relations defined by Lewis in terms of dupli-
cation. For instance, we can say that two possible worlds are T -divergent
iff they are not T -duplicates but they do have T -duplicate initial tempo-
ral segments. And we can then provide a Lewisian style of definition of
Determinism using this definition of T -divergent worlds.
But do we need such substitutes to get a coherent and systematic philos-
ophy? A systematic philosophy need not be a theory which mimics Lewis’s
theory, and a systematic philosophy that does not mimic Lewis’s philosophy
may need no such parody of Lewis’s theory of duplication. Take superve-
nience claims. Perhaps, we should better abandon Humean supervenience as
a mere simplification of reality. Moreover, different notions of supervenience
can be distinguished without recourse to any objective distinction between
the sparse and the non-sparse properties.29
The most fundamental explanatory tasks that metaphysics of properties
shall carry is an account of resemblance and an account of so-called Moorean
facts of commonality of type. Anti-resemblist metaphysics of properties car-
ries the task of accounting for resemblance at least as well as resemblist
metaphysics do. For anti-resemblist metaphysics of properties, contrary to
resemblist ones, explain the context-sensitivity of our resemblance judge-
28We may add that Lewis also used duplication to distinguish between intrinsic and
extrinsic properties in (Lewis 1999b). But many have found Lewis’s attempt to define
intrinsicness in terms of duplication unsatisfactory, and a definition of intrinsicness that
does not appeal to duplication and an objective distinction between sparse and merely
abundant properties has recently been proposed by Francesconi (Francesconi 1999).
29Cf. (Leuenberger 2008) and (Correia 2005, 131-49) for definitions of supervenience
notions that do not appeal to an objective distinction between the sparse and the other
properties.
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ments. Concerning the account of Moorean facts of commonality of prop-
erties, I provide an anti-resemblist and nominalist account of them in the
next chapter. If I succeed in doing so, we need not make use of the objective
distinction between sparse and merely abundant properties to carry these
two fundamental tasks.
Also metaphysics of properties have to enter an account of lawhood and
causation, as Lewis acknowledges. The reader can consult section VIII of
(Taylor 1993) to see how the vegetarian analysis of properties together with
Goodman’s notion of entrenchment can be used to provide an analysis of
lawhood and predictability.
Therefore, the utilitarian case for belief in favour of the objective dis-
tinction between sparse/merely abundant properties is not conclusive. It is
far from obvious that the belief in the carnivorous view of elected properties
is more useful than the belief in the vegetarian view of elected properties,
leaving apart applications of the carnivorous divide that are idiosynchratic
to Lewis’s philosophy. At least the utilitarian case does not convince me. I
do not believe in the objective realm of natural joints, and this is part of
the reason why I endorse Anti-Resemblism.
Chapter 9
Vegetarian Resemblance
Nominalism
In the present chapter I develop the view that I labelled ‘Vegetarian Resem-
blance Nominalism’ in chapter 7 and which is an anti-resemblist solution to
the Problem of Universals. Let me make clear from the start that I neither
endorse nor reject the view. The main reason for this position is that I think
that the proposed V-Resemblance Nominalism is a good and coherent anti-
resemblist solution to the Problem of Universals but it seems to me as good
as the view I labelled ‘Vegetarian Elected Class Nominalism’ in chapter 7.
For both theories incur the same ontological commitments and have, or so
I believe, equal explanatory power.1
The aim of focusing on Resemblance Nominalism at the end of the study
is double. First, the objective is to introduce a new plausible application
of resemblance as grounding a context-sensitive divide between elected and
merely abundant properties. Second, the aim is to connect the content of
the first part of the dissertation with the content of the second part. In
1That both theories are equally good also seems to have been Lewis’s opinion about
what he calls ‘adequate forms’ of their carnivorous counterparts: Resemblist Resemblance
Nominalism, and Natural Class Nominalism; cf. footnote 9 of (Lewis 1999a). Lewis even
claims that “At any rate, it is not at all clear to me that Moderate Class Nominalism
and Resemblance Nominalism in its present form are two different theories, as opposed
to a single theory presented in different styles.” (Lewis 1999a, 15). It is not at all clear
to me either that the version of V-Resemblance Nominalism I present in this chapter and
a version of V-Class Nominalism that adopts the proposed solution to the Coextension
Difficulty are not a single theory presented in different styles. If they are a single theory
presented in different styles, then I do endorse this theory.
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other words, the aim is to connect the result that resemblance is a monadic
multigrade property and the discussion of Anti-Resemblism. For conceiv-
ing resemblance as a monadic multigrade property is not without benefit
for Resemblance Nominalism, be it Anti-Resemblist or not. Also a study
of the metaphysics of resemblance should not fail to discuss Resemblance
Nominalism.
I say that the view is an anti-resemblist solution to the Problem of Uni-
versals? But do we need a solution to this problem once we embrace Anti-
Resemblism? Doesn’t the Problem of Universals presuppose the carnivorous
distinction between sparse and non-sparse properties? No, it does not, and
the anti-resemblist has to solve the Problem as well, or so I argue in the
first section of the chapter. Section 2 introduces the idea of V-Resemblance
Nominalism. Section 3 displays how the V-resemblance nominalist accounts
for ascriptions of resemblance and in section 4 I exhibit how I think the V-
resemblance nominalist should explain ascriptions of elected properties. In
section 5 I discuss the classical objections to Resemblance Nominalism and
show how the V-resemblance nominalist can address them. The last section
of the chapter is devoted to the discussion of the difficulty of coextensive
properties. In this final section, I uphold the view that coextensive proper-
ties are identical, and I show how the resemblance of properties is used to
account for the fact that we misleadingly believe that coextensive properties
are distinct.
9.1 Anti-Resemblism and the Problem of Univer-
sals
Taylor’s vegetarian theory of T -cosy properties that I introduced in the last
chapter is one among many possible vegetarian substitutes to the carnivo-
rous doctrine of sparse properties, as Taylor himself acknowledges. Taylor
understands Armstrong’s demand for an account of Moorean facts of ap-
parent sameness of types as a demand to explain why basic precepts of
common-sense having the form “the As are of the same kind” are highly
plausibly true and why these precepts are confidently believed to be true by
ordinary folk (Taylor 1993, 91). I do not deny that there is an issue here.
Yet, this is not what Armstrong is asking for when demanding an account
of these Moorean facts.
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Armstrong’s demand for an account of the Moorean facts of apparent
sameness of type is a rhetorical means to express his demand for a solution to
the Problem of Universals. The Problem of Universals being “the problem of
how numerically different particulars can nevertheless be identical in nature,
all be of the same ‘type’” (Armstrong 1978b, 41). The issue, following
Armstrong, is not to explain why some common-sense precepts appear to
be very plausibly true, but why they are true. It seems plainly true that
different individuals can be identical in nature, that they can be of the
same type. Thus, prima facie, no fact allows us to rule out the Problem of
Universals as a pseudo problem.
9.1.1 Is the Problem of Universals a pseudo problem?
But whether the problem is a pseudo problem depends on what is meant
by being of the same nature, being of the same type. If ‘being identical in
nature’ is interpreted as sharing a sparse property, then clearly the question
is idiosyncratic to the doctrine of sparse properties, and the relevance of the
question itself is idiosyncratic to the doctrine.
However, we need not understand the question like this. When I intro-
duced the notion of an elected property in chapter 1, I said that the core of
the notion of an elected property is that of a property the sharing of which
makes individuals have something genuinely in common or be identical in
nature. The Problem of Universals, in Armstrong’s terms, is thus to be un-
derstood as the problem of how distinct individuals can nevertheless share
an elected property. And as such, this problem is to be addressed by the
vegetarian as well as by the carnivorous about properties.
The vegetarian way of addressing the Problem will obviously differ from
the carnivorous way in that the election of a property is determined by the
mind-independent world given the sparse theory of properties, while it is
determined by a representational perspective and our classificatory habits
according to the vegetarian. Nevertheless, acknowledging that truths of
apparent identity of nature are truths relative to our classificatory habits
does not make the demand of explanation of these truths a pseudo or futile
issue.
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9.1.2 What is the Problem of Universals?
The anti-resemblist shall provide a solution to the Problem of Universals.
For the superiority of Anti-Resemblism over Resemblism depends on its
capacity to address difficulties both theories have to address and the Problem
of Universals is one such difficulty. If the addition of a hidden realm of sparse
properties is the only way to solve it, we should endorse the doctrine of sparse
properties.
First what is the Problem of Universals? As Oliver (1996, 49-50) empha-
sises the problem is the demand of an account, what is to be accounted for
vacillating in Armstrong’s work between the following six forms of truths:
(1) a and b are of the same type/have a common property.
(2) a and b are both P.
(3) a and b have a common property, P.
(4) a has a property.
(5) a is P.
(6) a has the property P.
What is meant by ‘a property’ here is not an abundant property, but an
elected property given Armstrong’s formulation of the Problem of Universals
as the problem of how distinct objects can nevertheless be identical in nature.
Hence, to disambiguate (1)-(6), I shall restate them as follows:
(1′) a and b are of the same type/have a common elected property.
(2′) There is a property P such that a and b are both P and P is elected.
(3′) a and b have a common property, P, which is elected.
(4′) a has an elected property.
(5′) There is a P such that P is elected and a has P.
(6′) a has the elected property P.
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Anyone who admits that there is a distinction between merely abundant
properties and elected properties, no matter whether this distinction is ob-
jective or not, should admit that (1′)-(6′) is the correct restatement of (1)-
(6). Philosophers who think that we need not restate (1)-(6) in terms of
(1′)-(6′) are philosophers who deny the status of properties to merely abun-
dant properties. I am not such a philosopher.
As Oliver (1996, 50) points out, Armstrong also vacillates between three
candidate views about what an account of (1′)-(6′) amounts to:
(a) a conceptual analysis of the content of (1′)-(6′);
(b) an account of the ontological commitment of (1′)-(6′); and
(c) an account of the truthmakers or ontological grounds of (1′) to (6′).
I agree with Rodriguez-Pereyra that the problem should be understood as a
demand for an account of the truthmakers for the truths under examination.
I agree with Rodriguez-Pereyra that it suffices to provide truthmakers for
truths of the form (6) to get an account of the truthmakers of (1)-(6), and
so that it suffices to provide truthmakers for (6′) to get the truthmakers
of (1′)-(6′) and provide a solution to the Problem of Universals.2 So I will
assume here that the Problem of Universals first demands an account of the
truthmaker(s) of true propositions of the form 〈a has the [elected] property
P〉. Such truths are conjunctive truths, as their logical form is the following:
a has the property P, and P is elected.
It is not the case that the Problem of Universals vanishes when the
doctrine of sparse properties is dismissed; it is not even the case that the
nature of the problem changes depending on whether we adopt Resemblism
or Anti-Resemblism. What varies is the type of truthmakers for (6′): in Anti-
Resemblism, the representational perspective is part of the truthmakers.
9.1.3 A note on Truthmaker Realism
It must be emphasised that not any anti-resemblist metaphysics needs to
address the Problem of Universals if the Problem of Universals is, as I con-
tend, a truthmaker problem. For a solution to the Problem understood in
this way implies a commitment to a certain correspondence theory of truth,
2Cf. (Rodriguez-Pereyra 2002, 28-30), (Rodriguez-Pereyra 2002, 35-42), and
(Rodriguez-Pereyra 2000).
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a Truthmaker Realism. Yet, some anti-resemblist may adopt an antirealist
theory of truth to account for the truth of ascriptions of resemblance and
elected properties, and deny Truthmaker Realism.
Taylor is an antirealist about truth (Taylor 2006), and this may explain
why he does not feel the need to address the Problem of Universals and only
addresses the demand of an account of Moorean facts of apparent sameness
of type understood as an account of why common-sense precepts appear
plausibly true.
A reason why an opponent of the doctrine of sparse properties may be
reluctant to Truthmaker Realism is that one of Lewis’s applications of the
doctrine of sparse properties is to solve Putnam’s model-theoretic argument
against Realism.3 Putnam’s argument is an argument against a realism ac-
cording to which there is a ready-made world out there to interpret scientific
theories. In the terms that I introduced in chapter 7, Putnam’s argument is
an argument against a realism according to which the interpretation of scien-
tific theory is determined by the substratum and not by our representational
perspective.
As a contingent matter of fact, the main advocates of Truthmaker Re-
alism also are the main advocates of the sparse property/merely abundant
property divide.4 Truthmaker Realism is almost always stated in such a way
that the truthmakers for truths have to be out there, objectively present
in the external world, benefiting from a mind-independent mode of exis-
tence. So realists about truthmakers seem to be among the realists Putnam’s
model-theoretic argument is targeting at: those who believe that there is a
ready-made world out there to interpret scientific theories.
As Taylor acknowledges, a drawback of the rejection of the sparse theory
of properties is that Putnam’s argument turns out sound,5 so that truth-
maker realists who believe that there is a ready-made world to interpret
scientific theories are still in the target area. But it seems to me that the
kind of Truthmaker Realism I advocate, as an anti-resemblist, is not the
kind of Truthmaker Realism which is threatened by the conclusion of Put-
nam’s argument. Neither are the truthmakers for resemblance statements
nor the truthmakers for statements of sameness of type part of an invari-
3See e.g. (Putnam 1983).
4The notable names in the list are Armstrong, Molnar, Mulligan, Rodriguez-Pereyra,
and Simons.
5Cf. (Taylor 2006).
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able ready-made mind-independent world in Anti-Resemblism. They are
part of a world made by the evolution of our inductive practices and our
interests; this world has already varied a lot and will vary again. Given
Factual Anti-Resemblism, there is no inconsistency in maintaining that the
interpretation of scientific theories is not determined by the substratum and
that such an interpretation has truthmakers which are part of our represen-
tational perspective. Hence, I can embrace the conclusion that Putnam’s
model-theoretic argument is sound; its conclusion does not threaten the kind
of truthmaker Realism I endorse.
Anti-resemblist metaphysics of properties have to solve the Problem of
Universals, and I discuss one such solution having resemblance as part of
the solution in the present chapter.
9.2 Another Vegetarianism
Vegetarianism about elected properties acknowledges that the elected/merely
abundant property divide corresponds to nothing in the objective reality.
According to it, whether a property is elected or not is a matter of our
classification practices, is determined by our representation of reality. Vege-
tarianism acknowledges that when the focus is on contexts of classification,
there is a psychological divide between properties thought of as genuine and
properties thought of as pseudo properties. However, the vegetarian denies
that this psychological divide corresponds to any objective divide between
real and pseudo joints in reality. Our classificatory practices might have
been different, and the divide between the elected properties and the merely
abundant properties varies depending on our interests in classificatory and
inductive practices.
A vegetarian may take the election of properties relative to representa-
tional perspectives as primitive to address the Problem of Universals. On
the other hand, because of its restricted context-relativity, resemblance has
been used in philosophy to account for context variable phenomena such as
the truth value of counterfactuals and our variable de re modal intuitions. If
resemblance is useful to account for context sensitive phenomena, why not
use resemblance to account for what, according to the vegetarian, is another
context sensitive phenomenon, namely the election of properties? This is
the project of V-Resemblance Nominalism.
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Resemblance Nominalism is a solution to the Problem of Universals
which explains commonality of elected properties in terms of resemblances
between individuals. In its most recent form, i.e., in the version proposed
by Rodriguez-Pereyra, Resemblance Nominalism appears as a carnivorous
solution to the Problem of Universals. But Resemblance Nominalism is not
essentially carnivorous.
Of course, Rodriguez-Pereyra describes his Resemblance Nominalism as
a solution to the Problem of Universals conceived of as the demand for an
account of ascriptions of sparse or natural properties. Nevertheless, his use
of the terminology of the doctrine of sparse properties is not a sufficient
reason for classifying his theory as carnivorous. What makes Rodriguez-
Pereyra’s theory a carnivorous theory is his account of the truthmakers for
ascriptions of resemblance and his account of the nature of the primitive
resemblance ‘relation’.
Resemblance is, according to Rodriguez-Pereyra, “ontological and objec-
tive”. This means that:
resemblance facts, for example, that a resembles b, obtain inde-
pendently of any system of representation which human beings
or any other cognizers might happen to use. (Rodriguez-Pereyra
2002, 62)
That resemblance obtains independently of any system of representation
is one of the basic claims of Resemblism. Thus the reason why Rodriguez-
Pereyra’s Resemblance Nominalism is a carnivorous solution to the Problem
of Universals is that Rodriguez-Pereyra’s account of resemblance is resem-
blist. What grounds his resemblist view according to which resemblance is
objective and ontological is his account of the truthmakers for ascriptions
of resemblance. According to Rodriguez-Pereyra, what makes it true that a
resembles b is that a exists and b exists.6 Resemblance facts are, according
to his account, wholly grounded in existence facts and since existence facts
are wholly grounded in the mind-independent reality, so are resemblance
facts. Now if such resemblance facts are what explains that individuals are
ascribed properties the sharing of which makes them identical in nature, we
get a solution to the Problem of Universals which is carnivorous.
6Cf. (Rodriguez-Pereyra 2002, 63-5).
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But Resemblance Nominalism is not essentially carnivorous. Essential
to Resemblance Nominalism is the claim that resemblance is what explains
ascriptions of elected properties together with the claim that the sharing of
an elected property is not what explains the strong minimal resemblance
of individuals. However, nothing in this fundamental claim of Resemblance
Nominalism makes it compulsory to ground resemblance facts on existence
facts or any other allegedly objective facts. Prima facie, there is no in-
compatibility between the view that resemblance is what grounds ascrip-
tions of elected properties and the claim that resemblance facts are not only
grounded in existence facts but also in our representational perspective.
In what follows, I first exhibit what explains resemblance facts, accord-
ing to the V-resemblance nominalist. Then I shall discuss in detail the
V-resemblance nominalist’s solution to the Problem of Universals. This
discussion will lead to the discussion of the classical difficulties raised to Re-
semblance Nominalism and to the demonstration that the favoured version
of Resemblance Nominalism can address these difficulties.
9.3 Explanation of ascriptions of resemblance
Resemblance nominalists may disagree regarding the kind of resemblance
they take as primitive to explain commonality of properties. Price (1969)
takes as primitive a comparative overall resemblance relation to a paradigm
individual. Rodriguez-Pereyra’s version of Resemblance Nominalism as well
as Carnap’s version and the one I discuss here have this in common that the
primitive kind of resemblance is strong minimal resemblance: the kind of
resemblance such that the sharing of an elected property is not only sufficient
but also necessary for resemblance.
Since the issue is strong minimal resemblance in this chapter I will use
‘resemblance’ exclusively as a shorthand for ‘strong minimal resemblance’
and I will assume that plural terms denote collectively in the present techni-
cal context. Thus “ascribing resemblance to the As” here will mean ascribing
strong minimal resemblance to the As where ‘the As’ denotesc the As.
As a resemblance nominalist, the V-resemblance nominalist agrees that
the resemblance of individuals is what explains that individuals have elected
properties, and thus that their having a common elected property is not what
explains why individuals resemble each other. Since it is anti-resemblist, V-
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Resemblance Nominalism contends that ascriptions of resemblance are rela-
tive to representational perspectives. What distinguishes the V-resemblance
nominalist from its anti-resemblist opponents is that the resemblance nomi-
nalist denies the following explanation for ascriptions of resemblance (where
the factual version of Anti-Resemblism is assumed; cf. section 2.3 of chapter
7):
Contested explanation of resemblance: it is true at w = <s, pr> that
the As [strongly minimally] resemble each other because in w there is
at least one property P had by each of the As that is elected.
For this would turn Resemblance Nominalism on its head. Moreover, the
V-resemblance nominalist cannot contend that the As themselves make the
As resemble each other because the As exist independently of any represen-
tational perspective. What the V-resemblance nominalist should maintain
is the following:
Purported explanation for resemblance: What makes it true at w =
<s, pr> that the As [strongly minimally] resemble each other are the
existence of the As in w and the representational perspective pr.
The V-resemblance nominalist explains the resemblance of the As by the
mutual contribution of the existence of the As, which is determined by the
substratum, and the nature of the relevant representational perspective: rel-
evant goals or tasks to be achieved, and relevant dispositions to perform
such and such inductive reasonings instead of others which result from evo-
lutionary processes, relative familiarity of the objects under representation,
etc. Therefore, resemblance facts are not brute facts here.
In chapter 6 I said that representational perspectives presumably are
properties of their occupiers: of agents occupying representational perspec-
tives. So part of what makes true that individuals resemble each other is
a property. Is this a difficulty? No, because the task of solutions to the
Problem of Universals is not to explain the instantiation of properties by in-
dividuals. Properties, as abundant, are out there as soon as individuals are.
Abundant properties, as I assumed in this study, are sets of n-tuples of indi-
viduals and it is certainly neither resemblance nor universals or tropes which
explain why there are the sets of individuals there are. The V-resemblance
nominalist has to explain the instantiation of elected properties, not the
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instantiation of properties. Hence, the fact that part of what explains the
resemblance of the As is a property is unproblematic provided this prop-
erty, the representational perspective, is not itself an elected property, and
it is not. The occupied representational perspective and resemblance are
here what explains ascriptions of elected properties but are not themselves
elected properties.
9.4 Explanation of ascriptions of elected proper-
ties
There exist various resemblance nominalist explanations of elected property
instantiation which are more or less satisfactory and more or less trans-
latable into the anti-resemblist framework. There is Price’s version (Price
1969) which makes use of paradigms or exemplars and which is inadequate
for the reasons exposed in (Rodriguez-Pereyra 2002). There is Carnap’s
version (Carnap 2002) which fails because of the Imperfect Community
Difficulty and the Companionship Difficulty. Rodriguez-Pereyra’s version
(2002) plausibly works as a carnivorous solution to the Problem of Uni-
versals but is inadequate for the anti-resemblist because it is based on the
assumption that there is a unique and objective measure of degrees of re-
semblance (Rodriguez-Pereyra 2002, 65-69). Moreover, Rodriguez-Pereyra’s
Resemblance Nominalism takes resemblance to be a binary relation what re-
semblance, as I argued in chapter 2, is not.
The version of Resemblance Nominalism I prefer and which, as I think,
can be adapted to the anti-resemblist framework is the one proposed by
Lewis (1999a) and which makes use of a multigrade and contrastive resem-
blance property. The V-resemblance nominalist explains the instantiation
of an elected property as follows:
VRN explanation of elected property instantiation: It is true at w =
<s, pr> that a has the elected property P because in w (i) the P-
individuals resemble each other and do not likewise resemble anything
which is not a P-individual, and (ii) a is one of the P-individuals.
Clause (ii) of the purported explanation states that a is one of the P-
individuals. That a is one of the P-individuals is wholly determined by
the substratum, the mind-independent reality. Since I identify P with the
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set of P-individuals, clause (ii) amounts to an explanation of why a has the
property P. Again, this is unproblematic since I conceive of properties as
abundant, and Resemblance Nominalism does not purport to explain the
instantiation of abundant properties.7
It is in virtue of clause (i) that the purported explanation is an explana-
tion in terms of resemblance, and it is in virtue of the purported explanation
for resemblance that the proposed explanation of elected property instantia-
tion is vegetarian or anti-resemblist. Clause (i) of the proposed explanation
describes in virtue of what P is elected: P is elected because in the world
the bearers of the property resemble each other and do not likewise resemble
anything which is not a bearer of the property. And given the purported
explanation for ascriptions of resemblance it is the mutual contribution of
the substratum and the representational perspective that makes (i) be the
case in w. Of course, the P-individuals need not resemble anything that is
not a P-individual. So the contrastive feature of the predication of resem-
blance introduced in (i) is to be understood thus: for all y that is not a
P-individual, if the P-individuals resemble y, then they do not resemble y
as they do resemble each other.
So (i) of the purported explanation actually involves three predications of
resemblance:8 it involves that the P-individuals strongly minimally resemble
each other; it conditionally involves that the P-individuals and y (that is
anything which is not among the P-individuals) strongly minimally resemble
each other; and it involves the negation of a predication of a new resemblance
predicate, i.e. the negation of the claim that the P-individuals do likewise
7It is because of clause (i) that the proposal is a resemblance nominalist proposal. A
little modification of the explanation of elected property instantiation would make it a
resemblance universalist proposal:
VRU explanation of elected property instantiation: It is true at w = <s, pr>
that a has the elected property P because in w (i) the P-individuals resemble
each other and do not likewise resemble anything which is not a P-individual, and
(ii) a instantiates the universal P.
So as I emphasised in chapter 7 there is no incompatibility between a Realism about
Universals and an explanation of the election of properties in terms of resemblance if we
admit an anti-resemblist abundance of universals.
8Notice that in Lewis’s proposal there is a single complex primitive resemblance pred-
icate which does not distinguish these three predications (Lewis 1999a, 15). I prefer to
make explicit the logical form of (i) of the V-explanation of ascriptions of elected property
instantiation.
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resemble y. The newly introduced minimal resemblance predicate can be
represented as a multigrade and contrastive dyadic predicate of minimal
resemblance.9 Thus let the predicate ‘. . . do likewise resemble . . . ’ be noted
‘RC ’. The complex predication of resemblance involved in the V-resemblance
nominalist explanation of elected property instantiaion “some individuals
resemble each other and do not likewise resemble anything which is not
among them” should therefore be analysed as follows (where ‘A’ is the among
predicate):
(9.1) ∃X [RSM (X) & ∀y (¬(yAX) → (RSMbX, ye → ¬RC(X, bX, ye)))]
(9.1) is a first-order plural sentence to be read: there are some individuals,
the xs, which resemble each other and for every y that is not among the xs,
if the xs and y resemble each other, then the xs on the one hand, and the
xs and y on the other hand, do not resemble likewise.
Since it has this form (9.1) is true whenever its second conjunct is vac-
uously true, i.e. whenever there is no y that is not among the xs and is
such that the xs and y strongly minimally resemble each other. Whenever
the second conjunct of (9.1) is vacuously true, then the strong minimal re-
semblance of some individuals, for instance the P-individuals, is all we need
to explain that P is an elected property and that a has an elected property
which is P.
But unless there is no P-individual distinct from a, this should not be
the way to go. For, in virtue of the distributivity of resemblance, if the
P-individuals resemble each other, any individuals among the P-individuals
that are not identical to the P-individuals resemble each other. Let for
instance the P-individuals be a, b, and c. If they resemble each other, so do
a and b. But we may deny that the property that a and b have in common
and do not share with c10 is an elected one. According to the proposed
explanation for ascriptions of elected properties, it would not be the case
that the property which is common to a and b but not to c is an elected
9I say that the predicate is ‘contrastive’ but not that it is ‘comparative’. Comparative
resemblance is a quantitative matter: it is about whether some things resemble each other
at least as much as others do. Contrastive resemblance is a qualitative matter: it is about
whether some things resemble as – which is not the same as resembling as much as –
other things do.
10There is such a property assuming that properties are abundant.
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one because a and b on the one hand, and a, b, and c on the other hand,
resemble likewise.
The V-resemblance nominalist can then provide an explanation for each
of the candidate explananda of the Problem of Universals:
• a and b are of the same type/have a common elected property because
∃X [RSM (X) & ∀y (¬(yAX) → (RSMbX, ye → ¬RC(X, bX, ye))) &
a, bAX].
• there is a property P such that a and b are both P and P is elected
because the P-individuals resemble each other and do not likewise
resemble anything which is not a P-individual and a and b are among
the P-individuals.
• a and b have a common property P which is elected because a and b
are among the P-individuals and the P-individuals resemble each other
and do not likewise resemble anything which is not a P-individual.
• a has an elected property because ∃X [RSM (X) & ∀y (¬(yAX) →
(RSMbX, ye → ¬RC(X, bX, ye))) & aAX].
• there is a P such that P is elected and a is P because the P-individuals
resemble each other and do not likewise resemble anything which is not
a P-individual and a is one of the P-individuals.
• a has the elected property P because the P-individuals resemble each
other and do not likewise resemble anything which is not a P-individual
and a is one of the P-individuals.
’RSM ’ is the familiar strong minimal resemblance predicate: the predicate
individuals satisfy if and only if they share some elected property. So if I
am requested to provide further clarification on clause (i) of the proposed
analysis of ascriptions of elected properties, this demand should concern
‘RC ’.
As I said above, this proposal is inspired by Lewis’s proposal which
makes use of a multigrade and contrastive predicate akin to ‘RC ’ though
more complex than ‘RC ’ in (Lewis 1999a, 14-5). But Lewis dismisses his
own primitive resemblance predicate on the grounds that such a resemblance
primitive predicate is artificial, so artificial that it does not mark any real
explanatory progress.
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It should be noticed that Lewis’s disapproval is only that if we have the
choice between an artificial primitive resemblance predicate and an unex-
plained difference between natural classes and classes that are not natural,
then “the game is not worth the candle” (Lewis 1999a, 14-5). So Lewis does
not take this artificiality as motivating the claim that the view is false but
only as motivating the claim that it would be a loss of time to defend the
view against an alleged rival he finds equally good regarding its ontological
commitments: Natural Class Nominalism. I think that ‘RC ’ is not artificial
in the context of Anti-Resemblism. However, I agree with Lewis that if the
predicate were artificial, we should not conclude that the view is false but
only that arguing in favour of V-Resemblance Nominalism against V-Class
Nominalism is a loss of time as both views seem equally good regarding their
ontological commitments.
What makes a predicate like ‘RC ’ artificial? First, artificiality cannot be
due to the contrastive character of ‘RC ’. For it should be noted that con-
trastive predicates are used in everyday talk and are understood by ordinary
folk. Consider “I love my mother and do not likewise love anybody else”
or “I enjoy Bach’s music and do not likewise enjoy the work of Mozart”.
If you try to formalise these contrastive love and enjoyment predicates in
a first-order language, their formal representation would also look less fa-
miliar than the usual representation of the ordinary, non-contrastive, love
and enjoyment predicates. But this does not make these contrastive pred-
icates artificial. Moreover, the artificiality of ‘RC ’ cannot be ascribed to
its multigrade character because, as I argued in chapter 2, resemblance is
multigrade. If ‘RC ’ is neither artificial because it is contrastive nor because
it is multigrade, what makes it artificial?
I think that Lewis’s judgement about the artificiality of ‘RC ’ should be
due to the fact that it is a contrastive primitive predicate once we attempt
to explain an objective distinction between sparse and merely abundant
properties in terms of it. If the contrast can be explained, the predicate is
not artificial. However, if the contrast is not to be explained, if it is not
explained why some individuals do not resemble some individual as they
resemble each other, we are facing a difference without difference maker so
that our use of the contrastive predicate does not mark any real explanatory
progress. The target of Lewis’s depreciation is a resemblist resemblance
nominalist who would make use of a predicate like ‘RC ’ to explain why a
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certain set is a sparse property. In the resemblist context, I think that the
worry is legitimate. But it is not legitimate in Anti-Resemblism, since here
the contrast can be explained.
What is puzzling about ‘RC ’ is that it looks like a predicate that in-
volves commitment to ways of resembling, and that we think of ways of
resembling as intrinsic features of individuals under comparison. But in
Anti-Resemblism, intrinsic differences do not suffice to explain differences in
resemblance. There are different ways of resembling that ‘RC ’ tracks, but
these different ways of resembling are not intrinsic features of individuals
under comparison within Anti-Resemblism. Ways of resembling are, al least
partly, ways the world could be; specifically, they are ways the representa-
tional part of the world could be.
Suppose that the As have in common an elected property that they share
with no individual that is not among them, and that they share with b, which
is not among the As, another elected property. So the As strongly minimally
resemble each other, the As and b strongly minimally resemble each other,
but the As do not likewise resemble b. In Anti-Resemblism, be it Nominalist
or Realist, the fact that the property that is had by the As but not by b
is distinct from the property which is shared by the As and b does not
explain why the As do not likewise resemble b. For in Anti-Resemblism, and
even if the anti-resemblist thinks of properties as universals or tropes, the
instantiation of a property does not suffice to explain resemblance so that the
distinctness of instantiated properties does not suffice to explain differences
in resemblance: there are individuals instantiating different properties that
resemble likewise.
In order to explain why the As on the one hand, and the As and b on
the other hand, do not resemble likewise, the anti-resemblist shall insist that
each resemblance is associated with distinctive goals, distinctive classifica-
tory practices, or distinctive genetically implemented traces of the history
of our biological ancestors. In order to simplify the explanation let me use
the phrase ‘representational task’ as an umbrella term for elements of rep-
resentational perspectives such as goals, implemented traces, etc. so that
the explanation can be as indeterminate as is required with variations in
elements of representational perspectives. So the resemblance of the As is
associated with distinctive representational tasks, the resemblance of the As
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and b is associated with other representational tasks and this is the reason
why they do not resemble likewise.
Consider the world w1 = <s@, pr> which is a variation of the actual
world @ = <s@, p@>.11 No representational task associated with the As
and b (taken together) belongs to the representational perspective pr of
w1.12 However, the representational tasks that are actually associated with
the As, abstracted from any individual that is not among them, belong to
pr of w1. Then the As resemble and resemble likewise in w1, whereas the As
and b do not resemble in w1. As a result, the elected property that the As
have in common and do not share with b in @ is also elected in w1. However,
the property that the As share with b and that is elected in @ is no more
elected in w1.
Now consider the world w2 = <s@, pr ′> which is a variation of the actual
world @ = <s@, p@>. The representational tasks that are associated with
the As and b (taken together) in the actual world belong to the represen-
tational perspective pr ′ of w2. However, the representational tasks that are
associated in @ with the As – abstracted from any individual that is not
among them – do not belong to pr ′. Then the As and b resemble each other
in w2, the As resemble each other in w2, but the As on the one hand, and
the As and b on the other hand, do resemble likewise in w2. As a result, the
elected property that the As have in common and do not share with b in @
is not elected in w2. But the property that the As and b have in common
and is elected in @ is also elected in w2.
So the V -resemblance nominalist can explain why RC holds or does not
hold between individuals in terms of variations in elements of representa-
tional perspectives. In section 2 of chapter 8 I argued that Anti-Resemblist
Nominalism is superior to Resemblist Nominalism because what the resem-
blist nominalist does not explain, i.e. what is a brute necessity in his theory,
is explained by the anti-resemblist nominalist in terms of representational
perspective. That the V-resemblance nominalist can explain the contrastive
11So we suppose that the substratum is the same in both worlds. If the variation is
due to a variation in our biological history, then the substratum should also vary. What
matters here is that there is not objective change in the As and b, i.e. no change in the
properties they instantiate, so that changes in resemblance are not to be explained in
terms of intrinsic changes in the compared individuals.
12I.e. neither is it the case that the representational tasks that are actually associated
with the As and b (taken together) belong to pr nor is it the case that other representational
tasks that could have been associated with the As and b (taken together) belong to pr.
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feature of ‘RC ’ while a resemblist who uses ‘RC ’ cannot explain it illustrates
the superiority in explanatory power of Anti-Resemblist Nominalism over
its Resemblist rival.
Besides Lewis’s own moderate disapproval, there is Rodriguez-Pereyra’s
objection against the use of resemblances holding between more than two in-
dividuals in Resemblance Nominalism that I already discussed in chapter 2.
Rodriguez-Pereyra argues that a collectivist resemblance nominalist cannot
account for the distributivity of resemblance. My V-resemblance nominalist
is a collectivist resemblance nominalist. And as I argued in chapter 2, the
collectivist resemblance nominalist can explain why resemblance distributes
in terms of (Nec)13 and the claim that whenever some individuals resemble
in some respect, any two of the latter resemble in some respect. Yet none
of these necessary truths are primitive in Collective Resemblance Nominal-
ism since they are explained by the resemblance nominalist explanation of
ascriptions of elected properties.
Resemblance Nominalism is better known for the classical difficulties
that have been raised against it than for its own proposal. So I shall exhibit
how the present vegetarian proposal addresses these classical difficulties.
9.5 Objections against Resemblance Nominalism
9.5.1 The Imperfect Community Difficulty II
The classical objection which has arguably been thought of as the most de-
cisive against classical versions of Resemblance Nominalism is the so-called
Imperfect Community Difficulty. As I mentioned when discussing the arity
of resemblance, an imperfect community is a class such that any two mem-
bers of it resemble each other but such that all the members of the class do
not share a property. Imperfect communities are challenging because they
show that the resemblance of any two of the As is not sufficient for there
to be an elected property shared by the As. This is true. But the result of
chapter 2 is that the resemblance of any two of the As is not sufficient for
the resemblance of the As either, (Rcumulativity) being invalid.
Imperfect communities raise a challenging difficulty to these versions of
Resemblance Nominalism which agree that resemblance is a binary relation
13Where (Nec) is the claim that whenever some individuals resemble, they resemble in
some respect.
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and aim to explain the fact that a has an elected property, P, by the fact that
a resembles every P-individual. But resemblance is not a binary relation.
The advocated version of V-Resemblance Nominalism embraces this result
and takes the resemblance of the P-individuals and the fact that a is one
of them as grounding the fact that a has an elected property instead of
the resemblance of a to each P-individual. Given (Nec), it is not possible
that the P-individuals strongly minimally resemble each other – and do not
likewise resemble anything which is not among them – without it being the
case that the P-individuals share an elected property.
It is not that the present version of Resemblance Nominalism provides a
solution to the Imperfect Community difficulty. Strictly speaking, the truth
is rather that the Imperfect Community Difficulty vanishes, ceases to be a
difficulty at all, once it is acknowledged that (Nec) is a non-negotiable claim
about resemblance and that resemblance can hold between more than two
individuals.
9.5.2 The Companionship Difficulty
A genuine difficulty against Resemblance Nominalism, which is also due
to Goodman (1966, 160-2) but had been anticipated by Carnap (2002), is
the so-called Companionship Difficulty. The difficulty is intended to show
that it is false that what makes an individual have an elected property
P is that it resembles all the P-individuals. For suppose that all the P-
individuals are also Q-individuals (where Q is elected as well) but not vice
versa. In this case we say that the elected property Q accompanies P. All
the Q-individuals resemble all the P-individuals so that resembling all the
P-individuals cannot be what makes an individual have the elected property
P. For, by assumption, some Q-individuals do not have P.
It is the contrastive feature of RC which allows us to solve the Com-
panionship Difficulty. Considering the former situation where the elected
property Q accompanies the elected property P, the P-individuals resemble
each other but do not likewise resemble any Q-individual which is not a
P-individual. As I described in section 4 of the present chapter, differences
in associated representational tasks would explain why the P-individuals do
not resemble any Q-individual that is not a P individual as they resemble
each other.
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Hence, the Companionship Difficulty does not threaten the proposed
version of V-Resemblance Nominalism because of the contrastive character
of RC .
9.5.3 Russell’s Regress
Here is a difficulty which also has been thought of as lethal to Resemblance
Nominalism but is, according to me, misguided. This difficulty against Re-
semblance Nominalism finds its roots in a famous passage from Russell:
If we wish to avoid the universals whiteness and triangularity, we
shall choose some particular patch of white or some particular
triangle, and say that anything is white or triangle if it has the
right sort of resemblance to our chosen particular. But then the
resemblance required will have to be a universal. Since there are
many white things, the resemblance must hold between many
pairs of particular white things; and this is the characteristic of
a universal. It will be useless to say that there is a different
resemblance for each pair, for then we shall have to say that
these resemblances resemble each other, and thus at last we shall
be forced to admit resemblance as a universal. The relation of
resemblance, therefore, must be a true universal. And having
being forced to admit this universal, we find that it is no longer
worth while to invent difficult and implausible theories to avoid
the admission of such universals as whiteness and triangularity.
(Russell 1997, 48)
Russell’s passage is often interpreted as arguing that Resemblance Nominal-
ism leads to a vicious infinite regress. The premises of the argument are (i)
that resemblance has a characteristic which is typical of universals, namely
that it can have distinct instances and (ii) that if you deny that resemblance
can have distinct instances, if you maintain that it is bearer-specific, then
you are pressed to accept a universal of resemblance to avoid an infinite
regress of resemblances between resemblances. I reject (i) and show that
rejecting it does not yield the conclusion of (ii).
As far as I know, none of the philosophers who make use of Russell’s ar-
gument to argue against Resemblance Nominalism ever wondered whether
what Russell calls “the characteristic of a universal” really is the character-
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istic of a universal. What this characteristic is, according to Russell, is the
ability to have distinct instances. We should wonder whether this charac-
teristic is a characteristic of universals or a characteristic of properties. I
think it is a characteristic of properties.
Advocates of universals such as Armstrong (1989) and Mellor (1997) have
argued that if there are universals, universals must be sparse, not abundant.
It is not the case that to any predicate there corresponds a universal. In par-
ticular, universals, if there are any, aren’t disjunctive or negative, while there
are disjunctive or negative predicates. However, since I conceive of proper-
ties as abundant, to each predicate there corresponds a property, and there
are more properties than predicates. If there are disjunctive and negative
predicates, these have as semantic values disjunctive or negative properties.
For instance, the property green or circular is disjunctive, and the property
non-red is negative.14
Armstrong (1989, 82) insists that there are no disjunctive universals.
For instance, being green or circular cannot be a universal, since that some
things share it “does not show that, in any serious sense, they thereby
have something identical. The whole point of universals, however, is that it
should be identical in its different instances.” Nevertheless, given my view
of properties, there is the disjunctive property of being green and circular
and it is true that this property can have distinct instances: the green
individuals and the circular ones. Therefore, disjunctive properties have
Russell’s characteristic of universals but are not universals if universals have
to be conceived of as sparse.15
Russell misleadingly ascribed to universals a characteristic which is a
characteristic of properties. Does resemblance has this characteristic? I
think it does. Hence, resemblance is a property. Yet no difficulty for the
V-resemblance nominalist follows from that claim since he does not intend
to explain property instantiation in terms of resemblance. Property instan-
14Though disjunctiveness of a property would depend on which properties we take as
basic or atomic. And which properties we take as basic s plausibly determined by our
representational perspective.
15If an anti-resemblist admits universals and conceives of them as abundant, then he
can agree that resemblance is a universal, provided he maintains that resemblance is a
merely abundant universal. For in Anti-Resemblism we can conceive of resemblance as a
universal and still explain the instantiation of an elected universal in terms of resemblance.
If resemblance is an elected universal, we have a regress. But there is no need to think of
it as an elected universal.
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tiation is a matter of set theory: an individual instantiates the properties
which are identical to the sets of which it is a member.
Some may reply that the characteristic of universals Russell has in mind
in the quoted passage is that of repeatability, i.e. the property of being
wholly identical in its different instances. Strictly speaking, properties are
not wholly identical in all their instances. Properties are multi-located, the
multi-location of properties being the many locations of its bearers (Lewis
1999a, 10-9). Universals on the other hand are genuinely repeatable, and the
characteristic that Russell intends to ascribe to resemblance in the quoted
passage is the property of repeatability. I think the objector is right about
the intention of Russell. But identifying the intention of Russell does not
make his argument valid. Russell’s argument fails to show that resemblance
is a repeatable property because, as I have shown, the property of being able
to hold between distinct instances is not identical to the repeatability prop-
erty, and emphasising that resemblance holds between different instances,
as being green or circular does, is not sufficient to show that it is repeatable.
Therefore, I deny that resemblance has anything that could be thought
of as a characteristic of universals. Shall I then conclude, as Russell says,
that “there is a different resemblance for each pair”? No, since I do not
deny that resemblance has many instances, that it holds between distinct
bearers. All I deny is that this feature of resemblance is a characteristic of
a universal. Hence, I am not pressed to admit that particular resemblances
share a universal of resemblance, and the regress does not follow.
9.6 The Coextension Difficulty
9.6.1 The difficulty
The previously discussed difficulties are all difficulties having Resemblance
Nominalism as specific target. On the other hand, the Coextension Dif-
ficulty does not specifically threaten the discussed version of Resemblance
Nominalism but threatens more generally the identification of properties
with their extension. The Coextension Difficulty is classically the difficulty
that theories of properties which identify properties with their extension fail
to distinguish intuitively distinct but coextensive properties. The Coexten-
sion Difficulty threatens the present proposal not because it makes use of
resemblance to explain why properties of individuals are elected, but be-
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cause it identifies properties, be they elected or merely abundant, with sets
of n-tuples of individuals.
The V-resemblance nominalist is threatened by this difficulty because it
may arise that for some elected properties P and Q, the P-individuals are
all and only the Q-individuals; in other words, P and Q have the same
extension. I do not endorse V-Resemblance Nominalism, but I endorse
Anti-Resemblist Nominalism which can take either the form of a Vegetar-
ian Elected Class Nominalism or a Vegetarian Resemblance Nominalism.
Both forms of Anti-Resemblist Nominalism are targeted by the Coextension
difficulty, so I have to address this difficulty.
Lewis and Rodriguez-Pereyra address the difficulty by committing them-
selves to Modal Realism16, and by identifying properties with sets of n-tuples
of actual and merely possible individuals.17 For let P and Q be coexten-
sive properties such that in some possible world some P-individual is not
a Q-individual. The class of every possible P-individual turns out distinct
from the class of every possible Q-individual. P and Q being respectively
identified with the class of every possible P-individual and every possible
Q-individual, we get the intended result that P and Q are distinct proper-
ties.
My worry with Lewis’s and Rodriguez-Pereyra’s solution is not that it in-
curs commitment to Modal Realism. Of course, it would be better to avoid
commitment to non-actual possibilia for matter of quantitative economy.
But there is a stronger reason to favour an alternative solution. The account
of properties as sets of n-tuples of possible and actual individuals leads to
a decisive difficulty as Andy Egan has proved (Egan 2004). Suppose that
Elmer has a favourite property which is being green. Elmer might have had
another favourite property instead. It is a modal fact that being green might
16Where Modal Realism is, roughly, the view (i) that first-order existential quantification
ranges over a domain of individuals among which only some actually exist and (ii) that
a possible world is a concrete object; cf. (Divers 2002). Notice that ‘world’ here is not
an ordered pair whose members are a substratum and a representational perspective. A
possible world is here a possible substratum. Thus the relevant notion of possibility is that
of s-possibility that I introduced in section 2.3 of chapter 7.
17According to Rodriguez-Pereyra, the resemblance nominalist need not identify prop-
erties with anything since Resemblance Nominalism is a solution to the Problem of Uni-
versals and since the Problem of Universals is not a demand for a reductive analysis of
reference to properties. But he agrees that if the resemblance nominalist had to identify
sparse properties with something, he would identify them with property classes.
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fail to have been anybody’s favourite property. In other words, being green
has the property of being somebody’s favourite property only contingently.
If you think of first-order properties as sets of n-tuples of possible individ-
uals, then it is consistent to think of second-order properties such as being
somebody’s favourite property as sets of n-tuples of first-order properties.
Let @ be the actual world in which being green is Elmer’s favourite prop-
erty and let w be a world where being green fails to be anybody’s favourite
property. Sets have their members necessarily. Then since being green is
somebody’s favourite property in @, being green must be one of the mem-
bers of being somebody’s favourite property. But since being green fails to
be anybody’s favourite property in w, being green must not be a member of
being somebody’s favourite property. But it cannot be both.
Notice that Rodriguez-Pereyra may not be threatened by this difficulty
because he only identifies sparse property classes with sets of n-tuples of ac-
tual and possible individuals. He abstains himself to identify merely abun-
dant properties with sets of n-tuples of entities. No second-order property
is sparse, following his account, so that he needs not identify second-order
properties with sets of n-tuples of first-order properties. However, I do iden-
tify abundant second-order properties with sets of first-order properties and
I would thus be threatened by Egan’s inconsistency, if I had to admit Modal
Realism to address the Coextension Difficulty. But I need not admit such a
thing.
My favourite solution to the Coextension Difficulty consists in biting the
bullet. Yes, coextensive properties are identical and we are wrong when
believing that they are not. The reason why we misleadingly believe that
coextensive properties are distinct is that, contingently coextensive proper-
ties at least, are only contingently identical; they could have been distinct.
This solution, as I shall show, is less counterintuitive than it at first sight
seems to be. For this solution to the Coextension Difficulty is analogous to
a popular solution to another problem, the modal problem of coincidence.
This parallelism has been suggested to me by Mark Heller.18 From the
proposition that the coextensive properties P and Q are identical but could
not have been identical, it seems to follow by Leibniz’s Law that P could
not have been identical to itself, which is self-contradictory. The difficulty
is overcome by endorsing a counterpart theory for properties.
18Cf. (Heller 1998, 313).
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9.6.2 Coextensive properties and coincidence
The Coextension Difficulty is the counterpart in the domain of properties
to the Modal Problem of Coincidence in the domain of individuals. It is not
only that the two difficulties are analogous. To my mind they are one and
the same difficulty applied to two distinct domains of entities: the domain of
properties and the domain of individuals. So possible strategies to solve the
difficulty in one domain of entities are also strategies to solve the difficulty
in the other domain of entities.
The statue and the lump of clay constituting it occupy one and the same
spatial region but have distinct de re modal properties. The statue could
not have failed to be a statue, while the lump of clay could have failed to be
a statue. The statue could have failed to be a lump of clay, while the lump
of clay could not have failed to be a lump of clay. If you admit transworld
identity for individuals, this means that there is a possible world wherein
the actual lump of clay is distinct from the actual statue. Since identity
and distinctness are necessary, this yields the result that the statue and the
lump of clay constituting it are two distinct entities even though they have
the same extension, that is, the same spatial location.
The parallel view regarding the Coextension Difficulty consists in main-
taining that coextensive properties are distinct even though they have the
same extension. Coextensive properties are thus conceived of as distinct but
coinciding in extension. For this solution to succeed, a necessary require-
ment is that properties are not identified with their extension. I do identify
properties with their extension, therefore, this approach to the Coextension
Difficulty is not available to me.
Another approach to the problem of coincidence consists in denying
transworld identity but in maintaining that ‘the lump of clay’ and ‘the
statue’ do not refer to worldbound entities but to fusions, mereological sums,
of worldbound entities. So let us agree that there is only one object that
occupies the spatio-temporal region where the statue-lump of clay is actu-
ally located, but maintain that when talking of the lump of clay we are not
talking of the actual object but of the mereological fusion which is the sum
of all the counterparts of the actual lump of clay. Maintain also that when
talking of the statue we are not referring to the actual statue but to the
mereological fusion which is the sum of all the counterparts of the actual
statue. Understood as such the lump of clay and the statue are distinct
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objects, distinct mereological fusions, since some counterpart of the lump
of clay is not a counterpart of the statue. Nevertheless, according to this
solution to the modal problem of coincidence, the statue and the lump of
clay have an identical part, which is the actual statue-lump of clay.
Lewis’s and Rodriguez-Pereyra’s approach to the Coextension Difficulty
parallels the latter solution to the problem of coincidence. Strictly speaking,
it is not that they admit transworld identity for properties, it is rather that
they take referential expressions for properties as referring to the set of the
many possible P-individuals. Just as the extension of ‘the statue’ is not
worldbound, the extension of the property of being red is not worldbound.
But the property of being red is not wholly located in the actual world since
it is not a universal. Let P and Q be contingently coextensive properties;
it then follows that these two properties are distinct because they refer to
two different sets of possible individuals even if these two sets have some
members in common, namely the actual ones.
A last strategy regarding the modal problem of coincidence consists in
maintaining that ‘the lump of clay’ and ‘the statue’ refer to the actual in-
dividual that occupies a same spatial region. Since there is only one spatial
region occupied by the statue and the lump of clay, there is only one individ-
ual here. Yet the statue might not have been identical to the lump of clay.
The latter seems to conflict with the necessity of identity, but it does not if
you deny transworld identity and endorse counterpart theory. No thing can
fail to be identical with itself, but something can have distinct counterparts,
a statue counterpart and a lump of clay counterpart, in the same possible
world.
The reasons which lead to this strategy are the following: (i) truly, the
lump of clay and the statue have different de re modal properties; (ii) truly,
when saying “the statue is composed of the lump of clay” we are not referring
to a worm in the logical space but to the actual statue which can be seen
or touched, and (iii) the sane metaphysical principle that there can be only
one individual occupying a same spatial region. This is the solution of the
modal problem of coincidence defended by Lewis (Lewis 1971).
A parallel view on the Coextension Difficulty, which as far as I know has
never been endorsed though it has been suggested by Heller (1998, 313),19
consists in maintaining that (i) truly, contingently coextensive properties
19Heller does not endorse it because he is not a nominalist.
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have distinct modal properties; (ii) truly, when talking of properties, we are
not referring to a set of individuals some of which exist in different possible
worlds but we are referring to a set of actual individuals; and (iii) truly,
properties are nothing over and above their extension. Contingently coex-
tensive properties are identical but only contingently so. They might have
been distinct in the loose sense that they can have distinct counterparts, and
it is because they might have been distinct that we misleadingly believe that
they are. This is the view I wish to advocate, and it involves commitment
to a counterpart theory for properties.
9.6.3 Property counterparts and the resemblance of proper-
ties
It is well-known that Lewis promoted the view that concrete individuals are
worldbound, i.e. that there is no transworld identity for concrete individu-
als. He makes use of countepart relations between individuals to solve the
modal problem of coincidence. But his strategy to deal with the Coexten-
sion Difficulty is different. He should better have used the same strategy,
the use of counterpart relations, to deal with both difficulties. For he would
then have avoided Egan’s difficulty.
Another advantage of using counterpart theory for properties as I do is
that counterpart theory does not incur commitment to Modal Realism. If
we maintain that properties are worldbound, we need not commit ourselves
to the existence of non-actual possibilia. The solution incurs commitment to
counterpart theory, but counterpart theory is compatible with Actualism.
For instance, Sider (2002) and Heller (1998) defend each an ersatzist, and
thus actualist, theory of possible worlds which makes use of counterpart
theory.
I assume that counterpart relations for properties are to be analysed as
comparative overall similarity relations between properties as follows:20
(Property Counterpart) property P is a counterpart of property Q iff P
and Q minimally resemble each other and there is no R in P’s world
20I say ‘relation’ here because counterparthood is a complex property, a conjunctive
one, which is composed of a non-relational element which is minimal resemblance, and a
relational element which is the comparative one. Counterparthood is relational in virtue
of its comparative element.
216 9. Vegetarian Resemblance Nominalism
such that R and Q resemble each other more than P and Q resemble
each other.
This account of property counterparts provides an opportunity to say more
about the resemblance of properties.
As already argued in chapter 6, whether we take properties to resemble
or not seems to be a matter of context. There are contexts in which we will
agree that the red shade of a book resembles the orange shade of another
book. But there are contexts in which we will deny that the red shade of
the same book resembles the orange shade of the other book depending on
the colour of the books which surround them in the library. Since I endorse
Anti-Resemblism, I maintain that this context-relativity is not only a feature
of our resemblance judgements about properties but a feature of the resem-
blance of properties itself. Whether some properties resemble each other
or not depends on a representational perspective. So counterparthood of
properties shall be understood as relative to a representational perspective.
Since counterparthood is relative to a representational perspective, the
way we compare properties is an indeterminate context-sensitive matter. So
there is no determinate way in which a property resembles another more
than a third. But here is a suggestion regarding how counterpart properties
can be compared.
Heller’s proposal is that properties can be compared relative to the role
they play. These roles can be nomological or otherwise. I shall illustrate
his suggestion. Consider, for instance, being renate and being cordate. Be-
ing renate is coextensive, and thereby identical, with being cordate. This
property is associated with various biological roles, and some of these roles
constitute its cordate aspect, while other roles constitute its renate aspect.
The roles which consitute its cordate aspect are those that are determined
by what hearts are;21 the cordate aspect is the set of these roles. The roles
which constitute its renate aspect are those that are determined by what
kidneys are;22 the renate aspect is the set of these roles. When we think of
the being cordate/renate property as the property of being cordate, the roles
that constitute its cordate aspect turn out relevant to compare it, while the
roles that constitute its renate aspect turn out irrelevant. When we think
of it as the property of being renate, the roles that constitute its renate
21Hence, determined by properties of hearts.
22Hence, determined by properties of kidneys.
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aspect turn out relevant to compare it, while the roles that constitute its
cordate aspect turn out irrelevant. And we misleadingly believe that being
cordate and being renate are distinct because we misleading believe that the
irrelevant roles are absent.
In another possible word, w1, it is not the case that every renate indi-
vidual is also a cordate individual, or vice versa. So the actual property
of being renate/cordate has two counterparts in w1: a renate counterpart
and a cordate counterpart. The renate counterpart is the counterpart of
the actual property of being renate/cordate when focusing on the renate as-
pect of the actual property. In other words, the renate counterpart of being
renate/cordate in w1 is the property instantiated in w1 which is the most
similar to being renate/cordate when the relevant roles are the roles which
constitute the renate aspect of the actual property. On the other hand,
the cordate counterpart is the counterpart of the actual property of being
renate/cordate we obtain when focusing on the cordate aspect of the actual
property. In other words, the cordate counterpart of being renate/cordate
in w1 is the property instantiated in w1 which is the most similar to being
renate/cordate when the relevant roles are the roles which constitute the
cordate aspect of the actual property. Variations in importance attached to
roles of properties thus explain why a single property can have distinct coun-
terparts in a same world, and why we misleadingly believe that coextensive
properties are distinct.23
23The content of this paragraph is to be compared with the counterpart theorist’s solu-
tion to the modal problem of constitution proposed by Lewis in (Lewis 1971).
We can in a similar vein explain why we wrongly believe that necessarily coextensive
properties are distinct, while they are necessarily identical. The difference is only that
necessarily coextensive properties have the same counterpart in every world, but the pro-
cess of change of focus also explains our belief in their distinctness. Suppose, for instance,
that being triangular and being trilateral are necessarily coextensive. The property of
being triangular is identical to that of being trilateral and necessarily so. This property is
associated with various geometrical roles, and some of these roles constitute its triangular-
ity aspect, while other roles constitute its trilaterality aspect. The roles which consitute
its triangularity aspect are those that are determined by what angles are (determined by
geometrical properties of angles); the triangularity aspect is the set of these roles. The
roles which constitute its trilaterality aspect are those that are determined by what sides
are (determined by geometrical properties of sides); the trilaterality aspect is the set of
these roles. When we think of the being triangular/trilateral property as the property of
being triangular, the roles that constitute its triangularity aspect turn out relevant to com-
pare it, while the roles that constitute its trilaterality aspect turn out irrelevant. When
This strategy might be regarded as ad hoc. It is true that the strategy
is introduced to solve the Coextension Difficulty, but the proposal seems
to me plausible on its own. Anyway, the value of the proposal should be
compared with the strategy which consists in the commitment to Lewis’s
Modal Realism. And my strategy seems to me more appealing than the
latter as it commits us to no extra entities and gives a plausible psychological
explanation of why variations in focus on roles make us wrongly believe that
identicals are distinct.
I wish I have shown that an anti-resemblist version of Resemblance Nom-
inalism can address the difficulties raised to Resemblance Nominalism and
thus that this version of Resemblance Nominalism is an available solution
to the Problem of Universals in Anti-Resemblism.
we think of it as the property of being trilateral, the roles that constitute its trilaterality
aspect turn out relevant to compare it, while the roles that constitute its triangularity
aspect turn out irrelevant. And we misleadingly believe that being triangular and being
trilateral are distinct because we wrongly believe that the roles that are irrelevant are
absent. They are still here, it is just that we are not paying attention to them.
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I have argued for the superiority of Anti-Resemblism over Resemblism, and I
have argued, I hope with success, that a nominalist version of Anti-Resembl-
ism, namely V-Resemblance Nominalism, is coherent and plausible. To my
mind, my arguments provide good reasons to endorse an Anti-Resemblist
Nominalism. But I am conscious that most metaphysicians will be reluctant
to take this stance mainly because Anti-Resemblism involves some moderate
dose of Idealism that is not very popular at a time when Realism on steroids
dominates the metaphysical debate.24
My first aim when introducing these views and arguing for them was
to show that the anti-resemblist/resemblist debate is a deep and fruitful
one and that it can be combined with alternative positions in the real-
ist/nominalist debate about resemblance. As I think that the anti-resemblist
vs. resemblist debate is the central issue in the metaphysics of resemblance,
this shows that a positioning regarding the metaphysics of resemblance is
not determined by any positioning regarding the metaphysics of properties.
Each view defended or displayed in this study will find its opponents.
For instance, some will attempt to defend the view that resemblance is
binary and dyadic against my arguments; and for this project to succeed,
a further account of collective resemblances must be offered. Some will
attempt to defend that Resemblism can afford a plausible account of the
context-relativity of our resemblance judgements; and the latter have lots of
work to achieve this task, if it can be achieved at all. Many will insist that
ways of resembling must be wholly intrinsic to the compared individuals;
and for these people to be convincing, it is required that the arguments they
24Anti-Resemblism is idealist in so far as it maintains that some apparent mind-
independent feature of reality, namely resemblance, is in fact a mind-dependent one.
But its Idealism is very moderate since Anti-Resemblism maintains that the existence
of individuals and properties is a mind-independent matter.
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propose do not beg the question in favour of Resemblism or the doctrine
of sparse properties. I believe that it is difficult to propose non-question-
begging arguments on this point.
I hope that the arguments I have displayed are strong enough to convince
the opponents of the defended views that arguing for their metaphysical
view of resemblance is a taxing topic. At least, they will be convinced that
it has been taxing to argue for my view of resemblance. To show that the
metaphysics of resemblance is a taxing topic has been the purpose of this
dissertation.
Appendix: Plural Logic for
Comparative Resemblance
A.1 Definitions and some properties
First a short terminological note. On some views of comparative resemblance
and difference, overall resemblance is obtained by focusing on resemblance
respects, and overall difference is obtained by focusing on respects of dif-
ference. So that “the As resemble each other more than the Bs do” is not
equivalent to “the Bs differ from each other more than the As do” and to
“the As differ from each other less than the Bs do.”
The logic of comparative resemblance, which is the topic of this appendix,
is not a logic for focused but overall comparative resemblance. Comparative
resemblance is here intended as resulting from a computation of all compari-
son respects of the compared entities be they resemblance respects, different
respects or both. The notion being overall, I take “the As resemble each
other more than the Bs do” as equivalent to “the Bs differ from each other
more than the As do” and to “the A differ from each other less than the Bs
do.”
First, I shall propose a logic for comparative resemblance, and then
consider how non-comparative notions of resemblance can be introduced in
terms of comparative resemblance. Though I will take weak resemblance as
my primitive, the most basic relations of comparative resemblance are, in
natural language, strict and equal resemblance, noted SR and ER. These two
relations are exclusionary in that it is not possible for the As and the Bs to
stand in both relations with each other, in the same context. The reference
to a fixed arbitrary context will in this appendix always be intended but
suppressed. The language used is the one introduced in chapter 5.
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Some properties of strict and equal resemblance are uncontroversial in
most contexts:
1. For all xs and ys, if the xs resemble each other more than the ys do,
the ys do not resemble each other more than the xs do;
2. For all xs and ys, if the xs resemble each other as much as the ys do,
the ys resemble each other as much as the xs do;
3. For all xs, the xs resemble each other as much as the xs do;
4. For all xs and ys, if the xs resemble each other more than the ys do,
the xs do not resemble each other as much as the ys do.
4. states that strict and equal resemblances are exclusionary. 1. states that
strict resemblance is asymmetrical, and it also follows from 1. that strict
resemblance is irreflexive. For whenever the xs = the ys, if the xs stand
in a reflexive relation to the ys, then the ys stand in that same relation
to the xs, which is not the case with strict resemblance. 2. states that
equal resemblance is symmetrical, and 3. states that equal resemblance is
reflexive.
The following is a restatement of the former properties of strict and equal
resemblance:
(CR.1) ` ∀X,Y (SR(X,Y ) → ¬SR(Y,X))
(CR.2) ` ∀X,Y (ER(X,Y ) → ER(Y,X))
(CR.3) ` ∀X ER(X,X)
(CR.4) ` ∀X,Y (SR(X,Y ) → ¬ER(X,Y ))
By (CR.3) we obtain the following:
(CR.5) ` ∀X,Y (X = Y → ER(X,Y ))25
Note that, as usual, weak resemblance can be defined in terms of strict and
equal resemblance:
(WR) WR(X,Y ) =df SR(X,Y ) ∨ ER(X,Y )
25See the first section of chapter 5 for the definition of identity in terms of ‘among’.
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But weak resemblance can be substituted for strict and equal resemblance
as our primitive comparative resemblance relation for matter of simplicity.
For we can define strict and equal resemblance in terms of weak resemblance
as follows:
(SR) SR(X,Y ) =df WR(X,Y ) & ¬WR(Y,X)
(ER) ER(X,Y ) =df WR(X,Y ) & WR(Y,X)
According to (SR), some things resemble each other more than some things
do if and only if the former resemble each other at least as much as the
latter do, while the latter do not resemble each other at least as much as
the former do. According to (ER), some things resemble each other as much
as other things do if and only if the former resemble each other at least as
much as the latter do, and the latter resemble each other at least as much
as the former do.
The proof of (SR) is as follows. Left-to-right : suppose that some things,
the xs, resemble each other more than some things, the ys, do, i.e. SR(X,Y ).
By (WR) it follows from SR(X,Y ) that WR(X,Y ). From SR(X,Y ) we de-
duce by (CR.1) that ¬SR(Y,X), and from (CR.4) that ¬ER(X,Y ), and thus
by (CR.2) we obtain ¬ER(Y,X). So by classical logic we get ¬(SR(Y,X) ∨
ER(Y,X)) which by (WR) gives ¬WR(Y,X). Right-to-left : suppose that
the xs resemble each other at least as much as the ys do and that the ys
do not resemble each other at least as much as the xs do. By (WR) it
follows from WR(X,Y ) that either SR(X,Y ) or ER(X,Y ). By the same
definition ¬WR(Y,X) yields ¬SR(Y,X) and ¬ER(Y,X) which by (5.2) gives
¬ER(X,Y ), and thence we obtain SR(X,Y ).
(ER) can be proved as follows. Left-to-right : suppose that some things,
the xs, resemble each other as much as some things, the ys, do; that is
ER(X,Y ). ER(X,Y ) and (WR) give WR(X,Y ). By (CR.2) we get ER(Y,X),
thence the conclusion by (WR). Right-to-left : suppose that the xs resemble
each other at least as much as the ys do, and vice versa. By (WR) it follows
from WR(X,Y ) & WR(Y,X) that SR(X,Y ) ∨ ER(X,Y ) and SR(Y,X) ∨
ER(Y,X). By (CR.2) we obtain SR(Y,X) ∨ ER(X,Y ). By (CR.1) it is not
true that both SR(X,Y ) and SR(Y,X), and by (CR.4) it is neither true that
both SR(X,Y ) and ER(X,Y ) nor that both SR(Y,X) and ER(Y,X). Given
that ER(X,Y ) entails ER(Y,X) and vice versa, we conclude that ER(X,Y ).
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It directly follows from definition (SR) that weak resemblance is non-
symmetrical. And from (ER) and (CR.3) it follows that WR is a reflexive
relation. Reflexivity of weak resemblance is stated thus:
(CR.6) ` ∀X WR(X,X)
A.2 Connectedness
(CR.7) ` ∀X,Y (WR(X,Y ) ∨ WR(Y,X))26
(CR.7) expresses that weak resemblance is connected. As we will see later on,
the assumption of connectedness is necessary if we expect to define degrees
of resemblance in terms of weak resemblance.
In many everyday situations, however, we do not have, and do not need,
connected resemblances. Suppose that the As and the Bs are of very dis-
tinct types. Imagine, for instance, that the As are some dogs and that the
Bs are some abstract entities, e.g. some sets. No matter how much these
dogs resemble each other and how much these sets resemble each other, it
seems that asking whether these dogs are more or less similar to each other
than these sets are is in most contexts asking a non-answerable question. In
such contexts, we would agree that sets and dogs are incomparable. Like-
wise, asking whether my cats resemble each other at least as much as my
screwdrivers do does not seem to have any definite answers.
Failures of connectedness of comparative similarity happen when the
compared items have a similarity value but when their similarity values are
obtained from wholly distinct similarity scales.
A.3 Symmetry of resemblance
In comparative terms symmetry of resemblance is to be understood as the
proposition that for any x and y, x resembles y at least as much as y resem-
bles x. Stated in terms of Williamson’s relation T , the property of symmetry
of resemblance is represented as follows (Williamson 1988):
(T5) ` ∀x, y T (x, y, y, x)
26See Lewis’s condition 2 on (centered) comparative similarity systems in (Lewis 1973,
92) and Williamson’s axiom (T1) in (Williamson 1988). Williamson (1988) agrees that
connectedness should be assumed by the most useful theories of similarity.
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This property is not trivial when stated in terms of T since Tversky and
Lewis have objected against it.27 However, this property of symmetry turns
out trivial when expressed in terms of WR:
(CR.8) ` ∀x, y WR(bx, ye, by, xe)
The reason why (CR.8) is trivial is that bx, ye and by, xe are one and the
same term in virtue of the fact that the brackets ‘b’ and ‘e’ do not introduce
any ordering just as the word ‘and’ in “x and y resemble each other” does
not introduce any ordering between x and y. In other words, (CR.8) is an
instance of reflexivity of weak resemblance (CR.6). I already undermined
the doubts cast on the symmetry assumption in chapter 3 and will thus
assume that (CR.8) and (T5) are equivalent.
The following sequent also seems to be valid:
(CR.9) ` ∀w, x, y, z (w = x & y = z → WR(bx, ye, bz, we))
For from the antecedent of (CR.9) and by (CR.7) it clearly follows that
WR(bx, ye, bw, ze). And since bw, ze = bz, we (since ‘w and z’ has the same
denotation as ‘z and w’), we obtain the conclusion.
A.4 Transitivity of comparative resemblance
A.4.1 Properties of transitivity
One important logical property of comparative resemblance is the following:
(CR.10a) ` ∀X,Y, Z (WR(X,Y ) & WR(Y,Z) → WR(X,Z))
(CR.10a) states that no matter what some things, the xs, the ys, and the zs,
are, if the xs resemble each other at least as much as the ys do and the ys
resemble each other at least as much as the zs do, then the xs resemble each
other at least as much as the zs do; hence, it states that weak resemblance
is transitive.
The corresponding properties of the other two relations are defined anal-
ogously:
(CR.10b) ` ∀X,Y, Z (SR(X,Y ) & SR(Y,Z) → SR(X,Z))
27Cf. Section 2 of chapter 3.
226 Appendix
(CR.10c) ` ∀X,Y, Z (ER(X,Y ) & ER(Y,Z) → ER(X,Z))
We will call quasi-transitive any weak resemblance relation WR such that its
strict part – that is such that SR is defined in terms of WR – is transitive.
‘Mixed’ transitivity properties of comparative resemblance can also be
defined. The most important of these are:
(CR.11) ` ∀X,Y, Z (ER(X,Y ) & SR(Y, Z) → SR(X,Z))
(CR.12) ` ∀X,Y, Z (SR(X,Y ) & ER(Y, Z) → SR(X,Z))
These properties are logically related because we can prove that if WR sat-
isfies (CR.10a) then (CR.10b)-(CR.12) are valid:
That (CR.10c) follows from (CR.10a) can be proved as follows: by (ER)
the antecedent of (CR.10c) yields WR(X,Y ) and WR(Y, Z). Then WR(X,Z)
follows by (CR.10a). Similarly, by (CR.2) we obtain, from the antecedent
of (CR.10c), ER(Z, Y ) and ER(Y,X) so that by (ER) we get WR(Z, Y ) and
WR(Y,X) which entail WR(Z,X) by (CR.10a). Hence, we get WR(X,Z)
and WR(Z,X), this conjunction being by (ER) equivalent to ER(X,Z).
The proof that (CR.10a) entails both (CR.10b) and (CR.11) is as follows:
by (SR) the antecedent of (CR.10b) yields WR(X,Y ) and WR(Y,Z) which
by (CR.10a) yield WR(X,Z). Suppose that SR(X,Z) is not the case; it
then follows from WR(X,Z) that ER(X,Z) from which, by symmetry of
equal resemblance and (ER), it follows that WR(Z,X). From this result and
WR(X,Y ) we obtain WR(Z, Y ) by (CR.10a). Yet WR(Z, Y ) contradicts
SR(Y, Z). It follows from this contradiction that SR(X,Z).
Finally the proof of (CR.12) runs as follows: by (SR) and (ER) it follows
from the antecedent of (CR.12) that WR(X,Y ) and WR(Y, Z) from which
WR(X,Z) follows by (CR.10a). Suppose now that SR(X,Z) is not the case;
it then follows from WR(X,Z) that ER(X,Z) so that by (CR.2) and (ER)
we get WR(Z,X). From this result and WR(Y,Z), we obtain WR(Y,X) by
transitivity of weak resemblance, contrary to SR(X,Y ). It follows from this
contradiction that SR(X,Z).
A.4.2 Derived properties
If we assume that weak resemblance is both connected and transitive, then
important derived properties follow. For instance, the following property,
called virtual connectivity (Hansson 2001, 327), is one such derived property:
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(CR.13) ` ∀X,Y, Z (SR(X,Z) → SR(X,Y ) ∨ SR(Y, Z))
(CR.13) tells us that no matter what the xs, the ys, and the zs are, if the xs
resemble each other more than the zs do, then either the xs resemble each
other more than the ys do or the ys resemble each other more than the zs
do. The proof of (CR.13) runs as follows:
∀X,Y, Z (SR(X,Z) → SR(X,Y ) ∨ SR(Y,Z))
iff 2: ∀X,Y, Z (SR(X,Z) → ¬(¬SR(X,Y ) & ¬SR(Y,Z)))
iff 3: ∀X,Y, Z (SR(X,Z) → ¬(WR(Y,X) ∨ WR(Z, Y )))
iff 4: ∀X,Y, Z ¬(SR(X,Z) & WR(Y,X) & WR(Z, Y ))
iff 5: ∀X,Y, Z ¬(WR(Z, Y ) & WR(Y,X) & SR(X,Z))
iff 6: ∀X,Z ¬(WR(Z,X) & SR(X,Z))
iff 7: ∀X,Z (SR(X,Z) → ¬WR(Z,X))
Step 2 follows by De Morgan’s Law. Step 3 follows from connectedness
in that if weak resemblance is connected, then ¬SR(X,Y ) is equivalent to
WR(Y,X).28 Step 4 and 5 follow by elementary logic. Step 6 follows by
transitivity of weak resemblance, step 7 by elementary logic. The conclusion
7 is a direct consequence of (SR) since (SR) tells us that SR(X,Z) implies
WR(X,Z) & ¬WR(Z,X). Thence 7 is to be admitted if (SR) is. Since
we have proved by (CR.11a) and connectedness that (CR.13) is equivalent
to the obvious 7, (CR.13) is valid provided (CR.10a) and connectedness of
weak resemblance are.
The following important property of semi-transitivity also follows if weak
resemblance is transitive and connected:
(CR.14) ` ∀W,X, Y, Z (SR(X,Y ) & SR(Y, Z) → SR(X,W ) ∨ SR(W,Z))
28Here is the proof that, given connectedness of weak resemblance, ¬SR(X,Y ) is equiv-
alent to WR(Y,X): left-to-right if ¬SR(X,Y ), it follows from (SR) that ¬(WR(X,Y ) &
¬WR(Y,X)), which by elementary logic entails ¬WR(X,Y ) ∨ WR(Y,X). Since by con-
nectedness we have WR(X,Y ) ∨ WR(Y,X), it follows by elementary logic that WR(Y,X).
right-to-left if WR(Y,X), then either SR(Y,X) or ER(Y,X). If SR(Y,X), it follows by
(CR.1) (i.e. asymmetry of strict resemblance) that ¬SR(X,Y ). If ER(Y,X), then by
(CR.2) we get ER(X,Y ) which by (CR.4) yields ¬SR(X,Y ). Thence ¬SR(X,Y ).
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(CR.14) tells us that no matter what the ws, the xs, the ys and the zs are,
if the xs resemble each other more than the ys do and the ys resemble each
other more than the zs do, then either the xs resemble each other more than
the ws do or the ws resemble each other more than the zs do. The proof of
(CR.14) parallels that of (CR.13) and runs as follows:
∀W,X, Y, Z (SR(X,Y ) & SR(Y, Z) → SR(X,W ) ∨ SR(W,Z))
iff 2: ∀W,X,Z (SR(X,Z) → ¬(¬SR(X,W ) & ¬SR(W,Z)))
iff 3: ∀W,X,Z (SR(X,Z) → ¬(WR(W,X) & WR(Z,W )))
iff 4: ∀W,X,Z ¬(SR(X,Z) & WR(W,X) & WR(Z,W ))
iff 5: ∀W,X,Z ¬(WR(Z,W ) & WR(W,X) & SR(X,Z))
iff 6: ∀X,Z ¬(WR(Z,X) & SR(X,Z))
iff 7: ∀X,Z (SR(X,Z) → ¬WR(Z,X))
Step 2 follows from (CR.14) by elementary logic and transitivity of strict
resemblance and thus by transitivity of weak resemblance, given (SR). Step
3 follows by connectedness of weak resemblance and elementary logic. Steps
4 and 5 follow by elementary logic. Step 6 follows by (CR.10a) and step
7 by elementary logic. Since 7 is uncontroversial by (SR). (CR.14) is valid
given transitivity and connectedness of weak resemblance.
Finally, I state the following property of weak resemblance, called Inter-
val Order :
(CR.15) ` ∀W,X, Y, Z (SR(W,X) & SR(Y, Z) → SR(W,Z) ∨ SR(Y,X))
(CR.15) tells us that no matter what the ws, the xs, the ys, and the zs are,
if the ws resemble each other more than the xs do and the ys resemble each
other more than the zs do, then either the ws resemble each other more
than the zs do or the ys resemble each other more than the xs do. Consider
the following equivalences:
∀W,X, Y, Z (SR(W,X) & SR(Y,Z) → SR(W,Z) ∨ SR(Y,X))
iff 2: ∀W,X, Y, Z (SR(W,X) & SR(Y, Z) → ¬(WR(Z,W ) & WR(X,Y )))
iff 3: ∀W,X, Y, Z ¬(SR(W,X) & SR(Y,Z) & WR(Z,W ) & WR(X,Y ))
Appendix 229
iff 4: ∀W,X, Y, Z ¬(WR(Z,W ) & SR(W,X) & WR(X,Y ) & SR(Y, Z))
Step 2 follows from (CR.15) by connectedness and elementary logic. Step 3
and 4 follow by elementary logic. Then, if transitivity of weak resemblance
is assumed, 4. is a valid sequent. For suppose that there are some ws, some
xs, some ys, and some zs such that WR(Z,W ) & SR(W,X) & WR(X,Y )
& SR(Y,Z). From WR(Z,W ) it follows by (SR) and (ER) that ER(Z,W )
∨ SR(Z,W ). From (ER(Z,W ) ∨ SR(Z,W )) and SR(W,X) it follows that
SR(Z,X) by (CR.10c) and (CR.11). From WR(X,Y ) it follows by (SR)
and (ER) that ER(X,Y ) ∨ SR(X,Y ). From (ER(X,Y ) ∨ SR(X,Y )) and
SR(Y,Z), it follows that SR(X,Z) by (CR.10c) and (CR.11). So we get
(SR(Z,X) & SR(X,Z)) which contradicts asymmetry of strict resemblance.
Step 4, and thence (CR.15), are valid given transitivity of weak resemblance,
connectedness of weak resemblance and the uncontroversial (CR.1).
A.4.3 An apparent failure of the transitivity of comparative
resemblance
Should transitivity of weak resemblance hold? Consider Sam, a European
client of a travel bureau. Sam is facing a dilemma. He is hesitating whether
he will spend his next holidays in San Francisco, Los Angeles, or Montreal.
Sam spent his last holidays in Seattle and really enjoyed the place. What
Sam particularly appreciated during his journey in Seattle was the landscape
surrounding the agglomeration, its public transportation system, and its
architecture. Sam asks an agent of the travel bureau to help him to make a
decision for the destination of his next holidays.
Given Sam’s preferences, the agent of the travel bureau proceeds as
follows to determine which of San Francisco, Los Angeles and Montreal is
the best destination for Sam’s holidays. She collects information in order
to decide which one of the three cities is the most similar to Seattle in each
relevant resemblance respect. She expects that in each of the three respects
– architecture, surrounding landscape, and public transportation system –
one of the three cities is more similar to Seattle than the other cities are.
Finally, she uses the following additive criterion to determine whether one
city is more similar to Seattle than another is:
(C) City x resembles Seattle more than city y does if and only
if the number of relevant respects in which x resembles Seattle
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more than y does is greater than the number of relevant respects
in which y resembles Seattle more than x does.
The agent assumes that by using this method she will be able to determine
which one of the three cities is the most similar to Seattle given the features
that are important for Sam and thus that she will be able to determine
which destination Sam will prefer.
Suppose now (i) that – according to the data the agent has collected
on Seattle, San Francisco, Los Angeles, and Montreal –, San Francisco and
Seattle are more similar in architecture than Seattle and Los Angeles are,
and that Los Angeles and Seattle are more similar in architecture than
Montreal and Seattle are; (ii) with respect to the surrounding landscape,
Montreal is more similar to Seattle than San Francisco is, and San Francisco
is more similar to Seattle than Los Angeles is; finally (iii), with respect to the
public transportation system, Los Angeles is more similar to Seattle than is
Montreal, but Montreal is more similar to Seattle than San Francisco is.
Given her criterion (C), the agent of the travel bureau obtains the fol-
lowing ordering: San Francisco resembles Seattle more than Los Angeles
does (architecture and landscape vs. transportation system); Los Angeles
resembles Seattle more than Montreal does (architecture and transporta-
tion system vs. landscape), but Montreal resembles Seattle more than San
Francisco does (landscape and transportation system vs architecture).29
Given the combination of similarity respects used by the agent of the
travel bureau, we get an intransitive instance of the binary relation ‘x re-
sembles Seattle more than y does’. It should not be concluded from this
result that the agent of the travel bureau is irrational when judging that
San Francisco is more similar (in the relevant respects) to Seattle than Los
Angeles is, that Los Angeles is more similar (in the relevant respects) to
Seattle than Montreal is, and that Montreal is more similar (in the relevant
respects) to Seattle than San Francisco is. For no rationality constraint is
violated by the agent during her evaluation of the relative similarity of the
three cities to Seattle.
Let us call a resemblance cycle any violation of the transitivity of weak
resemblance. The controversial cycles are those that contain at least one
29This is an adaptation of Condorcet’s paradox to relations of comparative similarity
first proposed by Williamson in (Williamson 1988, 463).
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instance of SR. All SR-containing cycles contradict transitivity of weak re-
semblance.
A.5 Exact resemblance as maximal resemblance
Consider the following property:
(CR.16) ` ∀x, Y WR(x, Y )
What (CR.16) expresses is that no matter what certain things are, anything
resembles itself at least as much as they do. If we aim to define a distance
function of degree of resemblance in terms of WR, (CR.16) must be assumed.
For necessarily, the distance from something to itself is at least as small as
the distance between (distinct) objects.
(CR.16) seems invalid given some measure of resemblance. For instance,
Rodriguez-Pereyra’s (D)30 entails the following:
(D′) w and x resemble each other more than y and z do if and only if m>n,
where m is the number of sparse properties common to w and x and
n is the number of sparse properties common to y and z.
(CR.16) and (D′) are incompatible given that the number of sparse prop-
erties shared by two objects may exceed the number of sparse properties
had by one object. However, (D′) is not a definition of overall comparative
resemblance but of some focused comparative resemblance, and therefore
fails to invalidate (CR.16) which is conceived of as a principle concerning
overall comparative resemblance.31
30Cf. section 6.1.4 on (D).
31In order to see that the notion of comparative resemblance defined in (D′) is a focused
one, suppose that w and x instantiate each three sparse properties and share all of them
in such a way that w and x are exactly similar. Now suppose that y and z instantiate each
eight sparse properties and share five of them. An obvious consequence of (D) is that y
and z resemble each other more than w and x which are exactly similar. If (D′) were a
definition of overall comparative resemblance, then it would follow from the previous result
that w and x differ from each other more than y and z do. But this clearly is not the case
since w and x differ in no respect, while y and z differ in several respects. Therefore, the
inference from “the As resemble each other more than the Bs do” to “the Bs differ from
each other more than the As do” is invalid for the comparative resemblance introduced by
(D′). From which it follows that (D′) is not a definition of overall comparative resemblance.
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(CR.16) is clearly valid when understood as a principle of overall com-
parative resemblance. For any failure of (CR.16) would be such that some
things resemble each other more than something resembles itself, which, if
comparative resemblance is understood as overall, is equivalent to the claim
that something differs from itself more that some things differ from each
other. The latter, however, is implausible.
A.6 Exactly resembling objects and monotonicity
of resemblance
The following principle is analogous to the Principle of Identity of Indis-
cernibles and may be called the principle of identity of exactly similars
(Assuming that some things are exactly similar iff they are as similar as
something is to itself):
(CR.17) ` ∀w,X (WR(X,w) → ∀Y,Z (YAX & ZAX → Y = Z))
(CR.17) states that no matter what the xs are, if the xs resemble each other
at least as much as anything resembles itself, then for any ys and any zs
that are among the xs, the ys are identical to the zs. Anyone who denies
the principle of Identity of Indiscernibles must deny (CR.17). (CR.17),
however, is a very useful property of resemblance in that it has traditionally
been maintained that, in order to define a function of degree of resemblance
in terms of a metric, (CR.17) must be assumed.
As Williamson (1988, 463) suggests, it is possible to recover the advan-
tages of the assumption of (CR.17) by means of a less controversial property
of weak resemblance which is:
(CR.18) ` ∀X, y (WR(bX, ye, y) → ∀Z WR(bX,Ze, by, Ze))32
(CR.18) states that no matter what some things, the xs, are and for all y,
if the xs resemble y at least as much as y resembles itself, then, no matter
what some things, the zs, are, the xs and the zs resemble each other at least
as much as y resembles the zs. This property of weak resemblance might be
called monotonicity.
32Compare with Williamson’s axiom T6 in (Williamson 1988).
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A.7 Representing degrees of resemblance
Judgements of comparative resemblance can often be interpreted as ascrip-
tions of degrees of resemblance. “The As resemble each other more than
the Bs do” can be interpreted as “the degree to which the As resemble
each other is greater than the degree to which the Bs resemble each other”,
and “the As resemble each other as much as the Bs resemble each other”
can be interpreted as stating that the degree to which the As resemble is
equal to the degree to which the Bs resemble. Degrees of resemblance, we
may assume, can be adequately represented in numerical terms. Let D be
a unary function that assigns a real number to each element of a domain of
relata. We can then construct a model of comparative resemblance in terms
of postulates as follows: (< being the set of real numbers.)
Let our similarity ordering be such that it contains a countable number
of similarity values, i.e. a countable domain of locations in the ordering.
Then the following conditions are equivalent:
• WR satisfies connectedness and transitivity.
• There is a unary distance function D from our domain of objects to <
such that WR(X,Y ) iff D(X) ≤ D(Y ).33
Postulating that the number of ordered objects in our similarity ordering
is countable and postulating connectedness and transitivity, the relation ≤
filled by degrees of resemblance is a total ordering.34 Then we can define the
real-valued function D of degree of resemblance as the function satisfying
the three following criteria (where 0 is absence of difference, and thus the
maximal degree of resemblance):
(D1) D(X) ≥ 0;
(D2) D(X) = 0 → ((YAX & ZAX) → Y = Z);
(D3) D(bX,Ze) ≤ D(bX,Y e) + D(bY,Ze).
(D1) follows from (CR.16), (D2) follows from (CR.17), and (D3) is the
plural substitute for triangle inequality which follows from (CR.13), i.e.
33The proof is a plural adaptation of the general proof proposed in (Roberts 1979,
109-10).
34See (Williamson 1988, 458-9) about similarity orderings such that the number of
ordered objects exceeds the cardinality of the reals.
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virtual connectivity. (D3) is to be read “the degree to which the x s and the
z s resemble is at least as great as the degree to which the x s and the ys
resemble added to the degree to which the ys and the z s resemble.”
We can by means of the unary real function D define a real-valued binary
function d that takes only singular terms as arguments. Such a binary
function d is what is generally called a metric function. d is a metric function
of resemblance if and only if it satisfies the following definition:
(Metric) d(w,x ) ≤ d(y,z ) iff D(bw, xe) ≤ D(by, ze)
The following standard constraints that define a metric follow from our
definition of a metric, conditions (D1)-(D3), and the trivial (CR.8):
(M1) d(x, y) ≥ 0;
(M2) d(x, y) = 0 iff x = y;
(M3) d(x, y) = d(y, x);
(M4) d(x, z) ≤ d(x, y) + d(y, z).35
Hence, it seems that by postulating connectedness and transitivity we can
define a metric function of resemblance in terms of WR and thus in terms
of a binary plural comparative resemblance predicate.
A.8 Axiomatic for non-comparative resemblance
This section is devoted to the connection between comparative resemblance
relations and the major types of non-comparative resemblance properties we
discussed in the dissertation. As we will see, we can provide an axiomatic
definition of the non-comparative resemblance properties in terms of the
comparative properties.
There are four main pairs of non-comparative properties of resemblance
and difference: strong minimal resemblance and weak minimal difference;
weak minimal resemblance and strong minimal difference; exact resemblance
and difference; overall resemblance and difference. There are properties in-
volving comparative resemblance that some of these pairs satisfy and others
do not satisfy. Let R and D be an arbitrary pair of non-comparative resem-
blance properties. We can introduce these important properties as follows:
35See, for instance (Beals et al. 1968).
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(Positivity) ∀X,Y (WR(X,Y ) & R(Y ) → R(X))
(Negativity) ∀X,Y (WR(X,Y ) & D(X) → D(Y ))
(Closeness) ∀X,Y (SR(X,Y ) → R(X) ∨ D(Y ))
(Excluded neutral) ∀X,Y (WR(X,Y ) → R(X) ∨ D(X))
(Maximal value) ∀X(R(X) → ¬∃Y SR(Y,X))
(Minimal value) ∀X(D(X) → ¬∃Y SR(X,Y ))
In what follows I consider which of these principles are satisfied by the
various pairs of non-comparative resemblance and difference properties.
A.8.1 Axioms for strong minimal resemblance and weak min-
imal difference
Let us interpret minimal resemblance as strong and minimal difference as
weak so that the resemblance of properties gets out of the picture. Which of
the above listed properties is satisfied by the pair strong minimal resemblance-
weak minimal difference?
Is (Positivity) valid for this pair? I think it is not. Assume that the As
resemble each other at least as much as the Bs do, that the Bs strongly
minimally resemble each other, and that the As fail to strongly minimally
resemble each other. If the Bs strongly minimally resemble each other, they
share some elected property. If the As do not strongly minimally resemble
each other, they share no elected property. Yet the As may be such that
they inexactly, but closely, resemble each other in many very important
respects, while the Bs resemble in only one relatively less important resem-
blance respect but exactly resemble in this respect. In this case we may, and
plausibly would, agree that the As resemble each other more than the Bs
do. Yet the Bs strongly minimally resemble each other, whereas the As do
not strongly minimally resemble each other; which means that (Positivity)
may fail for strong minimal resemblance.
Is (Negativity) valid for weak minimal difference? It clearly is. If the
As resemble each other at least as much as the Bs do and if the As weakly
minimally differ from each other, i.e. are such that some of them has an
elected property that some of them lacks, then the Bs weakly minimally
differ from each other. For otherwise the Bs, contrary to the As, would
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resemble each other exactly which is impossible since things that are not
exactly similar to each other cannot resemble each other at least as much
as exactly similar things.
(Closeness) is valid for the pair strong minimal resemblance-weak mini-
mal difference. For suppose the As resemble each other more than do the Bs
and suppose that the As fail to be strongly minimally similar to each other.
In this case the As are not exactly similar. Suppose now that the Bs fail to
weakly minimally differ from each other. This means that the Bs are exactly
similar. If so and given that things that are not exactly similar cannot be
more similar to each other than things that are, the As are not more similar
to each other than the Bs are; which contradicts the hypothesis.
(Excluded neutral) also is satisfied by this pair of resemblance prop-
erties. For if the As fail to strongly minimally resemble each other, they
clearly weakly minimally differ from each other, and if the As fail to weakly
minimally differ from each other, they strongly minimally resemble each
other.
(Maximal value) clearly is not satisfied by strong minimal resemblance.
That the As strongly minimally resemble each other is not sufficient for
them to be such that there are no things more similar to each other than
the As are.
(Minimal value) is not satisfied by weak minimal difference for the same
reason. The As can be weakly minimally different from each other and be
very similar to each other. In which case the As can be more similar to each
other than some other things are.
We get the following axioms for the pair strong minimal resemblance-
weak minimal difference:
(NegativityDWM ) ∀X,Y (WR(X,Y ) & DWM (X) → DWM (Y ))
(ClosenessRSM−DWM ) ∀X,Y (SR(X,Y ) → RSM (X) ∨ DWM (Y ))
(Excluded neutralRSM−DWM ) ∀X,Y (WR(X,Y )→ RSM (X) ∨ DWM (X))
A.8.2 Axioms for weak minimal resemblance and strong min-
imal difference
When we interpret minimal resemblance weakly, inexact but close resem-
blance in some respect suffices for there to be a resemblance between some
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things. If we interpret minimal difference strongly, that some elected prop-
erty had by one of the As is not shared by all of the As is not sufficient for
the As to minimally differ from each other. For, in order to strongly mini-
mally differ from each other, the As must also be such that there is a series
of elected properties such that each of the As has one of them, such that
these elected properties are ordered on a same relevant similarity ordering,
and such that they do not resemble each other according to this similarity
ordering. Which of our principles are satisfied by this pair of resemblance
and difference properties?
Given what we said about (Positivity) and strong minimal resemblance
in the previous subsection, it should be clear that (Positivity) is valid for
weak minimal resemblance. If the As resemble each other at least as much
as the Bs do, and the Bs resemble – exactly or not – in some respect, then
the As resemble – exactly or not – in some respect.
Is (Negativity) satisfied by strong minimal difference? I think it is. If
the As resemble each other at least as much as the Bs do and the As differ
in some respect, i.e. are such that there is a relevant similaritiy ordering on
which properties of the As are ordered but not closely ordered, then the Bs
must differ in some respect. For suppose they do not. This means that either
the Bs exactly resemble each other or that they resemble in every respect
but imperfectly in some respect. In both cases, the Bs would resemble each
other more than the As do, contrary to the hypothesis.
(Closeness) is clearly valid for this pair. For suppose that the As resemble
each other more than the Bs do. Then suppose that the As fail to weakly
minimally resemble each other. The latter means that the As are exactly
different. There is no way exactly different things can resemble each other
more than some other things do. Therefore, if the As resemble more than
the Bs do, the As weakly minimally resemble each other.
(Excluded neutral) is also valid for this pair. If the As fail to strongly
minimally differ from each other, then either they share all their elected
properties, or they at least resemble in every respect, though imperfectly in
some respect. In both cases, they weakly minimally resemble each other.
(Maximal value) is not satisfied by weak minimal resemblance for obvious
reasons. (Minimal value) is not satisfied by strong minimal difference for
obvious reasons.
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Therefore, we get the following axioms for the pair weak minimal resemb-
lance-strong minimal difference:
(PositivityRWM ) ∀X,Y (WR(X,Y ) & RWM (Y ) → RWM (X))
(NegativityDSM ) ∀X,Y (WR(X,Y ) & DSM (X) → DSM (Y ))
(ClosenessRWM−DSM ) ∀X,Y (SR(X,Y ) → RWM (X) ∨ DSM (Y ))
(Excluded neutralRWM−DSM ) ∀X,Y (WR(X,Y )→ RWM (X) ∨ DSM (X))
A.8.3 Axioms for exact resemblance and exact difference
Consider the pair exact resemblance-exact difference now. Does exact re-
semblance satisfy (Positivity)? It clearly does. If the Bs are exactly similar
to each other while the As are not, the Bs are more similar to each other
than the As are. So (Positivity) is valid for exact similarity.36 (Negativity)
is also clearly valid for exact difference. If the Bs do not differ exactly while
the As differ exactly, then the Bs resemble each other more than the As do
so that the As do not resemble each other at least as much as the Bs do.
(Closeness) is clearly not satisfied by the pair exact resemblance-exact
difference. For it is possible that the As resemble each other more than
the Bs do, that the As weakly minimally differ from each other, and that
the Bs strongly minimally resemble each other. If the As weakly minimally
differ from each other, they do not resemble exactly. And if the Bs strongly
minimally resemble each other, they do not differ exactly. Likewise, (Ex-
cluded neutral) is clearly not satisfied by the pair exact resemblance-exact
difference. The As can be at least as similar to each other as the Bs are
and be such that they fail to exactly resemble each other and fail to exactly
differ from each other.
(Maximal value) is valid for exact resemblance, as exact resemblance,
if comparative resemblance is overall, is the maximum of resemblance. No
resemblance exceeds exact resemblance. Likewise, (Minimal value) is valid
for exact difference. There is no greater difference than exact difference.
We thus get the following axioms for exact resemblance and difference:
36It should be noticed that (Positivity) is not valid for exact resemblance if we assume
Rodriguez-Pereyra’s measure for degrees of resemblance (D). But as I said in section 5 of
this appendix, (D) is not a measure for degrees of overall resemblance, but only for degrees
of focused resemblance. So if one assumes that WR is interpreted as overall comparative
resemblance in (Positivity), (D) is irrelevant here.
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(PositivityRE) ∀X,Y (WR(X,Y ) & RE(Y ) → RE(X))
(NegativityDE) ∀X,Y (WR(X,Y ) & DE(X) → DE(Y ))
(Maximal valueRE) ∀X(RE(X) → ¬∃Y SR(Y,X))
(Minimal valueDE) ∀X(DE(X) → ¬∃Y SR(X,Y ))
A.8.4 Axioms for overall resemblance and overall difference
Finally, we will consider which of the above listed properties hold for overall
resemblance. By considering which of these properties hold here, we shall
pay attention to keep the standard for typicality of resemblance fixed.
(Positivity) is clearly valid for overall resemblance. If the As resemble
each other at least as much as the Bs do, it cannot be the case that the
Bs resemble each other saliently more than is typical, while the As do not.
Likewise, (Negativity) is valid for overall difference. If the As resemble each
other at least as much as the Bs do, it cannot be the case that the As differ
saliently more than is typical, while the Bs do not differ saliently more than
is typical.
(Closeness) seems to me valid for the pair overall resemblance-overall
difference. For suppose it is neither the case that the As resemble overall
nor the case that the Bs differ overall. This means that either (i) both
the As and the Bs are neutrally similar, (ii) the As differ overall and the
Bs resemble overall, (iii) the As are neutrally similar and the Bs resemble
overall, or (iv) the As differ overall and the Bs are neutrally similar. If either
of (ii)-(iv) is true, then the Bs resemble each other at least as much as the
As do. If (i) is true, I think we will agree that the As and the Bs resemble
equally. In every case, it is false that the As resemble each other more than
the Bs do. Therefore, (Closeness) is valid for this pair.
(Excluded neutral) is not valid for overall resemblance and difference.
For precisely, the As can be neutrally similar and resemble each other at
least as much as some other things do.
(Maximal value) is invalid for overall resemblance for obvious reasons:
in many contexts, overall resemblance is not the maximal amount of resem-
blance. Likewise, (Minimal value) can fail for overall difference.
We therefore obtain the following axioms for overall resemblance and
difference:
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(PositivityRO) ∀X,Y (WR(X,Y ) & RO(Y ) → RO(X))
(NegativityDO) ∀X,Y (WR(X,Y ) & DO(X) → DO(Y ))
(ClosenessRO−DO) ∀X,Y (SR(X,Y ) → RO(X) ∨ DO(Y ))
I restate the results of this section in the following table (where ‘+’ means
that the property is satisfied by the pair and ‘-’ means that it is not):
Properties of non-comparative resemblances
RSM RWM RE RO
and DWM and DSM and DE and DO
(Positivity) - + + +
(Negativity) + + + +
(Closeness) + + - +
(Excluded Neutral) + + - -
(Maximal value) - - + -
(Minimal value) - - + -
These axioms should be added to the properties of the various resemblance
and difference properties displayed in chapter 5 to get a full logic for non-
comparative resemblance properties.
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